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CHAPTgR I 
INTRODDCTIO* 
I 
The repg&llee of Syria and Lebanon ara looated at the 
eastern end of the Madl tarraxwan Sea in the area generally 
termed the Levant. Today, both eowxtriea are separate, 
eontigtioaa, sovereign states, Syrian Independenoe was 
proolalmed in the name of the Allies in Damaaaue on 27 Sep-
tmber 1941, by General Oatrouz, Coaimnder-in-Ghief of the 
1 
free French forces. Wbanon «a# proelaimad iadepeadedt 
2 
under the aame authority on 26 November 1941. The two 
proelamations, establishing de faeto Indapendenea for Syria 
and Lebanon, followed the twenty years of a Freneh mandate 
that had been authorized by the League of Nation# in 1920. 
Syria and Lebanon are "amell powera" in the family of 
nations. Neither state ia large geogrephioally. Lebanon, 
3 
containing 5&00 aquar# mi lea, approximates Connecticat 
1. "Proclamation of the Independence of Syria and Lebanon 
by General Catroux, 27 September 1941, at Damas," 
Bo tea. Doeumentairee et Ztndea. Ho. 74. Serie Interna-
lleiiàt». iëlb. *2. *-8. 
2* jyËi^â.*'• 9—10» 
3» The World Almanao and Book of Facts for 1950, yew York, 
p. 1%. 
g 
iû area; Syria, although @l#teem times larger than her 
4 
alater republle, hae an area of only *6,046 aquare mllaa 
and is about the alze of Illlnola, Syria and Lebanon can 
also be elaaalfla4 aa "amall poaara" In Induatrlal activi­
ty. Both eountrlaa are baaleally agrarian and have âevel-
oped only email aaale prodaetlon In the textile, match, 
oement, tobaeao, soap, an# olive oil Indaatrlaa# Tha 
aaaralty of large aaale 1aiastry la eaaentlally eaaaed by 
inadequate supplies of eaal, Iron, and oil; and even 
ahara deposits of am oh basic natural raaouroea are found, 
aa Is the Majarba iron and aaal region and the Belr-Izzor 
oil region, they have been little exploited. 
Daaauea of the aagllglbla amomt of natwal reaoixroaa 
and manafaetixrlmg, Syria and Lebanon are poor eountrlea* 
Their standards of living are low fcr their email popula­
tions. Syria hae S,006,08© people, of «ho» 8,624,5*9 are 
5 
Moslem* Lebanon, although smaller in total population, 
la larger in Christian population, fifty-five per aent of 
6 
the 1,829,545 people in Lebanon are Christian* Both 
Moslem and Christian populatlona lack the necessary labor 
skill vital to Indnatrlallaatlom, 
4. The Statesman*s Yearbook# Hew York, 1949, p. 1347. 
5. Ibid,, .1950, p. 1590. 
Ibid., p. 1390. 
s 
Beoause of this shortage of skilled labor, natural 
and ioduBtrial reaouroes, and neoeaaary capital, the 
Levantin* Dations are not great oompetitora in the trade 
market* of the world. In 1949, their total eiDorts mere 
valued at 111 million Syrian pound*; #hlle their import*, 
valued at 516 mlllioa Syrian pounds, *ere five time* a* 
7 
large# Im Amer lean dollars, export* were equivalent to 
$50,226,000 and import* equaled $293,485,000.8 
Therefore la *1%#$ population, natural resources, in* 
duatrial activity, trade, aad wealth Syria and Lebanon 
muet be eoasidered "mmall power*." However, the Levant 
etete* ere etrategioally Important "*mall power*," Be-
oau## of their location at the eastern end of the Mediter­
ranean, they are part of the indispenaable three-way bridge 
of the Hear East ©onneoting Europe, iaia, aad Africa, 
Syria and Lebanon play an important role with the rest of 
the Bear last a* guardian* of the ïastera Mediterranean# 
the Suez Canal, and Persian Gulf "which together form the 
g 
moat vital s®a route in world trade aad commerce." fur-
thermore, the Levant mtatea are adjacent to the richest 
7. Ibid., p. 1392. 
8. Moody's Manual of lavestaeats for 1951, lew York, 
ld6l, 1906-190%. (#*19148 Syrian pound* equal one 
United States dollar.) 
9. lliahu Ben-Horia, Toward Conetructive Democracy,* 
Probleas of the Middle last, Kew York University 
Comfereoee, 1947, p. ta. 
é 
petfoleum reserves In the eorld. And, although oil fields 
of eigaifioaaee have sot been developed, there la the pos-
10 
eibllity that future field* may be discovered. 
Today# Syria and Lebanon are crossed by tyo oil pipe* 
lines ruaaing from the oil flelda of Klrkuk, Iraq to the 
refineries of Tripoli, Lebanon. At present, another line 
is under eoaetrueticm. The Kirkuk oil fields and pipe lines 
are o#ned and eomtrolled by the Iraq Petroleum Company, a 
joint etoek enterprise omned by Iraqi, Dutch, Bn&lish, 
11 
freneh, Amerioan, mû G# S. Gulbenkiaa interests. Butch, 
Ameriaan, frenoh, and British private oompanie* each o*n 
23.75^ of the etook im the Iraq Petroleum Company, the re-
maining 5$ being owed by the C. 3. Gulbenkian private 
10, Imoyolooedia Americana. 1$48 edition, HVI. Ne* York, 
W45, p. 18:. 
11. Calouste Sarkis Gulbemk&am, one of the world*s 
wealthiest mem, was born in Istanbul, Turkey, 03 years 
ago. He is reportedly a desoeadent of Armenian Kings, 
an e%-Turkish rug peddler, and a laee merchant. 
Gulbenkian became a British mubjeot in 1902 and at* 
tended lings college In London. In 1911, he mangled 
oil eoncesslons for all of Iraq for Britain, Germany, 
and the Netherlands. In payment for these conaeeaions, 
the three governmmts gave Gulbenkian a 5# interest in 
Iraq oil eells. These interests in middle Eastern oil 
grant him royalties of 11,200,000 yearly, and have 
helped to make Gulbenkian worth between $200,000,000 
and #800,000,000 today. Little is knosn of Gulben­
kian* s personal life. He spends most of his time at 
the Hotel Avim in Lisbon, Portugal pursuing his hobby 
of collecting Middle festers art treasures. 
5 
12 
Inter*#*#. la addition to tb* t*o operatlng plpallae#, 
m third lice begios at tb# Baiyeeis, Iraq oil fields, 
croe##* Syria aad labaBon, ana terminât*# at the Sldon, 
Lab&aon reflaarl*#* Thla $&E5,000,000 Trana-Aieblan pipe­
line aztendB 1088 miles and hae been teraed the greatest 
13 
American eoaatruotlon projeot on foreign aoll. A line 
baa been propoaad to link the Knaalt, Iraq flelda alth the 
Tripoli refinery. Aa yet, eonatruetion he# not begun. 
II 
The Levant is not only Important to the Big Powers be-
eau#a of It# atrateglc location, oil pipelines, and poten­
tial natural raaonrcaa, Syria and Lebanon In the paat have 
been apbare# of cultural Influa nee for oartain foreign 
power®, eepeolally franaa, Franee has long elalmed to be 
the protector of Chrlatlan# in the area, such elaims, go-
lag baok aa far aa the Craaadaa. During the lUddle A&ea, 
frescfa trader# developed aommerelal relatione with the Le­
vant, and theae eommarolal aatlTltlea beoeme very important 
to frenae by the 18th and 19th aanturlea, French mission-
arlea, Preaoh culture, and the French language accompanied 
12. Bualnaaa Week, No. @95 (Sept. 25, 1940), p. 118. 
13. *a#a#eek IHVII, 15 (April 9, 1901), p. 55. 
14. Ibid., p. SS. 
6 
commerolel latereats# and aobool*» oburohes, aonasterleg, 
aod bo*plt@lG «ere built* 1th freaeb moaey. In 1850, 
Freae# Bent troopg to Tufklah-oontrollGd Syria to piotect 
th« tightg of th# Maro&lte Ourlgtlejia tMn beli^ uaorped 
by the Moslem*, framo* obtalaed an Importaat oonoasBion 
from tb% Ottoman goTerameat. A eeml^autOBomoug dlatrlet 
*a# *#t up oDder th# governorahlp of a Christian offlolal. 
*?reaoe thus had a traditional olalm to Maronite aympa-
15 
thlee." The PreDOh olala, brought about primarily thrcugh 
rellGloua, aaltural, and eooàomlo pénétration, paia dlvl-
dend# at the San Semo Gonfareno# in 1920 ehea France ae-
Gured a Glaes "A" Maadate over Syria and Lebanon. 
On beeoming the maadatory pomer, *?reaee aought to 
make use of the #*letlag paroehlal dlfferenoee mhloh la 
16 
thle area are uaueually profuee, efea for the gear Zaat." 
In 1920, the Freaeh goverameot proclaimed Ghrlatlan Leb-
aaon a aeparate state* thus eeparatln^ the Maronite oom-
mnaity in part fro# Moelem Syria# Lebanon rem»ioed under 
the mandate, and "franoh poliey *aa at once directed to* 
17 
*ard the permammt reteatlba of the provloeea." A large 
15. I. A. Spaieer, The Halted States and the Bear %a#t. 
Cambridge, Mas®,, l6*?, p. 85, 
16» Ibid # # p .• 64^* 
17. The gaeyolopedia Amerloana, p. 190. 
7 
army was sent loto the Levant, and a merle# of dis­
orders and reballlon# followed* The moat Important of swoh 
disorders was the revolt of the Jebal Dr we s in 1925. Al­
though the Drnaean revolt bagan as a rebellion again#t 
freach civilizing change# In the educational end eoonomic 
fields impomed by the frenoh admlnlatrator. Captain Carbll-
let, other revolts of the time mere initiated primarily by 
Arab matlonallatle groupa. Con#tant attempte ware made to 
drive the Freneh from the Levant, franee persistently re-
fuaed to eithdra* on the ground# that Syria and Lebanon 
were not ready for independenee. 
Im an endeavor to peelfy the nationalistic attitadee 
of the mixed population# In Syria and Lebanon, France 
granted a eonetltetion to Lebanon in 1986 and one to Syria 
18 
in 19SÔ* Although both const!tmtions set up unicameral 
legialaturee «ith popularly elected presidents» tM French 
High Ocmmiealoner retained the veto power over all legis­
lation, Syria and Lebanon were little more than admlni-
19 
strativf dletricte of French contml. The conetitution# 
were no panacea for the political, religloue, economic, and 
social ills of the Levantine states, and internal troubles 
of a nationalistic and religious sort continued. 
18. Speiser, op. cit.» p. 101. 
19. Ben-Horin, op. cjt., p. 81. 
6 
Syria anû Lebamoa repeatedly âeaaMtô the termination 
of the mandate and admiaalon to the League of Ration# as 
aovaralgn and independent states, France, always reluotant, 
finally agreed to negotiate treaties of peace, friendship, 
and alliance In 19M prior to the grant ing of actual inde-
pendenee. The treaty negotiated with Syria wa# concluded 
for a twenty*five year period and provided for the ua# by 
France of Syrian territory in time of war; the privilege to 
maintain troops for eight years to protect the right# of 
minorities in Latakla and J#b#l Drum; and the right to me# 
20 
two Syrian air field#. The treaty with Lebanon guaran­
teed to France the right to maintain troops within that Le-
vaot nation for twenty-five years. Both treaties pro­
vided for elo#e association of French and Syrian-Lebanese 
foreign pollaiea. Syria and Lebanon were to become fully 
Independent three years after the ratification of the 
treaties and were to be welcomed into the League of Ma-
tien». 
Keither of the treaties was ratified by the French 
parliament beeamme of the outspoken oppoeltlon of military 
go. Samuel Van Talîcenburg, Whose Promised land#?. Sew 
York, 1946, p# 56. 
mi. Ibid., p. 5ê, 
22. Ibia.. p. 56 
9 
25 
eommerolal, and eeolealastloal interests. These groupe 
oontecdea that Syria end Lebanon #ere not ready Inde* 
pendenoe end attacked the logie of eetabllahlng a unitary 
government in Syria. lor had the question of protection 
of siaortties been solved by the treaties. And, finally, 
objection* *ere raised because the treaties did not provide 
for ayrian^Lebaae»* repayment of French expenses incurred 
under the mandate. 
Certain nationalietle group* in 3yrla gladly aecepted 
the failure of the treaties because they wanted to unite 
Syria and Lebanon into a greater Syria; but, the coneeneue 
«a# one of increased hostility toeard Prance, Accompanied 
by etrikee and riots, theee rumbling# of natlonallem gre# 
in strength. Prance retaliated with more stringent govern­
mental decrees, and in 1939, the Syrian-L#baneee conetltu* 
tloas #ere suspended. 
•World War II provided a temporary, if tragic, solu-
Ê4 
tion of the Syrian-Lebanese problem." Anglo»Preneh foree# 
invaded the Levant in the eummer of 1941 to take security 
meaeure# against Hail penetration and Vichy collaboration 
in the region. Remnant# of the Angle-Preneh force# mere 
still is Syria and Lebanon #hen World War II ended In 1945* 
23, Speieer, op. cit., p. 101. 
24. Ben-Horln, op. cit.. p. 81. 
10 
Daring 1945, the Levantine statee made repeat## overturea 
to France and Great Britain requeetlng the evaouatlon of all 
foreign troop*. Becauae these requeet* went unheeded by 
the two Greet Powers» Syria and Lebanon brought the ques­
tion of the evaeuatiOD of Freneh and British troops to tW 
attention of the Security Goonoll in February 1048. 
11 
OUPTSB 1% 
m MimgrmmTH MSMim 
OF THE 8KDRITT GOmRII, 
The Ssnrlaa-Lshaa®»® »o*@all@d In th# Unltea 
Batloa# b@#ema# it ImfolvM th$ #Ya#m%lom of Fren# aM 
Britimh troops from Syrlm &aâ LeWmom, iras first brought 
before the 8###rity Gommoll at th# tio-hoar long mimetemith 
aaatiag at Chmreh Homae, Wamtmlmlmter* LoMoa, on 14 f«bru-
sry iMi. R#pr@@#m'tatlvea of th# permamamt membara—Ghina, 
Frasoa, the Union of Soviet Soeiallst Rapmbllaa, the United 
Kingdom, end the United State#—and of imatralia, Brazil, 
Igypt, Mexieo» The Matherlamda, end Poland eere prasent. 
I 
The meeting was eoavened by^the firat president of the 
Seottrity Goimoil* 1* J. 0* Kekin of Amatralia. After the 
1. Saearity Gomaoil. offieial meoorda: First Tear. Firat 
^iliaa. KO» I. nineteenth mZeting. ke# Yorm# limt p. mu 
Z, Sormaa Jdhm Oaaald »kla# the fir at preeident of the 
Seeurity Oommell # #ae bora on 31 Mar oh 1889. Mekla 
has long beea aaeoeiated vith Australian affairs of 
state. From 19®t-ltSÉ» he #aa Speaker of the House of 
Repreaaatatifas of the Commoaeealth of Aastrelia. la 
1*45, Makia eas Minister of Aircraft Produotioa. Since 
1046, Makia has beea ambassador to the Baited States 
and leader of the Amstmliaa délégation to the Securi­
ty Coaaeil. 
12 
adoption of tha agaMa, tha praeldant referrad tha mwrnhara 
to a latter of 4 febroary 194d from the Syrlaa wd Labameae 
goverameate to the Seaarlty Couooll ahleh atated: 
#..tha 3yrlaa and Labamea# dalagatloaa, aatlmg 
oa the laatroetloma of their OoTemmeata# have tha 
honour, in aeaordanae #lth Article @4 of the Charter, 
to bring thie dlapmta to the attention of the 8ee%:rl-
ty Ooanall and to raquaat It to adopt a deelalon rao-
omeeodlng tha total and almnltaneowa evaoue^on of 
th# foreign troop# from tha terrltorlee of Syria and 
the Lebanon#* 
Prevloaaly, thla letter had beam alrenlated aa Document 5 
in aaaordance alth provlalonal Rule 8 ahloh provided for a 
three day notlfleatlan to membara before an laaue could be 
placed on the Seonrlty Coancll agenda. Eoaever, before 
the agbatanee of the letter aaa aonaldarad, eertaln prob­
lème of procedure aera aoggeated to the Council by the pree-
Ident, 
llthoagh tha letter fro# the 8yrlan*Lebaneae delegataa 
clearly atated that a "dlapnta* did exist to ahich franca* 
the Gait ad Kingdom, Syria, and Lebanon #are partie#, Makin 
amggefited that the reality of the alleged *dlap%te" need 
not be verified at that time. Th# prealdent pointed oat 
the dlfflei&lty ene«%ntered when the Seenrity Conncll at-
tempted antomatlcally to determine If a qaaatlon brou^t 
3. aeeurlty Gomnell. Official Reeorde; First Year, First 
Seriea. Supplement I. Annex 6. Doe. s/s» Ëe# York. 
IW, pp. (ëee appendlz, page 152.) 
13 
before It #ere m "Clepate" or a Se #6Tlee6 
that the CouDoll could, aot decide that e "dlepiite* or a 
"altuatloa" did exlat uatll It had ealled the partie# be­
fore It and heard all the evldeaee# The prealdeat took tbie 
atand beeauae If a "dlepute* exiated, partlea to that *dle^ 
pmte" ##re barred from wtlag under Article 27, paragraph 
3, of the Oharter.* Saeh procedure aaa la line with the 
geaaral prlaclple of lateraatloaal lem that a atate ehould 
s 
Bot be both a party to, aad a jmdge of, Ita o*a ease. 
Thla provlao eaa mot made mhen a qaeatloa aaa termed a 
"aitmatloh," lo ehlch eaae the abateatlom role did not apply. 
The letter from the gyrlam and Lebaaeae delegate# fur~ 
ther stated that the "dlapate" was belag aabmltted to the 
6 
Semuplty Oouaall ander Article 34 of the Charter. But 
4, %e Charter of the Baited gatloaa# Article 2?. 
"i. Each member of the 8#curlty douncl 1 ahall have 
one rote. 
2. Declalw&a of the Security Gcumcll on procedural 
matter# ahall be mmda by am affirmative vote of aeven 
member#* 
Declelon# of the Security Council on all other 
matter# eh#ll be #mde by am afflmatlve vote of aeven 
membera Indudlag the coacurrlng wtea of the perma* 
ment member*; provided that. In declalone under Ghap* 
tar VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 62, a party 
to a dlapute ehall abataln from voting#" 
i» Xduardo Jlmen#» d# Avechagm, Votlm and the Samdllng 
of PlcDutee In the Security Council, Re# TOrkT iwbuT 
#. The Charter of the Omlted Matlona, Article 34.. 
Security douncli may Invéctigate any dlepute, or 
any altuatlon which might lead to international frlc-
tloa or give rl#e to a dlapute, in order to determine 
whether the continuance of the dlapute or altuatlon la 
likely to endanger the malmt#Dance of international 
peace and aecurity." 
14 
the preeideat auggcsted that the Levaatioe atatea be la* 
Tlted to the CooDell table under Article 31 of the Charter 
under ehleh the Seeurlty Gowcll did mot have to determine 
at the outeet whether # "dlepute" or a "eltuatlon* ezleted; 
for& Article @1 permitted the participation of United Na­
tion# members in the dlacoaelon of question# before the Se* 
curlty Gomncll If the CoimcU coB#ldered the Intereet# of 
euch meWber# epeclally effe#t#d.^ Makln #ugg##ted auch a 
procedor# beeanee under Article 51 the Council could hear 
the queetlon iAtho»t determining "^eubetance" of that l##ue 
Immediately. 
Furthermore, Preeldemt Maklh propoeed that the dele­
gate# from Syria ead Lebmmcm, up^n being eeated at the 
Gowell»# table, be glvw* %h# pewr of "pr0po#l%lca*-*th# 
right of B0û-S«®wity Council member# to propose method# of 
##ttl#meat for qowtloo# to #hleb they #ere a party, such 
"propoeltlcm#" had mo legal #el^t before the Council.® 
7. The Charter of the Dmited Nat lone. Article 31. 
"^Ahy memmer '&t %me 'p'aiiea s'aiiohe #hloh la not a mem* 
ber of the geewlty Gwmell mmy participate, without 
vote. In the di#eu##loh of any queetlon brought before 
the Security Council «henever the latter conel der# that 
the Intereat# of that Nhmber are apeclally affected," 
8, Security Council# Provlalonal Rulea of Procedure, Rule 
Rw'York, 1M», p.^0% 
"Any meWber of the United Ration# invited In accordance 
with the preceding Rule or Im application of Article 82 
of the Charter to participate in the dlaou##lona of the 
Security council may eubmlt propo#ala and draft reeolu-
tlona. Theae propoeal# end draft résolution# may be 
put to a vote only at the requeet of a repreeentatlve 
on the Security Council** 
15 
Tat, to gp&Dt the po*af of "proposition" might facilitate 
th# aettleaGOt of a quaatloa, 
Befoy# th# Seaurlty Comioll oould aooept th# augg##-
9 
tloo# mad# by th# pramldemt, KamdoWi Rlaz of %ypt iBter-^ 
r%pt$d to ralB# a qoaatloD of prooedmr## Th# Egyptlam 
&#l#gat# atiggeeted that the Coonoll deold# whether the vota 
to &et#rmla# th# #%l#t#mo# of a "dlapnte^ or *altuatlon" 
«a# to h# ^prooedoral" or "#ah#taatlv#." Be oalled for 
thl# d##lalon h#for# th# Cooaoll owld hear th# Syrian-
Wban### qa##tl4m. Th# l##w# rala#d ### of th# Qt#o#t la* 
pwtaoo# beeauae# aoaordlng to àrtlel# 27, paragraph 2, of 
the Charter, the d#t#rmlnatlom of all "procedural* queatlon# 
r#^ulr#d m#r#ly th# affirmative vote of #*y aevem member# 
of th# S##uri1y Council* Bo##v*r, to determine all "non-
proeedaral" or "#ub#ta#tlv#* qmaatlom», a# #tat#d in Artld# 
»T# ^regrmph a# am mfflmativ# imt# of aevea member#. In* 
clMlog the coacurrlmg *>t#* of th# flv# p#rmMWi«&t members, 
#a# h#o###ary. Paragraph 5# of Artlcl# 27, thu#, provided 
9# Kamdoah Slam, ̂ orn Im C#lro Ih 18S6, #a# educated at 
the faculty of La# at the DAlveralty of Parle and th# 
School of Political SelcBe# In Pari#. B# #ae Ghalrmma 
of Foreign Relatloa# la th# Eoua# of Deputl## la Cairo 
from 1944^1945. In 1946, he #a# flnamce a%^ Budget 
Commlaeloner, Be ha# been an Egyptian representative 
to the General Aeaemhly and Security Council and «ae 
one of the #l#ct#d member# to the Council #hen th# 
6yrlao*L#bcnc8e queatlon «as before it In 1946. 
lÔ 
for the veto power of the permmemt member# la all *aub-
et&Btive* questions. 
aiaz «as attempting to blook the use of the ?eto po#-
er, Not only did be propose that the Seourity Coumell &#-
old$ mhether the "e^batantive" or "prooedural" vote mhould 
apply to the qaeetlon, but eleo eo deqiaiw; a **pPooedw-
al" vote ehoalA be employed. To esbetamtiate this etaai. 
Bias propoaed the folloaing motion: 
That the âeotsioe of the Council as to vhether 
any queetion 1& _e diepwte or a eltmatlon is a pro*-
eedttrel matter.*0 
The motion mm Involved the whole questloa of noting 
procedure as aet town in Article £7 of the United Hâtions 
Charter. Certain immediate questions mere raised as to the 
interpretation of this artlela. 
Plret, what ar# procedural mattera end eeoond, 
ehat ia the mmtmre of the vote required for the da-
olalon on whether a matter is procedural within the 
meaning of Artiele %7, paragraph 2.^^ 
The latter queatlon vae raised by Rla*. Be ealled upon 
the Seeurity Oouaeil to decide at onee that a "procedural" 
vote, or a eoneurrlag vote of any seven members on the 
Goonell, mould judge if a "dlapute* or a "situation" ©xlated 
la the Syrlan-Lebaneae queatlon. 
10. Seewlty Council, off loi ml Reoorda : First Tear, First 
Series. Mo.'T. nfnete^ath rnSetlne. «. S?t. 
11. De Areohaga, o#. clt»i p. 1 
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Th* Charter Itself offered ao mnamer to the (^ueetlom. 
It d%d, however, provide that mattera oomiag under Chapter# 
IT4 V, %, and HI of the Charter ahoald he oonsld^ed "pro* 
cedural" In nature. Article 31 la gound la Chapter ?. 
Turtheraore, the 8tateaBBt of the Spoasoria# Goveramamta at 
San Franolaeo ragerdlng voting proeedura la the Security 
Council provided no eonoluslve list of matters to be 00a-
aldered "procedural* la mature* Tet, the atetement did 
aaaert lo part I, aeotioo 3: 
.,,no ladlvldeal mamber of the Council can alone 
prevent oonalderation and diacaaaion by the Council 
of a diai;«te or altnatlon broqght to its attention 
under paragraph 2, aeetlon A, Chapter YIIl.** 
(Dumbarton Oaka Propoaala)^* 
Still, thla provision did wt atste the type of vote neoea-
aery to decide aueh a queatioa^ 
Porthermore, a Statement of the sponsoring Qo ver amant# 
provided In part II, paragraph 1: 
In the opinion of the delagatlona of the Sponaor-
Ing Oovemmenta, the draft Charter Itaelf eontaina an 
Indication of the applleatlon of the voting procadarea 
to the varloue funetiona of the Counell.l* 
Thla atatement, then* referred to the above aeotlona of 
Charter #hleh have been termed ^proeadaral.*^ Eoixever, If a 
12. To be found In Article 55# paragraph 2, of the Charter. 
15. United Bationa Conference on International Organization, 
Doemmeata. H# Kea York, 1945, p. ?11. 
14' 1*14.. n, p. 
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eomtroT#r*y âiû arise over the interpretation ot what «as 
"procedural" and Mi&t «as "siabstantiw under the Charter, 
the Statement of the Sponeorlng OoTeromente deolared in 
part II, paragraph 2; 
Should, however, euoh a aetter ariae, the deoi-
Bion regarding the preliminary question a a to whether 
or not 8uah a matter la procedural muet be taken by 
a vote of aeven members of the Seourity Counoil, in* 
eluding the ooaeurring votea of the permoent mem-
aera.lS 
To eomplieate the problem still more, the nineteenth 
meeting of the Security Couneil had before it no clear-cut 
definition of the eiaot diatlnotion between a "dispute" 
and e ** situât ion," No definition was to be found in the 
Charter or in the Statement of the Spomaorlng Oovemment# 
made in San Fraoeiaeo. The question #a# left for the nntSed 
Nations to decide. As late a« the 15 July 1948, the In­
terim Committee of the General Assembly was still trying to 
16 
draw up a definition. In connection «1th this attempt at 
15. Ibid.. II, p. 914. 
18. "(1) In deciding, for the purposes of Article 27, 
paragraph 3, whether a matter brought before the Se­
c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  b y  a  S t a t e  o r  S t a t e s  I s a  d i s p u t e  o r  a  
situation, the Security Council shall hold that a dis­
pute arises; 
"(a) If the State or States bringing the matter 
before the Security Council, mod the State or states 
«hose conduct is Impunged, agree that there is a 
dispute. 
"(b) Whenever the State or States bringing the 
matter before the Security Council allege that the 
19 
aeflnltlon» Imtmrlm Commltt*# mlm d«oiâ«d im 1946 tîmt 
the mmmmer of âeelâlag tkm emimtemee or aoa-txiatsBoe of a 
«âispate» «as to b# by m *pro@#&i%ral" vote. tJofortmoately, 
tbe Gwmltt#®*# report »a» mot adopte# by the General kê-
aembly* let alome toy the Seemrity Couaeil. Even ao, the 
Information «as mot before the Seewrlty eoimeil until two 
am# oae-half year# after the mlaeteeath meetiag. 
Perhapa a more «ortable définition of the differenee 
beteeea a "dlapate" and a *#it«atloa" waa given by Good-
rlGh and lasbro In their eoaaentary on the Charter; 
A dlapmte earn properly be eoasldered as a dis-
agreement or a matter at laaue betaeen teo or more 
aotloB# of another State or States im reapeet of the 
first State or States eoaatltate a breach of am In-
termatlonal obligation or are endangering or are 
likely to endanger the malntenanee of International 
peaee and aaemrlty, or that aueh aetlona d emonatrate 
preparation to eoarnlt a breach of international ob­
ligations or to endanger the maintemanee of inter­
national peaee and aeomrlty, and the state or Statea 
ahloh are the ambjeet of these allegations eonteat, 
or do not admit* the faeta alleged or Infereneea to 
be drawn from amah allegationa. 
*{$) farther. If a State bringing before the Se^ 
omrlty Coanail a matter of the natmre eontemplated 
under paragraph (1) above, allege# that another State 
la violating the righta of a third State, and the lat­
ter anpporta the eonterntion of the first state, then 
the third State shall alee be deemed to be a party to 
the dispute* 
"(8) Rothing in this definition ahall prevent the 
Seourlty Cornell from ddelding tWt a^dlspmte exists 
in oireamataaees not eovered by mm above definition." 
General Aaambly. Offleial leoordî Third Session, Supple-
meat 18. floe. A7êw.' W York: Iftls. iip. 7-8. ' ^ 
80 
etatea tbloh b&# raaohed a #t#g* *t «hloh th# parti## 
have formulated alalma sad #ouat#rolaljn# sufficiently 
4#flBlt$ to b# paaaAi upom by a eourt or other body 
set up for purposes of paelfle settlement. A eituatkm, 
by eontraat# 1# a #tate of affair# which ha# not a# y# 
assumed the nature of eonfllet between parties but 
which may* though not neceaearily, come to have that 
character.1? 
Like other definitloma, thla one, too, suffers from vague-
meaa; but* It doe# atate that a "dlapute" pre*#uppo#e# the 
eilmtenee of clal## and aounterelalm# which in thwaelvea 
are of a more aeriow# nature and a greater threat to the 
peace than condition# Involved under a "altuatlon»** %e 
conaenau# of the Security Council would appear to make thi# 
type of dlatlm»tlon» although the organixation haa never 
adopted a set definition of what con#titutea a "dlepute" 
or a "altuatlon*" 
Because these problem# were raised by the motion pro­
posed by Riaz, other member# of the Council—namely Presi-
18 
dent Nakln# 1# 1» van Kieffens of The Netherland#, Gyro 
19, Lelamd M. Goodrich and Xdvard Bambrc, Charter of the 
Halted lationSi. Comowntarv and Document#. Bo#ton. 
iPdb, p. É4S. 
16. Eelco Hicolaas van Kleffen# wa# born In Beerenveen, 
The metherlanda, on 17 fiovember 1894, After an ed* 
ucatlom at the Bnlveralty of leyden, he entered govern­
ment service. From 1@4#-194?, he aerved a# minister 
without portfolio and Netherlands repreaentatlve on 
the Sedurity Council and the Economic and Social 
Council. Mr. van Kieffan# is the present (1951) Dutch 
ambaaaador to the United state#. 
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6# FT€lt4R3*Valle of Brazil, and Wellington Eoo of Gblna--
#*r# in general agreement that the Egyptian motion should 
be referred to the Committee of 2:q)ert8 for further atudy. 
Thee# gmmbere deelred to have the Syrian-Lebanese delegate# 
eeated Immediately at the Goumoll table eo that the Levan-
tlne eaee eould be heard. 
The aetlon of thee# fo%r members eaa chareeterlatlo 
of the eamtloi&e atmoeiAere In take Security Gounoll during 
It# flrat fe# meetlmge. Operating onder provlelonel rule# 
adopted at Ite flrat meeting, the Security Coimoil ea# In 
It# nineteenth meeting etlll feeling Ite eay more or lea# 
on day-to-day baala, $h* repreaentatlve# from Auatralla, 
China, The letherlands, and Brazil realized that the Goua-
ell #a# In the proee## of getting preeedenta, and for thle 
reaaon they auggeated that Ibe Coimell take no action It-
self la determining whether the exist®ate of a •dispute" or 
19. Gyro de Freltaa-Valle, BraelHaa dlplomatlat, *aa bora 
In 1894 and edneated la Sao Pablo* He ha# held eaoh 
poaltlona aa the General Secretary of the Brazilian 
foreign Office In 1939 and the ambaaaadorahlp to Ger­
many from 1939-194&, Slnae 1944, he haa been 
Brazilian ambaaaador to Oamada and a repreaentatlve of 
hla oountry to the United Batlona* 
20. T1 Kyuln Wellington Koo mea boM In 1888* Since re-
aelTlng hla Doctorate In phlloaophy at Columbia Uni* 
veralty, Koo ha# repraaentad the Chlneee government 
la the League of Batlona and the United Nation#. Be 
haa alao been Ghlaeaa ambaaaador to the united State# 
alnee 1948. 
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* "sltaatloa" to bs oon5ld«re@ a "proseduzal" amttar. 
Beoaase the Committee of Expert# #@8 stwdyiag at that tin* 
th# protlema relative to the fuaûtlonl% of the Couaoil# 
the above mentlomed membera propoaed that the queetlon be 
tumea over to that group of experte eharged vlth aecldlag 
those very lee*e#, 
Maz aooepted the auggeatlon of the praaideat that the 
aeolalon on whether a "dlppote* or a "altuatlon" aid azlat 
be poatponad imtll after the Security Gounell heard the 
Syrlaa and lebemeae delegates. But the Zgyptlaa delegate 
malntalmed that the type of vote neceaaary to datarjalae 
that qweatloa ahould be daolded at omee* He argwed that 
the vot# ehould be "prooedaral." Koo dlaagreed amd attempted 
to block the Egyptian motlom; 
I au$geat th^ the motion of the repreaentatlve 
of Egypt be tabled amd referred to the Committee of 
Experte for them to atWy It and report baak to the 
Cogaall.Bl 
II 
At thla polBt, ao aetlon aaa taken on the Egyptian mo­
tion or Chineee propoaal. The Co*noil turned from Ite de* 
bate over the wthod of voting to the q^atlom whether the 
Bl* Sae^rlty Cognoll, Offloial Records, First Tear, First 
Hëriea, Ho, ' ']E'^ ' niheteeo^ 'lastting'» p .''"'#'8". 
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m&lateaaao# of freseh aad Brltlmh troop# In Byr&a amA L$b*-
22 
aon eon#tltBt#d # "Al#p*t#" or a "altumtion," Braaat Bavla 
of the Baited Klagdom believed t&at a "dlapute" actually 
existed: 
If any aoauaer State eay* that there la a dispute, 
then there la a dtspate; ead If a State make* a ebarge 
egalBSt aaother Stata, aad the State e^alaat ahloh It 
1* made repadlatea it or oo&testa it, then there 1# a__ 
dispute, aad the Goamell *aa aaka Ita reeoamendatkms.** 
The United Kingdom delegate aalatalned that beeaaae 
Syria emd Labaaoa aaeerted the ezlateaae of a "dispute" Im 
their latter of 4 February 1946, the# In faet It did exist. 
Be arguad that the Goaaell oaght to aaeept that faet and act 
aooordlngly* la apeeklag thaa, Bevla at l&aet Implied that 
the United Kingdom aas partially the oauae of the Syrlaa» 
Lebaoaae qaestioa, baeeaa# British troop* were at that time 
stationed on 3yriaa~Labaaase territory. Noraorer, In main­
taining that a "dlspgte* exlated. Bavin farther Implied 
that his oountry, as a party to the *dlapute* aoold be da-
barred from TotlBg la tha aeourlty Oounoll aoeordtng to 
22. Iraeat Bevlm (P#0. 1940) aas bom on 9 Mar eh 1881 and 
died on 14 April 1961. Bavin lang nerved the British 
government* Prom 1940*1#45, he aes Minister of Labor 
and National sarviea* Bavin aas Saorctary of state 
for foreign Affairs from 1945-1951. Whan the Syrian-
Lebanese question eaoe Into the seourity Gounoll, 
represented the United Kingdom as a permanent member, 
23. Saauritv Gouaell* Offlelel Reeords: first Tear, first 
deries. #0. I. nineteenth meetlaK. 576. 
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Artlol# Z^i paragraph 5, if asd «hem- méthode of eettlement 
»ere propoeed. The Dalted Kiagdom delegate eae the firet 
repreeeatative of a (breat Poeer to take this et&ad m the 
Syrlaa-Lebeaeee qmetloa. 
The vleee of the aealler etatea mere eontrary to those 
held by BeTlm, The delegate* from X&ypt, Brazil, and The 
Betherlaade argae* that the Seearlty Goaneil ehould decide 
if e parÊiemlar qaeetioa eoaetltated a "diepate," bat only 
after the Goamell had heard the partiee to that qneetion 
end Wd evaluated mil feet* In the eaee. Tan Kleffene s«®-
med *p the attitude of the three poaere: 
I qmite agree with the repreeentative of China 
that it might be a good thing to have that queation 
(whether a diepate or a eltuation ea&ated and the 
proeednre of deeidimg) mtmêieâ. I think this is a 
very healthy debate beeanae the world ean eee that 
this Comneil is working oat what we might perheps 
call its eommon law. We are trying to find oat our 
way. This is a new body, le mnat work very guardedly 
in these mmttere, I think all iatereete would beet 
be served if we first heard the parties and then took 
the deoiaion.Be 
The getherlande delegate, in explaining the nsoessity 
for the eetabli«hmemt of e eolid foundation for futur# ae-
tlvity, realized that the Oouneil was mm king its eommon law. 
for this re aeon# wan deffene pleaded for eo-operetion end 
a methodieal approeah to new problems, perhaps more im­
portant, he and representative® of oertein em11 nations 
*4. Ibid., p. a??. 
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iatlsttô that the 8##Grlty eonjiell aiiomM ieelie the oature 
of q**#tion» pre#eat*d to It thro*gh opea Aleouaaloa. 
Through auah aotioa, th# email aatloas olearly aho«@4 thai* 
faith im aa latermatloaal orgaalgatlom. 
Rlat* by ao« ##ar# that th* majoTity of Oouaall opln-
loa #*# agaiaat h&a o%i@l#al motioa, zaaorda* hia motloa 
to r#ad: 
Wltheat to th# flaal d##laloa ## ahall 
take, may a##ia&oa oa *h#ther a oaae broaght before 1&* 
8»eerity Go*m#il aoaatltatea a diapat# or a altaatloa 
ahall be eoaaldarad to b# a qaeatloa of procedure aa& 
ahall tharafor# b# $h# aabjaot of a prooaaural vote.*5 
Vas Klaffaaa iat#*f*pt#a #lth a aoaatar propoaal: 
I ball eve that, bafoz# «# can vota oa the %yp%lam 
propoaal, aa ahoalt firat vote oa tha qaeatioa ahethar 
it la maoaaaary to vota oa that propoaal ao*. I bag 
to mora that it la no* aaa#a*ary that tha Couaoll vote 
oa that propoaal aa*.** ^ 
Tha Goaaail at thia polat had tao motions before it. 
Before a vote aoald be taken oa either the motloa of vaa 
lEleffaaa or oa the amaadad motion of Bias# tha aoviet dala-
gata, Aadral Tyahiaaky, alahad to apeak. la hie rebattal 
25 * Ibl6 * * p• iE80* 
• IblA* * p• WèO• 
£7. The saggettioa mmda by loo #aa not a motloa. 
18• Aa&pal Jaaaar&avlah Yyahlaaky, Soviet la«yar and poll* 
tlclan, #aa bora la 168$. A mambei of tha Commaaiat 
party *la#a 19*0, ha haa 1* tha paat baaa Haad of tha 
Legal Saatlom of the Soviet Aaadaay of Saleaoaa, 
Depaty-fublle Proaaautor and fablio Proaaautor of tha 
Sovlal Daloa# Amba##ador to the Waited State#, aad 
Sovlat rapraaaatativa to the Saeurity Counoil. 
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to Riaz* argument that a "procedural" vote ahould be taken 
to aetermlne mhether a "dlapute" or a "eltuatlon* was be­
fore the Council, Tyshinsky explained: 
Procedure is the manner of deciding a matter, a 
method of decieion* but the queation a* to ehat the 
actual eubetance of a particular matter amouata to, 
ehether it ia a aituatlon or a diapute, la not the 
manaer of decielon, mat the method of deciding the 
matter, but relate* In fact to the evaluation of the 
very aubetance of the matter,®' 
Since according to Tyahinaky the determination of a "die-
pute* or a "aituation" concerned the eubatance of a quae* 
tion, he maintaimed that a "aubetantlve" vote muat be 
taken uader Article 87* paragraph 5. He argued farther: 
If, finally, the queatlon arise* as to ehether a 
matter la procedural or not, the rule to be applied 
la that laid doen, on ? July 1945, in Sac fraociseo, 
on the basis of the report of the Third Committee, 
where It is stated that a declBlon in regard to such 
questions asast be taken by an affirmative vote of 
eeven member* of the security Council, including the 
cooourrlhg vote* of the permanent member* of Council, 
thgt la, again, aecording to Article 27, paragraph 
Vyehlneky baaed hie case upon teo major premises. Be 
insisted that determining a question to be e "dispute" was 
a "non*procedural" matter because that determination had 
to do with an evaluation of the "eubetenae" of the issues 
involved. In auch a case, the required eoaeurrenee of the 
29. Security Council, Official Seeord*; First Year, First 
Series » #o ,'t * alae'f eeatfe aee i'x'ni» ppT" ' '! 
SO. Ibid., p. 881. 
2? 
peym&nent mw^ere #ou)Ld permit the uee of the veto. Be 
thea laaletea that th* deolaloa ehether e "eabetantlve* o* 
"prooe&urel" vote eee to he taken (eooordimg to the State* 
meht of the Spoaeorla* GOTefxmente), required the ea&eof* 
remoe of the permanent membere. In the letter ergtmeot the 
Soviet delegate #»e eorreot la hie Interpretetion, but hie 
aeeertioa that "eabetentlve" voting ehoald determine ehether 
a "dlepmte" or a "eltuetlom" prevailed *ae debatable. 
were Tyehimeky^e argweat aeoepted (that the quallfl-
eatlon of a eaee a* a "dlapete* or a "eltuatlon" «ae to be 
deolded by a "eubetamtlve* vote), then a permanent meeker 
of the Seourlty Cotmell eould, by hie dleeent alone, pre­
vent the identlfioatlon of any leaue to ehloh he eae a 
party ee a "dlepnte."* Dhder euah prooedare, the permanent 
member oould retain hie rlg^it of veto even ehen, eeoording 
to Impartial atanderds, the queetlon *ae a "dlepute." The 
permanent mwdber thue eonld act as a jndge In Ite oen eame, 
fo prevent thle very danger# Artlele W, paragraph of 
the Bnlted Nation* Charter *ae Ineorporated to prevent nee 
of the veto by pertlee to a ^'dlepote" under Chapter TI and 
Artlele 52* In 1946, the Goanell had not eoeeeeded in de­
fining a "dispute* nor la re&olving that a "procedural" 
method of voting mould bo need to deolde ehether a *dle» 
pnte" ezieted. 
After the Soviet argument for the "eubetantive" vote. 
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Makla oalled for # vote upon the van Kleffena aotloa which 
had gtatea that the Gooaeil need not vot# oa the Blaz mo­
tion at thia time. Eight #embara voted in the affirmative 
31 
and the motion «a* oarrled. Elaz* motion *aa automatleal-
ly killed. 
The preaident of the Co%mell then invited the dele-
gatee fr«m Oyrla and Lebanon to take their eeate at tlw 
Council table, Ha explained the Counoll prooednre to them: 
I ahowld like to Inform the repraaentatlvea who 
have jaat taken their seats at the table that they 
are invlied by the 3eeurlty Gownell to take part in 
its dellberatlona upon the question that la now be-
fore it, and aith the right to participate in the dle* 
euasioas althoat vote. Also, at an appropriate time 
they till have the opportunity of making a propoaltlon, 
if it la their aleh to do ao* In those alraumatancea, 
they «111 reellze that the Gonneli hae dealred tbelr 
attendance and invited them to take part in its dia-
euaaiooe upon thla matter.^2 
III 
In aummation# the nineteenth meeting of the Security 
Couneil decided very little. The Council did not decide 
whether the meintenanoe of British and freneh troops in 
31. Ibid., p. 881, (In the early meetlnge of the Security 
dounell, no breakdown was given in regard to the way 
members voted on a particular lesue. Total votes were 
recorded only. How the vote is broken down as follows: 
in favor, against, abetainlng, and absent.) 
32, Ibid., p. 283. 
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Syria and lebaaoa ooastltutea a "dlapate" or a "situation." 
Although Devin malntaloed that If a stat* eald a "dlapute* 
did Gzlat, then In fact it aid; the other ammbere appear** 
to b# uaallllag to arrive at auch daelsloa until after all 
p&rtlea to the "Alapute" had been heard. In addition, and 
even mare to^)ortant, idle Security Council oouiq not agree 
aa to the type of voting procedure to be followed Im deter­
mining snob que atl one. 
T*o diametrically opposed views developed, Rlaz main­
tained that the question was *pro@edur&l;" Vyablnsky in-
aleted that it w&e "eubetentive,* The uae of the veto In 
suoh matters ^as therefore left undecided. Even though a 
Bolutlon wae offered by &oo, van Kleffens, and de ffeltas-
Valle (to submit the question to the Committee of Eiperte 
for determination)* the Council took no action. 
However, the meeting did take some poaltlve action. 
The Syrian-Lebanese question waa brought before the Seeur-
ity Council# and placed upon the future agenda. The Syriao-
Lebaneae delegatea were eeeted at the Gouaoll table. They 
were invited to take part in the dlGcuaaion, and they were 
given the right of "propoaitlon." 3uoh aetlon implied that 
the Seeurlty Council might at some later date, after hear­
ing the Syrien-Lebaaese oaet, peaoefully aettle the quea-
tloa regarding the evacuation of Brltleh and French troop# 
from Syria end Lebenon. Furthermore, the Counoil implied 
30 
that It might iD some future meet lag deteraiae «h#ti#r a 
"dispute" oz a "gltuatloa" eiistea ia Syria and lebaaonaa 
wall a# «hathar thé "prooadural" or "aubatantlva" vote *a# 
to b@ employed In maklog that declaloa* 
31 
OEiPTZR III 
TBE TMKTIRS MEETING OF 
TBE 8W0RITT GOmCIL 
OB the a#%t Amy, Friday# 15 February 194@, the teem-
tleth meeting of the geearlty Comsell me held at Ghmreh 
Booee, weetmlmleter# Loadom, amd the eetml dleeuealon of 
the Syrlam-lebameee qeeetIon hegam. Thle aeetljqg# too, eae 
presided ©ter by Pre mid eat Makim. The eame delegate a were 
1 
present with one exeeptlom; Sir Alexander Cadogaa, repre* 
eeatimg the Waited Klmgdom, replaeed Beria eho at thie time 
2 
eaa oe#spied eitfa ether affaire. 
I 
After the edoptloa of the agemde end the eeetiag of 
1. The &t* Boa. Sir Alexander George moatagrn Gadogao eae 
bora oa 85 BoveWber 1®84 a ad edmeated at Itoa ##d Ox­
ford. Gadogaa has lorn# been aommeeted #lth diplomatie 
servi oes for lie Majeety*# Goverameat a ad eae aabaeaa-
dor to Ohima from 1G3#^1956 a ad permaee# trader secre­
tary of forei^ Affaire 1938-1946. Siaee 194#, ha ha# 
been a Wmited Kiagdom delegate to the Dai ted Hâtions. 
2. See wit? Coaaeil. Offielal leeorda; First Tear, First 
Seriee/m>. I. teeaUitk meetiae. «4. ' 
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Hastia B#y framgl# of Leb&nom and Fari® ii-ïhoîufi of 
Syria, tkm pr#ald*at oallad upon th# Levant in# delegates 
to state tbelr oaee# 
fraagie of Lebanon epoke first. In preeentlng the 
Lebanese ease, be first made it el ear that Lebmon and 
Syria aoverelgn and Independent state»» Both of the 
Levant nation# bad elgned the Tfnl t#d Sat loos Charter In 
8an Pranoleeo In 1945# and thie aetlon in Iteelf $ Praagie 
argaeâ» preeluded any limitation of their eoverelgnty. For 
proof, be referred to Artie le 2 of the Obarter ehloh stated 
that the organ! m t ion me based op on the eovereign equality 
S 
of its member 8. Other mwdxer mtiom# tee a, accepted thie 
eoverelgnty and Independeme# In the Lemnt «hen they, too, 
nlgned the Charter, Fraagie argmed. fraaee and the United 
3. Blograpbloal material on Frangle le unavailable. 
4. Farie ll*Ehoari» representative of Syria to the Seonrl-
ty Gonnoll torlag tW Syrlan-Lebaaeee qneetlon, mae 
born la Eeir, Syria In 167i. Se «as edmoated at the 
Amer lean University of Beirut and baa been professor 
at the Syria© Wnlverelty of Damaaene and a member of 
the Arab Aeadeev sinee 191#. 
5. The United Ration# Charter. Artlele 2. 
4he Organisation and iie Member#, In pnrenit of the 
Pmrpoaea stated la Artlele 1, shall act In aeéordanee 
with the following Prlnelplee, 
1. The Organ 1 nation le baaed on the principle of the 
eoverelgn egoality of all its Mehbera. 
2 ,  All Member»,. In order to en#are to all of them the 
right® and benefits reaulting from membership, shall 
fnlflll In good faith the ebligatlone aasumed by them 
in aeeordance «1th the present Charter..." 
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Kingdom as signatories had accepted Syria and Lebanon as 
sovereign nations, 
Frangle eorreot In hi# argument. The ITnltad Kl%-
dom and Franc# not only aaeaptad Syria and Labanon a# aover-
algn and lnda#nd#nt atataa In 1945 at San Pranolsoo# but 
tba t#o Greet Pomera had aeaepted that Independmoe In the 
paat* Before the Imraalon of Syria and Lebanon In 1941# 
General Gatroux, repreaantlng Free franoe In the Bear Eaat, 
on 8 Jume 1941» etated; *»,#! eome to put an end to the 
d 
mmdatory regime and to proolal# you free end Independent." 
The proolam&tlon aet up# at leaat In ̂  faeto etatua, Syria 
and Lebanon aa Imdependwt atatea, Catroux promlaed that 
the Independenoe mould be guaranteed "In a tr«*ty In ehlch 
? 
(our) mutml relatione #111 be defined»" a treaty to be 
negotiated ae eoon aa poaalhle# 
On the aame day. Sir Kllea Lampaon» BrltlgA anbaeaadDr 
at Cairo, made the folloelng etetement regarding Brltlah 
polley In the Levant: 
I am authorlaed by Ml# Majeaty*# Governmnt In 
the Dnlted Kingdom to deolare that they eupport and 
aaaodate thmaaelvee #lth the maauranee of indepeni-
enoe given by General Oatrmwc on behalf of General 
d* Klnlatere de L* informât Ion# "La France et lea Etata 
du Levant*" #otea. Doeumkentalraa et Btudea. Bo* 74. 
Serle Internationale. Parle, lEvl* V. ̂ aee a^andiz. 
pege 
? * Ibid#* p# ?. 
04 
8 
4$ Gaulle of Syria and Leb&aoa. 
LampsoD «eat on to etate that If Syria aa& Lebanon awp* 
ported the Alllee, they eould enjoy all the aavaatagee of 
the free oountrlea of the «orld Including the lifting of 
the blockade and admittance to the aterllng block. 
Theae tao earlier guarantees of indepandenoe were 
elaborated later in the awmmer of 1941 by the Lyttelton* 
de Qenlle Agreement of ? Ai^uat 1941. The United Kingdom 
reatated her earlier pledge to Syria and I,eh&non, for 
lyttelton #rote; "Both Free Franoe aal Ofeat Britain are 
9 
pledged to the Independimee of Syria and Lebanon." Fur­
thermore, the United Kingdom recognized the favored posi­
tion of Franoe In the Levant after eomplete Independenee 
«&S granted: 
#hen thla eaaentlal atep haa been taken (the 
oompleta InAependenee of Syria and Lebanon), and 
without prejudice to it# *e freely admit that franoe 
ahoald have the prede#laant poeltlon In Syria and 
Lebanon over any other European pwer.l^^ 
Lyttelton did not define thla privileged poeltlon, but It 
8# Sir Mllea Lampeoa, **Deelaratl@B by Sla l^jeaty*a jm» 
baeaador at Cairo* B ynne 1941*" 3tat@a#Aa of Polloy 
by Ms *a j##ty*e Wvemmemt in the'Halted KihKdom in 
%o Myria a#4 Letwoon. 8 fuie* isAi amd^9 sep-
temer l#41, uommahd ëWo # London * i##ë# p. z. 
(ëee app#n4l%, page 
9* Ibid,* p » 3• 
10. Ibid., p. 5 *  
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Bas geaerelly ooaoeâed that france should have preferea* 
tl&l trestment In cultural» eooaoalc, aa4 strategic saBsMk 
The Importance of the Lytteltoa-âe Gaulle Agreeaeat 
V&8 that the Halted llngùom and France again oommlttea 
themselves to the la&epsa&eaoe of Syria aa& lebaaoa. Pur-
theraore, the n%ited Elogdom Gccepted a pri?llege& posltioa 
for France la the L@T&at %hca that la6epea<lea.c€ remliaa. 
Therefore, Zroagle *&2 correct ahsa he malataiaed that 
Fr&j^ce and the United Elngdc& accepted ttm Levantine atatee 
as sovereign and Independent. 
With this hlBtory in mind, frangle infermed the Securi­
ty Council that British and Trench troops at that moment 
tere stationed on Syrian and lebaneae aoll, Gkch action, 
he said, constituted a grave vlolaticn of the sovereignty 
of the t»o nations, especially alnoe there «as no legiti­
mate reason for these troopa to be la Syria and Lebanon. 
#or aes the preeence of these troopa approved by the 
levantine goversmente, Ae FrsBgle stated, the occupation 
#a8 not "jnetlflGd by the eilatence of any agreeoents, 
11 
treaties or understanding of any eort." 
frangle #as correct. There tae no legitimate reasonibr 
the maintenance of Brltleh and french troope in Syria 
11. Security Coupoll. Official Reoorda: First Tear, Flrat 
Berlem* #0. I, tventietb meeting, p. 665. 
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I,ebaAon In 1946 even thomgh there had been a juatlfl* 
oatlon In the peet. frenoh troop# mere etatloned In Syria 
ana Lebanon elnee the beginning of the mandate granted to 
12 
France at the 8an Bemo Conference on 24 April 1920. 
Theee troops eere to be maintained f% the defense of the 
15 
mandated territories# Boeever* "French rale bore too 
close a reeeAlance to that anmexatlcn for #lch It #as a 
mibstltnte, and the limits of the mandate, as orlglmlly 
contemplated, were In faet soon eztended by a process of 
14 
military conquest.'* Revolts occurred snch as Dm-
eean revolt of 1926-1926, and France found It necessary to 
send larger mmbers of troops (many of «hlch sere the 
hated Senegalese) Into Syria and Wbanon. The Syrian and 
Lebanese peoples objected to this shoe of foreign mili­
tarism. They objected. In fact, from 1920 until 1948. 
British troop* joined French cecupatlon forces In 
the Levant In 1941. On 8 Jime 1941» a mixed force of Im-
12. Q, M. Gathome-Bardy# A Short gletory of International 
Affairs. 1920^1934. Lonéos, 1934, p. 121. 
13. The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Article 2. 
"^Tke %indatory may maintain Its troops In the said 
territory fcr Its defense. It shall farther be em^ 
pceered, until the entry Into force of the organlm 
la# and the reestabllshmsnt of public secwlty, to 
the defense snd also for the maintenance of order. 
These local forces may only be recruited from the 
Inhabitants of said territory. 
14. Gethorne-aardy, op. cit., p. 121. 
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perlai, Pre* Preach, aaâ other Allied troop* umder oommaDd 
of General 31r Henry Maltland Bilson oroseed the frontier* 
15 
of Syria and Lebanon. The Invaalon came a* no euddem 
eurprlee, beoauae it aa* eommon knoaledge that franee par­
le 
mltted German aircraft to aee Syrian alrbase*. To pre--
rent *uah aetlon and farther Natl penetration Into the Le­
vant, Gatrow wad Lampeon made their jolmt proelametion* of 
Syrian and Labaneae Indepeadenee on the aeme day that Al­
lied foroe* were oroealng Levantlme frontier*. 
After four aeek* of ooncentrated fluting* Tlohy 
force* under General Dent% aaed for an armlatloe. The 
Allied oootipatlon of Syria and Lebanon aa* auooeaafol. 
Remnaate of theee Preneh aad Brltleh foreee, a* eell a* 
Brltleh troop* ehloh Intervened In May 1945 at the requeet 
of Syria mad Lebanon, aere etlll la the Levant In 1946* 
BkMeever, Syria and Lebanon no longer aaa a need of or a 
deelre for the oontlnaed malntenanoe of theae troop* by 
1946. Therefore# Praagle, In apeaklng before the Coanoll* 
argued that theee troop* aere violating Syrian-Lebanese 
eoverelgnty and moat be evaaaated^ 
Prangle oontlnaed the Labaneae ease by informing the 
15. Albert Habib Boaranl, Syria and Lebanon, Rea Tork, 
1948, p. 237. 
16. Ibid., p. 2S7. 
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Cooacll that Syria and Lebaaoa bed. made repe&tea repré­
sentations to jTr&ace end the United KlBgaom elBce the end 
of Woria War II la aa atteapt to secure the slmultaaeouB 
elthdreaal of foreign troops. Ee stated that such regxs^ 
had failed to settle the "dispute* and that the United 
Elngdom and franoe had not *lthdra«n their troope. In-
Btead, the t*o Great Poser# had slgaed the Anglo-Freneh 
Agreeaent of 13 Deoember 1945: 
The programme of evacuation *111 be draen up In 
eueh a *ay that It «111 ensure the salntenanee In 
the Levant of sufficient foroea to guarantee eeourl-
ty, until Gueh time aa the Baited Nations has decided 
on the orgaalzatlon of eolleotlve aeourlty In this 
zone. Until theee arrangemeate have been carried 
out* the freneh Government *111 retain forces re­
grouped In the Lebanon#!? 
Frengle admitted that the agreement mentioned evacu­
ation* but he Ineleted it made no (Wmmltment on ho* or 
*hen that evaeuation *ae to take plaee. fraagle also ar­
gued that the Angl@«"Freae6 Agrement *a# a violation of 
the Charter bem&uae *md*r that agreement fra&ee and the 
United Elngdmm *ere maintaining troope on Syrlan-Lebaneae 
eoll until the United Batlone oould provide "eolleetive 
aeeurity* in the region. Ee Inaiated that euoh action eae 
illegal. Syria and Lebanon *ere independent natlona. 
If* Anglo-French Agreement 13 Deomber 1945, (3ee appendix, 
pi<»C. ISZ) 
89 
Keither had been dGslgaated a "truat territory* or a "stra-
1A 
teglc area.* Their slgmlag of the Charter preoluaed any 
poealbllity that Syria aad lehaaos oooia fall In either of 
19 
these categories. Moreover, Trangie also aeagred the 
Cowaoil that Syria mad lebaaoa #ere able to provide for 
their o*n aeeurlty and la aueh manner fulfill their obliga-
30 
tloaa to the United Nation* uader Artlel* 43. 
18, The Charter of the United Batloae, Article 82. 
"There may be designated, la aay truetse&hip agree­
ment, a etrategle area #bleh may laclnde part or all 
of the truat territory to «hlch the agreement appllea, 
without prejudice to aay apecial agreeaeat or agree-
meate under Article 45." (Certain of the ^aoiflo 
laland* are an example of *uoh areas. The United 
States hae full poaer of adalaletretioa, legisletioa, 
and jurlmdletlon, and protection over theee lalanda.) 
Article 78. 
"the truateeehlp eyet^m ahall not apply to territories 
mhich have become Member# of the Dnlted Ifatione, re­
lationship among #hich ahall be baaed on reapeot for 
the principle of aoveralgn equality." 
20. IbAd.. Article 43 
"ÎT"" All Member* of the United Nations, la order to 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, undertake to make available to the 2e-
curity Cowncll, on Ita call and in accordance «ith a 
special agreement or agreemeota, eraed forces, assist­
ance, and facilltlee, including the right of passage, 
neceaaary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and aecurlty. 
&. Such agreement or agreemente Aall govern the num­
bers and typea of forces, their degree cf readiness 
and general location, and the nature of the facilltlee 
and asaistance to be provided. 
3, The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as 
soon as possible on the initiative of the Security 
Council, They ahall be concluded between the Security 
Council and Members or between the Security Council and 
groups of Members and shall fee subject to ratification 
by the signatory states la accordance with their re­
spective constitutional processes 
40 
He stated: 
They (Syria and Lebanoa) have no deelre that 
foreign powers should settle matters oa their he-
half or should aot Im their atead In the accomplish* 
ment of this mlaaloo.^ 
Gweh aetlon, frangle contended oonatltuted a "dlapute" ahloh 
22 
created "a threat to International peace#*' and Syria and 
Lebanon «ere ambmlttlng the "dispute" to the Security Coun-
@11 for aettlement* 
In elosiag, frsagle made it plain that had Syria and 
Lebanon requested unilateral troop withdrawal, British 
troops would have been out of the Levant. Eoaever* he 
statedÎ 
for our part# we have always asked for the aim* 
ultameou# althdranal of Irltlah and French troops, 
namely# that of treating on a footing of equality 
all frlendlv Power# and all Powers «1th whom ae have 
relatione.^ 
II 
li-Ihomrl of Syria aoeepted all the argumente preaented 
by his aollaagma, Fraagle. the Syrian delegate, too, con­
tended that Syria and Lebanon «ere Independent states and 
21. Seourlty Council. Official Beoorda; First Tear. First 
S»rtea. So. Ï. ttentieth aeetlng. p. MS. 
Ibid., p. B64. 
23. ibid., p. 285. 
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that the statloalng of troop* oa their territories *as an 
abridgment of soverelgaty. Such action #aa a violation of 
the Charter. Overturea that Syria had made to franoe for 
troop evaaaatlon had gone anaowered, Il-Ihouri stated. 
The Syrian delegate rejeeted the Anglo»Preooh Agree­
ment of 13 Deeemher XS45 baaaoae it «as a bilateral agree-
memt het«e*n Prsmoe and the United Ilngdom* He contended 
that the establishment of "eollectlTe security" as pro­
vided is the agreement «as not needed, #as not aanted* and 
«as not legal. Be objected farther to the bilateral agree­
ment on the grounds that It was vague and that it did not 
set a time limit for the evacuation of all foreign troops. 
And, finally, ll-Ihourl explained that evacuation under the 
agreement *as mot dependent upon purely technical consider-
atlone. Il-lhotiri*s position at this time «as eounter to 
that taken by Syria and Lebanon #hen the Anglo-Freoeb Troop 
Agreement «as made public. 
In Deewher If45, the populations of Syria and Lebanon 
first rejoiced at the Anglo-French Agreement because of the 
promise of evacuation of the Levant and mutual support and 
consultation between France and the United Eingdom on Mid­
dle gastern affairs. Bcmever, the joy expressed in the 
©4 
Levant soon turned to reneeed hostility. When the French 
Ë4. The Me# York Times, Dec. 30, 1945, p. 6. 
42 
mad British military experts met in Beirut on 21 Deoember 
1945 to dra« up plans for evacuation, they found themaelvee 
in dlaagreement aa to the method to be followed and the 
E5 
time limit to be set. A mia-interpretation arose between 
the signatory po#era over ## question of regroupme nt. 
France maintained that the United Kingdom should regroup in 
Taleatina. The Fnited Kingdom interpreted the agreement 
to mean that her?forces ahould regroup in Lebanon («ith 
27 
the French) until the levant «as completely evacuated. 
Demonstrations and strikes mere called in the Levant to 
aho# the Syrian and Lebaneee diasatisfaction over the lack 
28 
of agreement among the two Great Powers over evacuation. 
Freneh troopa #$re put under Britiah guard, and France «as 
forced to give up the remaining control# over cuatcma, 
radio stations, and railways in Syria. But these conces­
sion# did not satisfy the Syrian and Lebanese governments 
which Insisted that foreign troops be completely removed. 
Syria and Lebanon sent notes to France on 26 December 
1945 and the # January 1946 informing France of their dis-
25. Ibid.. Dec. 22, 1945, p. ? 
26. Ibid., Dee. 28, 1945, p. 3 
27. Ibid.. Deo. 28, 1945, p. 3 
28. Ibid.. Deo. 28, 1945, p. 3 
29, Ibid.. Dec. 28, 1945, p. 9 
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approval of the troop agreement. Neither of the notes 
#es ans#ere& by ?ranee. The Lebanese note of 9 January 
1946 Btetedf 
The Lebanew gOTeroment Immediately made kno#n 
to th# %lnl#t#r of Great Britain and to the repre-
aentatlT# of France in Lebanon, that being the third 
party #ith reapeet to th# agreement, it oonld only 
reeognlze the atlpolatlona of It aa likely to ing^ 
fringe *pon th# right* and intereata of Lebanon. 
Beeanae the not## ##nt nnana#ered, and beeanae no 
dafinit# aetlon «aa taken for the aithdraaal of troops, 31* 
Ihouri Informed the General Assembly of oondltiona In th# 
Levant at it* alzteenth meeting on 19 January 1946: 
The Syrian Govammaat, acting on a motion 
paaaed by the Syrian Parliament, haa reqaeated the 
Syrian delegation to bring thia matter to the atten­
tion of the Dnited Ration*, dem&ndlng an early and 
complet# aithdraaal of foreign troop#. 
The Syrian delegation *onld be content for the 
moment to do no more than aall th* attention of the 
Aaaembly to thla matter, ahloh It hope# #111 be re-
aolved by the early aithdraaal of foreign troops so 
that it #111 not be naoaaaary to bring up thla ques­
tion in full before the United Batlona Orgmnlzatim.®^ 
Before the Aaaembly in Jannary, ll-Ehouri did not re­
fer to oondltlona in Syria and Lebanon aa aonatltnting a 
"dlapRta." On the aontrary he uaed the term "matter." 
30, The Syrian legation did not eo-operate In aendlng a 
copy of the Syrian note of 26 December 1945, 
31. See Lebanese Mote of 9 January 1946, appendix, page 
52. General Assembly, Journal, First Session, No. 10, 
" York. 194*. p. 25ST ' 
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nomever la the joint Istter of 4 February 1946, the Gyrlsn 
aaa lebaaese governnants statea that ooadltlona at that 
tl#e ooaatltuted a "aiapute.* It must be Implied, then, 
that the aiaagreeoent betteea the British aa& the Freaoh 
themeelves ea to evacuation and regroupaeat of forces, the 
failure of that eTaooatloa of foreign forces to become a 
reality, the atrlkea and rlota that broke out la the Levant 
over the Interpretation of the agreement, the failure of 
France to anaiier overture a made by Syria and Lebanon In 
regard to évacuation, and the growing resentment bet*een 
French troopa and the Syrlan^Lebaneae populatloz^ leere the 
oauaes of the "dispute" on 4 February 1946. These condl-
tiona are sufficient causes for any "dispute." 
^Ith this history In aind, El-Ehourl oontlnued the 
Syrian case before the Council by ea^)lalnlng that a "dla-
pute* did e%l#t In Syria and Lebanon during this twentieth 
meeting of the Security Gounell. 5e malntalwd that French 
and British troopa *ere the oauae of thia *61apute." Be 
called upon the Security Council to take action and propose 
methoda of aettlement by deciding that: 
...all foreign armed foroee should be #ithdra*n 
almultaneouely from Syria end Lebanon and to fix a 
maximum date #hlch la technically posaible for the 
realization of the mlthdremal.^S 
33» Security Gounoil, official Reeorde; First Year, First 
B ê r l e s ,  K o .  I , "  ' ' W ê n t i e t h  m e e t i n g % ' " p .  
Ill 
34 
Georges Bidault, la speaking for franoe, #aa care­
ful to Inform th# Council of the paet bcnefolent French 
attitude toward tibe Levant states. He ezplalned that In-
depenàenoa wae granted to Syria eM Lebanon In 1641. Thla 
Independence eaa reoognlzed by the other nations of the 
world* and Bldaolt Inelated for that reason that Franee 
had been Inetrumental In having the Levant states Invited 
to the San Francleco Conference. Syria anA Lebanon re-
35 
ceived Invitatlona on 28 TKmrdh 1945. 
The question of whether Syria and Lebanon were eom-
pletely independent was debatable ae waa the etatement 
that France was Inetritmental in having Syria and Lebanon 
invited to the San franeisoo Conference. The argument 
that other nations of the world had aeoepted Syrlan-
Lebanese independence wae not debatable. The United King-
dom extended formal recognition to Lebanon on 26 DeoeaAer 
34» George* Bidault, freaoh diplomat, hiatorian, and edi­
tor, waa born In 1899. During World Far II, he 
served in the ranks and wae held prlaoner by the Nazie 
for eighteen montha. After relaaee, he became Chair-
awin of the Reeietanoe Council Inelde France. Bidault 
has been a past Prime Minister, Foreign !Mlnlster, and 
Kinleter of Foreign Affaire for JKranoe. He is a 
member of the Trench delegation to the United Rations. 
35. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chroaolo*y 
of the Second Woild War, New York, 1947, p. SSVl. 
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1941. Im July 1944, the Union of Soviet Socialist Be-
publlo* r#oognlzed Syria and Labanon aa aoTaralgn, Imda-
@7 
pandaAt atataa. Tha Umltad States aompletad raeognltlon 
@8 
by tha Great Foitrs on E7 September 1944. 
Sièaalt ooataadad that Fremeh troops #ara In Syria 
and Lebanon bacanaa of the heritage of war. Ha pointed out 
that Frenoh and British troops invaded the Levant In 1941 
to pro tee t the Syrian and Lebanese populations from the 
horrora of aar. Therefore, he frankly admitted that he 
eould not see hoe the Levant government* eonld insist npon 
the evaeimtlon of troops at this time. He explained that 
troops #ere still stationed In other belligerent eoontriea 
all over the world. Certainly, the Syrlan-Lebaneae situ­
ation did not differ from any of these. And, furthermore, 
Bidault argued that freneh troops eere legally in the Le­
vant. After all, France had been given certain responsi­
bilities nnder the mandate. One of these was the protec­
tion of the mandated territory. Bidault Inalated that the 
mandate had never been terminated de jnre through the no# 
defunct League of gatlone, and that conaeqnently It earn up 
56. Eonranl, op. cit.. p. 2S2. 
@7. Ibid., p. 30%. 
38. U. 3. Dept. of State, "Recognition of Syrian and Leba­
nese Independence," Wipt. of state Bulletin, XI, 
Vaahlngton, p. 313* 
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to the Ualted Bationa "to ammime (o#r) respooeibllity aad 
to deeid# whether apeolfio mmaaares ahoold be taken to ooo-
59 
tlaae to emaare the eeourlty of the region In queation.* 
Bidault Imaletad that a "dlapiAe* did act eziet be-
teeea JgYemoe and Syria and Lebanon. Aa eTldenmt, he elted 
the apeeeh of Il^Khoorl b#fore the General Aaaembly on 19 
Janïiary 1948. At that time ai*Kho%rl had referred to ecmdl-
tlona la the letant aa a "matter" and not ae a "dispute," 
Bidault stated: 
Bothlag has happened elnee then that oould alter 
the statua of .j^e question or give it the eharaeter 
of a dlapute**9 
Saving eoneluded that no "dispute* eziated, Bidault argued 
that Article 55 of the Charter #aa lnoperatlT@ in this case 
because that article referred to a "diapute" or e "altua-
41 
tlon being brought before the Council by any swmber nation# 
39. Security Gounell# official Beeorda: Mrat Tear, first 
aeries.':*. I. teeatietk meetiae. p. *9S. 
40. Ibid., p. B9g. 
41. fke Oalted lationa Charter. Article 35. 
"i. Any Meaner of ihîe (fnited Nations may bring any 
dispete, or aay aituetioa of the nature referred to In 
Artlele 2t4# to the attenitioa of the Security Oounell 
or of the Gemeral Aeeembly. 
2. A state ahlch is not a Kember of the United Ra­
tions may bring to the attention of the Security Coun-
oil or of the General Aaeembly any dispute to ehloh It 
la a party if it aecepts in advance, for the purposes 
of the dispute# the obligations of paoiflo settlement 
provided in the present Charter. 
3. The proceedlage of the General Assembly in reepect 
of matters brought to its attention under this Article 
#111 be subject to the provlsicws of Articles 11 and 12." 
48 
E# argued that Artlele 55 *aa Inoperative becauee the 
partie* isTolTed, Biaault contended, had not attempteo 
aettlemeat through negptlatloaB or other method* prior to 
42 
auhmlttlag the question to the COQncll, (Prance had 
turaed a deaf ear to the overturea made by Syria acd Leba* 
Bon in notes of 26 Peeemher 1945 and 9 Janoary 1948.) 
farthermorep Bidault argued that Article 34 (the article 
under which the Syrian and lebaaeae goTerament* had aub-
fflltted the "dispute" to the Council] was inoperative because 
under this article the Counell aaa glTen the right to in-
veatlgate any "dispute* or any "aituatlon" that might en-
43 
danger morld peace. The Council had not inreatlgated the 
Syrian-Lebaneee queation in the peat, so Bidault queatloned: 
Why, therefore, invoke thla Article (34) no*, if 
not because in fact there is no dispute, and bec%uae 
the existing eituatlon la Syria and Lebanon cannot in 
good faith be considered as likely to endanger inter­
national peace and aecurity?** 
42" 2*14.. Article 35. 
*IT" The parties to any dispute, the continuance of 
ehlch is likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, shall, first of all, 
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, re­
sort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice. 
2, The Security Council shall, when it deems neces­
sary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute 
by such means." 
43. See pase. la. 
44. Security Gounoil. Official Records; First Tear, First 
Serle s .Wo. " 'I, twentieth meeting, p. ̂ 62. 
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The Freaoh delegate** argument that a "dispute* did 
not exist la Syria and Lebanon «as b&eed upon hla inter­
pretation of Artioles 35, 34, and 35 of the Charter. Thia 
Interprétation, hoaever, wee that of only one meaber of 
the Security Counoll, It la questionable whether its logic 
*83 Bound. The ezlsteaee or non-eziatence of a *dlapute" 
cannot be eetabllshed by merely examining certain ertlclea 
of the Charter. The "eubetanoe* or oauee of that condition 
gust be studied. The evidence of all parties involved must 
be heard. The majority of the member* had accepted the 
latter procedure in the nineteenth meeting. 
The French position obvlouely was oppoeed to that taken 
by the Syrian and Lebaneee delegate*. The latter had ar­
gued that a "diepute" did eilet la the levant at this time. 
That "dlepute* #a* eauaed by the maintenance of French ana 
Brltiah troop* in the region against the ezpreeaed *111 of 
the Syrimn-Lebaneme people*. The French delegate insisted 
that aueh *aa not true. He argued that there *aa no "dis» 
pute;" and, moreover, that French troope «ere not a threat 
to world peace beeeuae they had a legal right to be in 
Syria and Lebanon. 
Ill 
Cadogan, representing the United Kingdom In the ab-
50 
aeaoe of Bevla, aaaured the Security Couaoll that hla gov-
ernmeat 3lahed to evaouate British troopa from Syria aad 
Lehaaon aa sooa aa posaible. Be, as did Bidault, ooateaded 
that British troopa wefe la the Levant aa * heritage of 
Rorld 3ar II. But, mere Importaat atiil, Cadogaa iaforaed 
the members that Brltiah troops were in the Levaat beoauae 
they had been requested by the Syriaa-Lebaaese goverameata 
la Bay 1945. 
To uaderataad Cadogaa'* argumeat, a brief eiaalaatioa 
must be made of oondltlo&s in Syria aad Lebaaoa la the 
aprlag aad aummer of 1945. 
During April aad May 1946, France, represeated by 
General Paul-B#yaet, #a* attempting to aegptlate oertaia 
treatlea #lth Syria aad Lebanon prior to the turning over 
of the " troupea apeolalea* to the Levant government s aad 
prior to the complete evaeuatloa of French troop*. The 
treatle* *ere to guarantee to France atrateglc right* in 
the form of air fields in Syria and naval bases in Lebanon ; 
45. The "troupes epeclalea" mere Syrian and Lebanese 
troops «îiich «ere incorporated into the frenoh army 
in that they «ere completely under the jurisdiction 
of the freneh eommand. They totaled between 25,000 
end 30,000 in July 1945. In contract, there were only 
5,000 French troop* in the Levant at the time. But, 
because France controlled the ^troupes aplclales," 
she controlled the military strength ot Syria and 
Lebanon and could, therefore, dictate policy. The 
Kern York Timee, July 8, 1945, p. 6. 
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#ooao*lo privileges in the fom of preferential tariffs; 
ana cultural advantagea ia that th# Franob languag# *aa to 
48 
the aompulaory languag# in Levant aohools» Th# Levantine 
4? 
states agreed only to th# #trat#gle right# condition. 
Durlag the proa#*# of negotiation, the Pr#B#h steamer, 
46 
Jeanme d'lr#. unload#d 500 S#n#gal### troops at Beirut, 
fran## #ont#nd#d that the &#n#gal### *#r# needed replaoe-
memta for fïench troop# la Syria and Lebanon then being 
##nt to the Paeifio. Syria and Lebanon interpreted the 
move a# #n attempt to build up Freaeh military strength in 
the Levant to eoeree their government# into granting the 
special righte France d##lr*d. In retaliation, the Syrian 
and Lebanese r#pre$ent#tiv## walked out of the conferenoe. 
A chain réaction followed the walkout. Strikes and 
riots, culminating in street fighting in Damascus, Aleppo, 
and Bern# enmed. On Sd l^y 1945, the United States ad­
dressed a note to the French government expressing "deep 
concern over the French thrwt of fore# to obtain concee-
sloos of a political, cultural, and military nature" in the 
49 
Bear last. Syria and Lebanon appealed to the Sen 
46. Time. XLV, 1945, p. 58. 
4? * Ibid *, p# 38* 
40. Bewsweek. XZV, 1945, p. 61. 
49. The lew York Times, May 29, 1945, p. 1. 
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rf&nol*oo Goafer&D** to take aotloa la the "dlapute" bat 
##re laformad that the body #a# la a prooe#* of foramtloa 
50 
aad had no jurladletloa. Therefore, they appealed to 
the Bolted Klagdo* for aeeded Brltlah troop proteotlon, 
Brltlah troop# *#re ##Bt Imto the area oa 51 %ay 1945, th# 
same day that Chardhlll aeat hi# *##ae# fire" note to de 
Oaulle atatlngi 
la cyder to avoid a oolllalon heteeen the Brltlah 
a*d Preaeh feree# «# regaemt you immediately to order 
th# Freneh troop# to ##a*# fire aad #lthdra# to their 
harraaka. Oao# firing ha* eeaaed and order haa heea 
reatored, «e ahall he prepared to hegln tripartite 
talk# hare la Loadoa*5l 
Immediately after reeelvlag th# "a#a## fir#" order, de 
Gaulle, la an attempt to #av# fa## la the Rear Beat, pro-
posed a foar Power Confarenae of franoe, the Baited Kingdom, 
the Soviet Baloa, aad th# Baited Stat## to daal alth all 
52 
problems In th# Bear Bast. Th# #oaf#reaoe #as not held 
heeaaa* the Baited Stat## aad th# Bait#d Klagdom b#ll#v#d 
that th# aattlameat of eoadltloa* la Syria and Labaaon 
Shoold b# left up to the poaer# Involved. 
franae attempted another method of settlement In the 
latter part of Jume 1945. The frenah representative. 
50. Ibid.. *#f 30, 1945, p. 18. 
51. Ibid.. Jaae 1, 1945, p. #. 
52. Iblâ., 3, 1945, p * S» 
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Joaaph p&%l-Boa@our, appeals* to E&«ard 3. Stettlniua, 
Ghelrman of the 3%#@utlT# Commltte* at the 8an franclaao 
Ooafereaae, to eatabllah a three meabar aooolllatory oom-
55 
mltta* to Investigate aondltlon* Im the lavant. StettUdaa 
refueea on the groon&a that the United Ratlone aaa not 
@4 
eqnippad to handle ##oh qgeatlona at that time. The or­
ganization *ae la a pro***# of formation, and It would ap» 
pear that Stettlnla# «lahed to keep it free from settling 
partlonlar lasuea until the proper maehlnery *as eatahUahed. 
franee and the Ualtad Kingdom did reach certain agree-
manta *lth Syria and Lebanon derlag the anmmer of 1945, On 
? July 1945, General Beyaet annonaoad that the "troapea 
apdelalea" *oald be teraed over to Syrian and Lebaaeae an-
55 
thorltiea within forty-flTe day#. Thl# aotloa #aa com-
plated within the atlpalated time limit. On 25 July 1945, 
France and the United Xlngdom agreed, through an agreement 
signed by General Paget and General Beynet, that Freneh 
6 
troop# were to remain la the eoaatal areaa of labanon only. 
On Ë8 July 1945, the complete military control of Syria waa 
taraed o*#r to the 8yrlan govarnment with the one ezception 
53. Ibid.. June 25, 1*45, p. 10, 
54. Ibid., June 25, 1945, p. 10. 
55. Ibid.. July 8, 1945, p. 6. 
56. Ibid.. July 26, 1945, p. 9. 
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S? 
that fraaoe retalaed several mlrflelds ia the country, 
Hosever the complete evaouatloo of foreign troops had 
aot haea oarried out by Deeeaber 1945. la aa attempt to 
reach aa egreem&at aa to evaouatloa aad to provide for *e* 
ourlty In the zone uatll th# United BatlGBs oould aot, the 
AB&lo-?reaoh igreemeat of 13 Deoeaber 1945 *as eigaed, 
Thla *as the agreement to whleh Syria and Lebaaoa objeeted 
beeawae no aet tlme-llait for evaegatlon #aa e&tabllshed. 
The aembera eere aeara of theae facts at the time that 
Cadogaa *as addreeelag the tweatleth meetlog of the Seourl-
ty COBAOll, 
Oadogaa eoatlaaad the British eaee *lth the British 
laterpretatioa of the Aaglo~Frea*h igreemeat of 15 Deeeaber 
1945* Be argued that it #a* Impoaelble for the British to 
elthdra# their troopa aad leave a vaeawm la th* levaat, »h 
mhere, he remladed th# Oouaell, th#r# had beea troubled 
eoadltloa# aad bad feellag. After all, Brltlmh troope had 
been ealled la for th# preeervatloa of order* aad Gadogaa 
felt that theae troopa should be malatalned until the Se* 
ourity Comaell oould eatablleh "oolleotlve eeourlty," 
Gadogaa argued that the agreemeat oould la ao may be in­
terpreted to mean that Frenoh *ad Brltlah troop* mere to 
stay in the Levaat for aa Imdeflalte time, oa the eoatrary. 
57. Ibid,. July 27, 1945, p. 7. 
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statad: 
And I repeat, o*r desire la to «Ithdre# at the 
aarlleat pe#*ibl* #o**at and ba fr*a of raspoaalblll-
ty to «biôh, by our preseaca la tha Levaat, are 
a%poa#â*G6 
IT 
Th# t#aatl#th maatlag of tha 8#*urity Gouaeil pro-
Tldad a forum for th# actual dlaoeaalon of tha Syrian* 
Lebaaeaa question by the four parties imvolvad. Rone of 
tha other mambers ezprassa* oplaloa# oa tha question in 
thl# maetlag. 
Tha ayriaa and &ab#aas* dalegatas# El-Khourl aad 
Fraa&la, formally aAvised tha Oouaoll that fraaoh and 
Brltlah troop# #are balag malatalaad oa Syrian and Leban­
ese soil agaiast tha eiprassad alshas of their governments. 
They insisted that the praaaaoa of thaa* foreign troops 
«as a definite vlolatioa of their sovereignty, further­
more, Fraagie and Zl»Khourl eonteadad that these foreign 
troops oa their soil ooastltuted a "dispute" #hloh might 
gravely threaten tha peao#. They insisted that these 
foreign troops be evaeuat#d immediately and oalled upoa 
the Couaall to take aotloa. 
58, Besurlty Oounai1. Official Baoordsi first Year, First 
È er le s, ao, ' I, t # ent i at h maetinr, pT ~ 
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Bidault and Cadogaa admitted that Freneh and British 
troopa gere stationed In Eyrlc ana Lebanon, nowevar, they 
argued that their foroea were In the Levant because of the 
heritage of *ar an&la fact, Dlda&lt olBlmed that French 
troops had kept the Lavant safe from the horrors of #ar. 
Gadogan admitted that British troops had entered with the 
Allied foreee In 1941, but he alao pointed out that Brltlah 
troopa were la Syria and Lebanoa because their preaenoe had 
been requested by the Syrian aad Lebanaae goveraments In 
Bay 1945. 
B&th Bidault and Cadogan reeognlzed the eoTereignty 
and Independeace of Syria and Lebanon, but they appeared to 
believe that the preeeaoe of their troops within the Levant 
state* was no abridgment of independence. Bidault eon-
tended that Franoe atlll had certain reaponalbilitlea with­
in the area, namely that of providing secwrlty. Be eiplain-
ed that Ptanee wae charged with this duty until the United 
Nations could eatabliah eeourity in the Levant. Cadogan 
accepted the latter arg#m&nt. Both admitted that the Anglo-
French Agreement of 15 December 1945 had been drawn up for 
this interim period until the United Mations could establish 
"collective security," 
frangle and Sl~Khourl complained that the Anglo-French 
Agreement was a bilateral agreement whloh vitiated their 
sovereignty and the Charter. They argued that Syria and 
5? 
Lebanon «ere able to provide for their own aeourlty. 
Prangle eyrlelaed that neither Syria aor Lebeooa #ere 
"trust terrltoriea" or *#trate%lo area#," and, foreign 
forcee had no legal right In their ooentrle#. 
Bidault etated flatly that a "dlapute" did not ezlat. 
Be taraed to Artlelaa 33, 34, and 35 of the Charter to 
prove his point. Primarily, he b^#*d the Frenah eaae om 
the Interpretation of Article 55, malntalalng that eloee 
Syria and Lebanon had refuaed to negotiate there could be 
BO "dlepqte." Cadogan *me Bon*oom*lttal on the question 
of whether a "dlapate* did or did not ezlat» but he did 
admit that @ troubled eoadltlon eilated la Kay 1945, 
Prscgle and Sl-Khourl mlatruated Cadogan*a non-committal 
attitude and flatly rejected Bldault*a ineletenoe that a 
"dispute" did not ezlat. 
frengle and El»Khourl maintained that tb* Security 
Council should pettle the "dlepete." They requeated Im­
mediate, glmolteneoua mithdrmeal. Bidault Implied the 
laaue could be settled between the parties through nego­
tiations. Frangie and El-Khourl mlatruated negotiations 
because aegotietlona la the past had been unauccesaful. 
Cadogan did not commit himself oa a method of settlement. 
3e stated that British troops were ready to withdraw, and 
further informed the Gouaoll that the prioolple of evacu-
atioa aes set dosn in the Anglo-freneh Agreement. 
52̂  
In tSG&tlGtb meetl&g of the Scourity Council ao 
actlOD %&8 taken for the settlement of the Syrlaa-Lebaaeaa 
question, the arguments of the four p&rtlsG In­
volved BGre heerC. The ma^berG, therefore, received Infor-
matloa that alght aid la the future settlemeat of a condi* 
tioB iB Syria acd Lebanon thick Wrangle and 21-Ehouri 
termed & "dispute." 
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Cm?T2R 17 
THE TW2gTT*?IR8T MEETING 
oy THE szcnaiTY coiwcii, 
The Seemrity Counoil reassembled after a three hoar 
recE#*, mû dlaouesloa of the Syrlaa-Lebaneee queetlon 
*as eoDtlBued la the teeaty-flrat meeting held at Church 
House, Weatmlalater, Londoa, on 15 February 1946. The 
same repreeeatatlve* *ere present, #lth one ezeeptlon: 
Bevln, the permanent delegate from the Baited Kingdom, 
1 
replmeea Oadogan mho had eat la the teeatleth meeting» 
I 
Frasgle of lebaaoa opened the dleoueeloa. He attasked 
the paeudo-benevolent attitude of fraBce ae palated by 
Bidault In the previous meeting aad eontended that the is­
sue did not lie beteeea aa almaye geaermua France and al­
ways dlaeoatented Syria aad Lebanon. In proof, he stated ; 
...the reoogaltloa of Syria*# aad lebanoa+a 
ladepeadeae* *as not a pure gesture of benevolenoe 
1. Security Council, Official Records; first Year, First 
9eriea/Ko. Î. tfenty-firet meetiai. p. S98. ' 
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but am aet of Jastic® as «ell as being vital for the 
«ar effort.* 
In axplasatloc, Frangle noted that Syria and Lebanon had 
aided the Allies la World War II. Both of the Levant 
State# had placed at the dlapoaal of the Allie# their man# 
of ooamunication, their eoonomio and industrial souroes, 
3 
and their troop*. Prangie Insisted that eithout thi# aid 
(ainoe there #ere only 12,000 British and 3,000 frenoh 
troop# in the area in 1941), the Allied oampaign in the 
4 
Rear East mould have loat it# effeotiveae##. Se oonelmded 
that Syria and Lebanon had #ho»n that they mere eapable of 
defending themaelTe# and, oerteialy to a great extent, had 
earned their independenoe, 
Prangie again refuted the heritage of nar argument 
ttsed pretioasly by Cadogan and Bidault. Hostilities had 
ended, and he insisted that Freneh and British troop# must 
be evacuated. Xvaouation preaented no baaic problem#. The 
Lebaaeae delegate oalatained that all the Pïenoh and British 
had to do eas withdraw. These troop# had no legal right to 
provide for Syrian and Lebame#e #eourity. frangle insisted 
that as sovereign and independent states, Lebanon and Syria 
«ere reaponaible for their o«n aeeurity, and foreign troop# 
had no legal or moral right to usurp this responsibility. 
2. Ibid., p. 296. 
5. Ibid., p. 29*. 
4. Ibid., p. 296. 
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fraagle oallea upon tbe Security Council to mettle th* 
qaeetloa: 
The Lebaneae delegation, a* «ell aa the Syrian 
delegation, la prepared to eonalder a eolgtlon which, 
on the baala of tke fundamentel prlnelplea of the Char­
ter, eoBld provide for the almnltaneona *lthdra*al of 
freneh a6d Brltlah troop# atatloned in Syria and Leba­
non in full reeognitlon of the aoverelgn rights of 
theae Stataa».#* 
8ueh avaouation, he explained, ahould not only be aimultan-
#o%a But nnaondltlonal. Re aaked that th# «Ithdraeal be 
anbjeot only "to the tl#e required for making the neoeasary 
© 
teehnleal and material arrangementa." Syria and Lebanon 
would aoeept no other aondltlona. Frangie then aeked that 
the gueation be settled under the continued auepioes of the 
Council until the eithdraaal had been carried out in full. 
II 
The repreaeatative of the United States, Br. Edaard R» 
f 
Stettinlua, spoke for the firat time on the Syrien-Lebaneaa 
6 * Xbid. » * p « wOO • 
6, Ibid*, p. 500. 
?. Edward B* Stettiniua, Jr., was born on 22 October 1900. 
Re waa educated *& Pcmfret school and at the Onlveralty 
of Virginia. Be ha* l#ng been connected with govern­
ment affairs in t&e United States. In 1944-1945, 
Stettinlua waa Secretary of State. Be hae been chair­
man of the united States delegation to the General Aa-
aembly alnoe 1945 and la the American representative 
on the Security Council. 
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question la this meeting. Sttttinlas believe# that the 
t»€stion of évacuation of French and British troops should 
tome under Article 33 of the Charter. Slnee negotiations 
had not been ezhaueted by the parties Involved, he sug-
geeted that they farther eontlnne negotiation* among them-
eelvea, Ontll a aettlement *a* reeehed, the gueetlon ehould 
be of coatletting concern to the Council. 
In omtllnlng general United State* policy In awch mat­
ter*, Stettlnla* Informed the Council that hie government 
supported and encouraged the removal of Allied troop* from 
member nation* #hen thoee member nation* so requested. Be 
stated: In ©o 
In conformity with this general policy, I wish 
to ezprea* the hope of the United State* Government 
that the desire* of the Syrian and Lebanese Govern­
ment* that the foreign troops in their territory 
should depart at the earliest practicable moment 
shall be met by mean* of e mutually satisfactory 
agreement to that effect.* 
Thus Stettlnlu* committed the United State* government. 
The United States not only deelred the evacuation of inglo-
Prench troop* from Syria and Lebanon, but auch evacuation 
ehould take place at the earliest practicable moment. 
Stettlni** did not define "practicable moment." He left 
this to the parties Involved. 
8. Ibid., p. 301. 
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III 
?y«hlD#ky rebutted Bidault*e argument on t*o major 
premieea. He claimed that the plaolng of any ooadltlone 
OB the oomplete eTaouatioa of Aaglo-freneh troops from 
Syria and Lebanon #as contrary to the Charter, and he ooa-
tended that franee had no right to special privileges in 
Syria and Lebanon. 
Tyshinsky again referred to the French note of General 
» 
Beynet to Syria aod Lebanon of 18 May 1945* Be informed 
the Gooneil that the note had demanded certain cultural, 
strategic, and economic privileges before france would 
give %p the "troapes spéciales * to Syria and Lebanon. 
He implied that, because Bidault #as uneillli% to commit 
himself on certain conditions to be settled before the evec-
uatlon, France still was attempting to get the same privi­
leges as those la Nay 1945, Tyshinsky called upon Bidault 
to etate epeeifically ehat conditions sere to be f^&fllled 
before the removal of troops could be realized. The Soviet 
delegate cautioned the Council that conditions of the na­
ture impoeed upon Syria and Lebanon by france in 1945 sere 
9. la a letter of 29 January 1951 to the author, the French 
Embassy stated that the note *as not made public. 
10. See page 
64 
imeompatlble *lth Artlol* E of th# GharteT. 
Vyahlnaky atated that Soviet UmloD could not ao-
oapt the premlB* that Ffaaoe ma* entitled to special privi­
leges la th* Levant. He alleged that the halted Kingdom 
did aoeept freneh special privileges la the Levant (the 
Lyttelton-.de Oaulle Agreement of 7 lagnst 1941 had stlpa-
11 
lated saoh.) As proof# he quoted from a ^eeoh made by 
de Gaulle In the Consultative Assembly of franee la June 
1945: 
On# might say that the Interest s of our t#o ns'» 
tlons (France and the United Kingdom) and the Inter* 
eats of Arab 3tates Imply the aeoesslty for franoe 
and England to adopt a eommon position and to porsae 
a oommon pollay, as se have suggested a good number 
of tlmms.l* 
The Anglo*frensb Troop Agreement of 15 Dso«sber 1945 did 
provide for mutual ewpport aad oonsaltatlon betseen franee 
13 
and the United Kingdom on all Near Eastern problems. 
Farthenmore, neither France nor the United Elagdom sas to 
Interfere *lth the other's established laterests la that 
14 
area, Tyshlnsky soasladed that the latter statemeat 
could only refer to eertala special laterests. 
11. See 3V. 
12. Security Coaaoll. Offloial Records: First Ygar, first 
Èerles. Bo* Ï, twenty-first meeting, p. 305. 
13. See appendix, pà&c. JSl. 
14. Ibid.. 
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VyshlB*ky*B el&lm *@a not unfoundea. Churchill, In 
reporting before the House of Common# In 1945 on the Yalta 
Confereoce, mtated that the Dnlted Kl%6om "nould never 
#eek to enpplant French Inflmenee by British Influenoe in 
15 
the Levant State*." It was Indisputable that the United 
Kingdom at the time of Yalta favored a privileged poai-
16 
tlon for france In Syria and Lebanon. Opposing the 
British position at Yalta were the United State* and the 
Soviet Union *iio insisted that there mere to be "no ane* 
17 
clal pomitlona for any foreign eountrle* " in the Levant. 
Vyahlnaky had such statements in mind when dlsouaaing 
French special privileges before the Gonncil. 
The Soviet delegate continued to attack the Anglo-
French Troop Agreement on legal grounds. Be stated that 
it *a# a violation of the principles of sovereignty laid 
dosn in Article B of the Charter bee*use the agreement #a# 
signed withoet the consent of Syria and Lebanon. Further-
more, Tyshinaky attacked the agreement because It contained 
no set method for evacuation, le argued that the agreement 
contai&ed nothing but "algebraic formulae, and abstract 
15. The Re# York Times, March 5, 1945, p. 10. 
16. Ibid.. March 5, 1945, p. 18. 
17. Ibid., March 5, 1945, p. 18. 
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18 
proml#ee, mltbomt any real basla of reality," end he 
feand It totally uomorkahle, laatly, Vyahlnaky iaalatad 
that "oolleotlve aaourlty" me* a matter which aonoarned 
Syria and lebanon alone because the Dolteo Hatlona had not 
acted. He maintained that France and the United Kingdom 
had no legal right to l*po*e aecurlty on a sovereign state, 
and he coneluded: 
fros the point of vie* of the elementary prin­
ciples of international la*, this Agreement is sim­
ply Illegal, simply unfair in regard to the sover* 
elgnty of Syria and Lebanon,..19 
Tyahlnsky mentioned nothing abont the principle of 
evacuation that actually was embodied In the Anglo-French 
jlgreement. He did not attack It# "substance." ge could 
not because the principle of evacuation was stated, 
Tyshlnsky was correct In maintalnlog that no method of 
withdrawal was established* He was correct in *Bintainlng 
that the agreement abridged the sovereignty of Syria and 
Lebanon» After all, the agreement wae signed by France and 
the Fnlted Kingdom without the consent or without the par­
ticipation of the levantine states. 
Tyshlnaky admitted the need for French and British 
18, Security Counoll, Official Record; first Tear, first 
3erles. No. I. twenty-first meetiAg, p, 305. 
19. Ibid., p. @05. 
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troops in the Levant durlag World %ar II, bcoauae thoae 
troops #er@ providing "oolleotlve security* for the Levant 
durlag the #ar period. However, he malatalned that there 
DO longer %as a need for forel&a troops in the area* aaa 
that actually freach troops gere creating "collective la-
geourlty" because they *ere being atatloned against the e%-
presaed ^111 of the Syrian and lebaaea* peoplea. Re re» 
ferred to the etrlkes and riots of May 1945 as an example 
of "oolleetlve Ineecurlty," and insisted that much condl-
tlone did Goaatltute a "dispute." Because of these clrca*^ 
etencea, the Soviet delegate Informed the membere thst the 
Syrian-Lebanese appeal for evacuation of troops *a* a "de-
20 
mand" and not a "requeet*" He Inelated that the Council 
could not stand by as a epeetator in thl* "dispute,* and 
called upon It for Immediate action to bring about settles 
ment* vymhlneky concluded: 
The only decision worthy of our Organization la 
to satisfy the demand of the Syrian and Lebanese Gov-
ernaents, which the Soviet delegation hereby fully 
supports in the name of the Soviet Government. 
IT 
la speaking for Chine, loo insisted that the malnten-
20. Ibid,, p. 309. 
21. Ibid., p. 30@. 
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aace of foreign troops im the territory of a friendly 
eoverel&B state, elthout the ezpre** oomeeat of that state, 
«a® a prima facie case of limitation of that state's sorer-
elgaty. He polated out that this *ae happeaiag la Syria 
aaâ Lebanoa aad stated: "Such troops should be eithdraea 
22 
as sooa as possible»* 
Koo suggested aegotlatioas beteeea the fomr parties 
iavolved as a method of settlemeat. Be eiplalaed that 
these aegotiatloas oaght to be ooaoeraed only with the prao-
tieal arrangements aeeessary for withdrawal, iaeludiag the 
flzlag of a period for the begiaalag sad oompletloa of the 
evae%iatioa. tJotil the evaoaatioa «as eompleted, the Chinese 
delegate believed that the 5#eurity Ooaooll should be tept 
laformed of the progress of the aegotlatloas betmeen the 
parties. 
At this point, the presldeat briefly summarized the 
causes of the Syriaa-Lebaaese question. He stated that 
although troops had beea statioaed la the Levaat ia the 
past for a definite purpose, that purpose was ao# aeoom-
pushed, aad Syria aad Lebanoa had requested that these 
troops be eveeuatea. Be oautloaed the members that these 
troops mere ao# statioaed oa the territories of tio member 
aatloas agaiast the #111 of those member cations, aad that 
Ibia.. p. 309. 
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therefor* the guestioa «a* of a different nature than thet 
25 
of the three prevloua easee before the Couaell. The 
president euggeated the folloeing plan for eveooatlon: 
..*lt would be sufflcieat if the Couaeil took 
note of the etetementa of the partiee and invited 
them to eoBtinne aegotletlone *ith a Tie* to reaoh-
iag an agreed aolutloa of thie problem epeedlly. 
The résulta of the aegotiatloaa mhould be reported 
to th* Cooneil, and if they are not aatiaf otorily 
eoneluded aithin a reesonable time* the Coonoil can 
thea eoneldar #hat further aetioa it might aleh to 
take.*4 
No aotloB aae taken oa the preeldeat** proposal. 
? 
Biaz of Egypt ineieted that the Syrian and Lebanese 
reqaeata for troop aithdraaal #ae abaolutely legal. He 
pointed oat that the reqaeet #aa foaaded oa the beaio 
premlee upon ahich the United Katioaa had been eatabllehed, 
that of the aovereiga eqaality of aatioaa. Be etatedi 
If ageh a elear and eell eatabllehed prlaoiple 
le put Into doubt ...it eoald be better for ua to 
disband this Organiaatloa and leave to the five 
great foeere the right to do what they thlak fit for 
23. la the Iraaian qaeatloa foreign troops mere atationed 
la Iran uader legal tresty arraagamenta. In the Greek 
and ladoneaiaa queetloas, foreign troops «ere atation­
ed upon Greek and Indoaealan territory with the eon-
aeat of those t$o governmenta. 
24. ^oarlty Counell, Official Reeorde; first Tear, First 
Series, Ko. 1, tienty-fIrat meeting, p. ^11. 
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25 
the malDtenaDee of peace end proBperlty. 
Although Wlaz coasldered that the Syrian and lebanese akdma 
were based upon legpl groundc, the égyptien dele&ate deemed 
the franeh olalm to be baaed upon mere political, moral, 
hlatorleal, and opportunlatlo grounds. Be eteted: "...the 
freneh argument does not reat on any legal baala; It la no 
more based on the text of tiie Charter than on recognized prln-
2* 
olples of International la#.* 
Rlez* Interpretation *as eorrect. Syria mad Lebanon 
were no longer "mandate*" or "truata." The levant dele­
gates algned the Charter and #ere aooected Into the family 
27 
of sovereign nation* at San ffanolaoo, franee, however, 
atlll considered the mandate to be In de jure effect be-
o&use she had not turned It over to an International or­
ganization. This position *aa not accepted by the other 
natlona» nor «ea It valid fro* a legal standpoint. 
Hlaz questioned the right of franoe and the United 
Kingdom to provide for aeaurlty In Syria and Lebanon. Re 
maintained that, accordlag to Article 43 of the Charter, 
28 
Syria and Lebanon were responsible for their oi-m security. 
25. Ibid*, p. 311. 
2Ô. Ibid., p. 311. 
27. See page -54. 
28. See page 3?, 
?1 
Be Informed the Couaoll that mgreemeote made bet#e#D meabers 
for protection under Article 43 *ere to be aegotlated "on 
29 
the Initiative of the Seoorlty Council." The Anglo-French 
Agreement of 1& Deoember 1945 had not been negotiated on the 
inltlstlve of the Council. Therefore Prenoe and the United 
Kingdom, aooordlng to Blmz, were usurping the right* and 
dutlee of Syria end lebanoo as *ell as thoee of the Security 
Council. 
Blaz aeoepted Koo'e anggeatlon for settlement. The 
Egyptian delegate aeaerted that negotiation# should be 
started Immediately bet#een the four parties to the "dispute." 
Ee too believed that negotiation* ahomld deal only *ltb the 
dlacuaalon of the ways and means Beoeasary to bring about 
troop "withdrawal from Lebaaon and Syria aa gulekly aa poe-
30 
Bible." 
31 
Mr. Zygmunt Modaelevakl of Folaod spoke for the first 
29. 8ea page 39. 
30. Security Counell Officiel Beoorda, First Year., First 
series, te, I, teenty-firat meeting, p. Z1È. 
31. Zygmunt Modzeleeekl, Polish statesman and diplomat, eaa 
twrn In 1900, He *as adueated at the School of Politi­
cal Science In Paris. After serving as an officer In 
the rollah Army In %orld War II, he beeame Ambassador 
to the Soviet Union In 1945. Ee also served aa Polish 
Dnder-Seeretary of State and Minister of Foreign Af­
fairs In 1945. In 1946, Modzelewakl *a* W&e Polish 
repreaentatlve on the Security Council and one of the 
Members of the Polish delegation to the Geaeral Assembly. 
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time on the Syrlaa-Lebanese qwcstloa, After welcomlag 
Syria and Lebanon to the family of Independeat states, he 
Informed the Gouaoll that It should settle the legally 
juetlfled claims preseated by the Levantine aationa, Ee 
stated: 
...the Polish deleratloa *111 not heeltate to 
vote in support of the solution asked for by the 
delegations of Syria end Lebaaoa,a6vea if my delega-
tion should be In the minority.. 
Therefore, the Polish delegate aaaepted the elala of the 
Levant states. Furthermore, Modzelewski asserted that the 
founeil should take aetlon to rid those two countries of 
freneh and British troops. 
Be Freltas-Talle of Brazil, in azplalnlng that foreign 
troops should be kept In a member nation only by virtue of 
agreement *lth that nation In which troops mere atatloned, 
aceepted the Stettinlus philosophy expressed earlier In 
this meeting. The Brazilian delegate agreed with the other 
members of the Council «ho proposed negotiations between 
France, the United Kingdom, Syria and Lebanon, 
32, Security Council, Offlolal Records, First Tear, First 
ëerles, No.'''Ï» t*enly-firet meting, p." 3l4'. 
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VI 
Bidault, iB &Ba«er to Tymhlaaky+a pravloua queatlona, 
did DOt aiplala #bat apaalfle laauee freoo# alàbed to ne­
gotiate prior to evaeuatloB. Be did laform the CouBcll, 
homaver, that la J%Be 1945 d* Qaull* had propoaed a five 
po*#r oonfereoce to examlae the «hole Bear Baatarn altwa-
tioa. The Graat fo*er@ bad not aecaptad the Invitation. 
Purthermora, Prane* had requaetad that the 8an Franalaoo 
Confaraaoa aat up a aommlaaloa of aaqalry to atudy oondl-
34 
tloaa In Syria and Labaaon In Juae 1945, Thla aotlon, 
too, had aot baas aooaptad. Tharafora, Bidault maintained 
that hla govarnmeat had attamptad to uaaovar the faota In 
the oaaa, Slaae no actloa *aa taken prevloualy, the French 
delegate mainteInad: 
*,.lf the proble* la studied with the necaaeary 
Impartiality, it %111 be fouBd that there la noddla-
pute likely to andaagar paaca or, therefore, to jua-
tlfy any apaolal action on the part cf the Security 
Oooacll*" 
Sine* there aaa no "dlapate," Bidault propoaed that the se­
curity Council ahould rely upon the French government, to-
33. See page 52. 
34. See page 
55* Security Coiwoll, Official Records; Flrat Year, First 
Siriei, lo. "1.' tmenty-flret mèeting* p.' 
gather *lth the British goverameat In agreement *lt& Syria 
amd lebanon, to reach a satisfactory aolutloa of the aiffl-
QultleB 3ubmltte& to the Couooll. 
Bidault *38 Gorreet la assertlag that PraDee had at­
tempted on the tao ocoaaioas eeatloaed to have the problem 
lovestlgated. Both times froBoe BAD beea turoed do*D. 
Homever, Franoe %aa never reedy to evacuate without Impoe-
lag certain ooadltloa* oa Syria end Lebeaàa. For thle rem* 
eoa, Syria mad Lebeaoa had, aa a lest resort, gybmltted 
*hat they termed a "dlepute" to the security Coucoll, 
Yaa Eleffeae of The Retherland* *ee the laet to speak 
on the Syrlaa-Lebaaeee queetloa la the taeaty-flrst meeting. 
He partially upheld the Freaoh poeltloa by Implylag that 
Freaee mould %lthdra* her troope at the earliest poaelble 
time. He e&id that troop* etlll «ere atatloaed la many 
oouBtrlee ae a result of the #er. suah oondltloDe oouia not 
be remedied overalght, Tet The Netherlaada delegate admit­
ted that the atatlonlag of troops on the territory of a 
eoTereiga etate without the eooeeat of that state esa a 
breech of that etate*s eoverelgaty, For thl* reaeoa he *ae 
eare that Praaee mould *lthdr** her troop*. Bovever, If 
withdrawal of foreign troop* oould aot be erraaged betveea 
the p&rtlee Involved, van Eleffene suggeated th&t the Se­
curity Couacll thea take ectloa uader Article 34 of the 
75 
58 
Charter* He #uhmltte4 the folloeing motion for eettlemeat 
of the Syrlan-Lebaaege diapute: 
I therefore believe that the Couaeil ahoald take 
note of the atatemeate ma&e by the foar State*; e%-
preae Ita ooafl&enoe that, a# a result of negotla* 
tioB* or otherelae* the foreign troope la Syria eod 
Lebaaoa *111 be elthdraen at ao distant date; re-
qmeat the partie# to Inform the Council mhen thle ha# 
been done, la order that the Gouaell may at any tlm# 
revert to the ̂ »#tlon; and pe#e on to the next Item 
on the agenda.™ 
The van Kleffene motion *a# the first formal proposal for 
#ettlemeat of the Syrlan-lebaneee dlapete. It euggeated 
that the four partie# to th# "diepate* nettle that "dlepnte" 
through negotiation# among themaelvee. These negotiation# 
mere to deal with the evaouatlon of foreign troope. The 
Connoll ees to be informed «hen evacuation «aa completed 
eith the etipulation that the Connoll oonld at any time re­
vert to dlaeusalon of the queetion. 
VII 
Th# t«enty-firat meeting of the Seeurlty Council pro­
vided for further dleouaeion of the Byrian-Lebaneae queation 
that tended to uav#ll t«o baaio difference# of opinion 
58. See page /3. 
37. Seeurity Gounoil, Official Record#; Plrat Tear, first 
Seriea.'Wo. I. tienty-flrat meeting, p. 91?. ' 
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#ithlD the Couaoil. frangle aod Yyahloeky atlll malBtalaed 
that a "dlapate* did e%l#t, Bidault Insisted that a "dis­
pute" did not ezist. The other members of the Gounoll were 
non-eommittal; but they agreed that the malateaenoe of 
troops apOD the territory of a sovereign state *lthout the 
eonsemt of that state ##s eontrary to the Charter and to 
international la# and that much troops mhowld be eTaouated 
ae soon as possible. 
From this point there eae diaagreement apon the manner 
in #hioh the frenoh and British troop* should be reaoved 
from Syria and Lebanon, frangie, basked by Tyehlnsky and 
Modeelemaki, insisted that the Security Council should pre­
scribe the manner of evacuation and that such évacuation 
should be simultaneous and immediate* Stettinius, &oo, 
Makin, Riaz, de Freitas-Valle, Bidault» and van Kleffens 
#ere of the opinion that the four parties should settle 
the question themselves through negotietions. Van Eleffens 
submitted a motion to that effect that the parties involved 
negotiate or employ some other means of settlement to bring 
about the evacuation of French and British troops from 
Syria and Lebanon and notify the Council *ben this action 
mas accomplished. Bntll such settlement, the Council could 
revert to the question at any time. 
No vote *as taken on the van Kleffens motion in the 
twenty^first meeting\^ However, the first definite plan of 
77 
eettleaeat for the Syrlea-Lebaneee qaeatlon *&3 put before 
the Couneil--the Impllcetloa belag that th* Couaoll later 
*oul& take action, perhaps uaaer the Yaa KleffeBs motion 
or perhape In some other way, to brlag about the avaquatlon 
of freaeb ana Brltlah troop* from Syria eod lebeaoa. 
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C&àPTEE 7 
«mz TWERTT-SECOim mSTIRG 
OF THE smmiTT comciL 
Th# Seeurlty Comneil resuaeâ the dlseussloo of the 
SyrlaB-Lebanese qaestlon the next mornlDg* 16 February 
194#, at its twnty-aeooBd meeting. The a erne repreeenta-
tl?es *#re preeent* After the Syrlaa-Lebanese delegetea 
took their seats at the Couneil table, discussion was 
1 
opened by Padllla Rervo of B&ileo. 
I 
Paiilla Rerfo stated that the Mexican governaient could 
"never approve the preaenoe of foreign troops in the terri­
tory of a sovereign State without the free and express con-
1. Luis Padllla Servo, Mesioan poet-diplomat, was born 
ès 19 Âugttst 1898, He has represented hie eouotry 
in Mezloaa embaaaiea and legations In five European 
countries and in el#t weatern hemisphere nations, 
Fadilla Nervo haa also represented Mexico in the 
United Kations, and was the Mexican delegate to the 
Security Council in 1946, The lexiean diplomat wrltea 
poetry in hie spare time—«modern stuff with s philo­
sophical flavor." 
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2 
Beat of its legitimate government." Therefore, be salâ 
that the Anglo-frenoh Agreement of 13 Deeember 1945 was 11-
legal beoBuae it provided for French troop regroupaent la 
3 
Lebanon elthout the consent of Lebanon* Padllla Rervo 
aleo qmeetioned the ground on «hioh franee and the United 
Kingdom took It upon themeelvea to eetablleh eecurity in 
the Levant. Thia «aa a job delegated to the ijiecurlty Coun-
eil. He contended that the obllgationa of rrance and the 
United Kingdom to the United Nations (the reapect of eover^ 
elgoty of member nation# under Article Z) should prevail 
over the obligetlone of the two countries to each other un­
der the Aagjo-French Agreement, The Anglo-french Agreement 
4 
Has thus a violation of Article 105 of the Charter. 
Padllla Nervo submitted the following motion for the 
settlement of the "dispute." 
1. That the claim of the Syrian and Lebanese 
Government a to the effect that the British and French 
troope should be mithdramn eimultaneouely and at the 
earliest possible date is justified. 
Ê, SeouritT Council. Official Becords: First Tear* Ftrst 
Series, ko.'f, "i#ent?-8@@oad meeting, p. 3lé. 
8. See appendix, page 152. 
4. The Charter of the United Rations, Article 103. 
'^In the" eveni of a"eonfitct betweea the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nat ions under the present 
Charter and their obligations under mj other interna­
tional agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail." 
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8. That the date for the cYaouatlon of cucb 
troops should be fixed by aegotiatioos between the 
parties In thla case, It being understood that suoh 
negotiations will be oonoerned exclusively with the 
mlllt&ry-teohnloal arrangements necessary for the 
adequate evmouatloa of such troope. 
3, To request thm parties to Inform the Coun-
oll mhen thi& 1@ done.^ 
The motion of the Mexican delegate required the partlee to 
the "dlapute" to aegptlate. In this respect. It agreed 
?ith the Tan Kief fens motion of the laat meeting. Bo*sver, 
Padllla Keryo's motion differed In one important rempeot, 
Negotiations were to be limited to those of a "mllltary-
teohnloal" variety. There oould b# no doubt that euoh nego­
tiations #er# not to deal *lth the "mubetanoe" of the ques» 
tlon. Van Kleffene* motion did not speolfy th# nature of 
negotiation*. 
II 
Frangie of Lebanon Interrupted before a vote eould be 
taken on Padllla Kervo*a motion. The Lebanon delegate 
stated that actually all the members vera in agreement In 
principle that foreign trocps should be evacuated from Syria 
5. Securl ty Coupoll» Official Records, first Tear# First 
Series, No. I, twenty-secohd ree'tïÊk»" p">' 
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and Labaaoa, (France had stated aa maoh In the Anglo-French 
6 
Agreement.) Furthermore* the eoneenaue «as that evacuation 
procedures should be eatabllahed through negotlatioae be* 
tmeen the partlee lawlTed. Frangle laalated that $uch ae-
gotlationa should deal only with the "fizin* of a time-
limit for oarrylag out withdrawal.* Although he preferred 
that the Council set thla time limit, he did state that Leba­
non would bow to the Council's decision if the Council 
ruled that the time-limit was to be determined through nego­
tiation by the four partiea to the "dispate." 
Frangie preferred to trust the Security Council rather 
than the proposed negotlatione. For this reason be called 
upon the Security Council to #et a time-limit to which France 
and the United Kingdom were to conform. On similar grounds, 
Frangie objectmd to the motion submitted by van Kleffene. 
He mistrusted the nature of the negotiations that France 
would envisage under the motion, frangie maintained that 
negotiations regarding evaouation should be oompletely inde­
pendent of any other agreement between lebanon and France. 
21*Bhourl of Syria accepted Prangle's agreement, but 
with one radical eioeptlon. Zl-Khourl flatly stated that 
6. See appendix, pa^e 152. 
?. Security Council, Official Records ; First Year, First 
Series, No. ' I. twenty^second meetIn'g»""p." %2'U. 
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there *as so n@ea for De&otlatloma, Be laslated that yreao* 
and the United %la?&oa need merely *lthdra* their foroea. 
He Informed the Council that after all such 93s the nolloy 
In the United Kingdom abere Aaerlean forces vera evaouetlng. 
No negotiation ?ae aeceasary. Bavin Interrupted to point 
out thet the United States and the United Kln^doe did have 
8 
"to negotiate on the bride*." After the interruption, 31-
Khourl Gonoluded his case for no negotletlon by stating: 
I deolare aolemnly here, in th@ name of my Oovern-
aent, that we shall raise no objeetiona to avaauatlon. 
%e shall lapoae no oondltiona as to foraallties. %e 
shall not say anything. Let them evaouate without ask-
ing U8, without negotiating *lth ua, because for ua 
there la no question of opposing a prinelple tbw appll-
oatlon of *hloh *e are emphatioslly demasdln#.* 
Ill 
At this point Biaz of 3gypt proposed the third motion 
for settlement of the Syrian-Lebanese dispute: 
After having heard the statements by the repre-
seatativee of Lebanon, Syria, Prance ani the United 
Kingdoa, and after having ezohanged views on the ease 
#hioh Is suMltted to it, 
The Seearity Oounoil, 
Considering that the preaence of British and 
French troops on Lebanese and Syrian territory is 
8# Ibid., p. 322 
9. Ibid., p. 322 
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Incompatible mith the priaclpl# cf the Boverelga 
equality of all Kember* laid do#n la the Charter; 
Believing that this principle, the validity of 
*hlGh is fully recognized by all the parties oon-
oerned, ahould receive Its full application by the 
Immediate and simultaneous «Ithdrawal of all Brltldi 
and FreBch troops still In the territories referred 
to; 
Eeeommemds to the Brltiah and /reach Government a 
on the one hand, and Lebanese and Syrian Government# 
OD the other band, to eater lato negotiations as soon 
as possible with a vie# to establishing exclusively 
the technical details of the said «ith&ramel, includ­
ing the filing of the date of Its completion, and re­
quests the& to keep the Council Informed of the re­
sult of these negotiation*, 
The Rlaz motion #aa similar to the van Kleffens and 
fadllla Hervo motions In that it, too, provided for nego-
tlatlona bet#een the four parties. Ho*ever, the Hlaz mo-
tlon contained certain fumdameatal differences. Negotia­
tions were to be exclusively for arranging the technical 
details of #lthdra#ml. Padllla jiervo had stated the same, 
but van Kleffens had merely mentlomec negotiations or other 
means. Hlaz' motion provided for Immediate and simultaneous 
evacuation, fadlll* Kervo made so mention of immediate 
#ithdra#al, and van Kleffens made no mention of simultaneous 
withdrawal. Although the other t#o motions requested that 
the negotiating parties Inform the Council #hen negotiations 
had been completed, Rlaz* motion Implied that the parties 
10. Ibid., pp. 583-224 
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to keep the Counoll Informed of tlm progress of nego-
tiatioas. Under theme olroimstanoee, the Council could 
play a more active role. Both Rlaz and Pad ilia îîervo pro­
vided that the negotiations fix a time limit for evacuation. 
Van Kleffeag did not. Finally* Biaz* motion atated that 
the maintenanee of foreign troops upon the territories of 
member ate te® without their eoasent was ino ompatible with 
the prlaelple of sovereign equality. Neither of the other 
two motions had made this atatement, although fadllla Nervo 
had atated that the elaim for *ithdra*al *a® just. 
Before dlaouseion of the Rlaz motion, Bidault anawered 
the questions put to him in the taenty-flrat meeting by 
Vyahlnsky. Bidault pointed out that naturally France had 
special Interests In the Levant since she had been given 
certain responsibilities there under the mandate. The man­
date had charged France with the protection of her mandate 
peoples, and Bidault stressed that point. He explained 
that French interests were cultural end strategic. Bidault 
mentioned the letter of 4 February 1946 from Syria and Leba­
non as en example of a cultural interest* The letter had 
been written in French. Bidault admitted that such cultural 
rights should be protected by cultural methods but he 
explained: 
I could wish only that the voice of Intellect 
could be heard and that, in particular, our French 
schools in Syria were not at present the object of 
85 
digerimlnatory memaureG #hlcb ere not In keeping 11 
*lth the status of the other schools in that country. 
The French eomplaint of dlscriffllnation failed to point out 
that such dlacrlmlaatlon ®as part of a desperate policy to 
get French troops to eveouate. 
Bidault continued, turning to the question of strate-
gic interests. He stated that the problem *as not that of 
dealing with a state that had been Independent and a member 
of the League, but a problem involving the question of a 
mandated territory. France had been responsible for seouri-
ty in the region umder the mandate. To aid in this task, 
France had recruited the "troupes spéciales". These 
troops had since been returned to Syria's and Lebanon's 
Jurisdiction in the fall of 1046. However, Bidault eon* 
tended that French troops could not just *ithdra* and leave 
a vacuum in the area. "In order to fill this gap, the 
Agreement of 13 December 1946 proposed a system of collee-
13 
tive security*" Bidault coneluded. 
The French argument was logical as well as legal only 
so long es the mandate was in existence. In fact, the 
French argument was logical during the war after the actual 
11, Ibid., p. 524. 
IE, See page 50, footnote 45. 
13. Security Council, Official Records; first Year, First 
Series, No. I,, twenty-second meeting', p. 525. 
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grant of Indepeadence, Bat after the Levantine natlona 
signed the Charter at San Francisco and mere recognized as 
eoverelgn, independent oationa, elth the etlpulatlon that 
neither «as a *tramt" territory under irtlele 78 of the 
Charter» there can be no doubt that France eae no longer 
charged elth the protection of #hat eae no* a defunct 
14 
aandate. 
18 enewr to the Rlat argument of the prevloua meeting, 
Bidault Iwkleted that Article 43 of the Charter did not in 
any #ay Invalidate the term# of the Anglo-frencb Troop 
Agreement, Blisult ^maintained that according to paragraph 
15 
E in Article 43, much agreements should govern the number 
and types of force*, their degree of readiness and general 
location and the nature of the facilitiea aM aaeletance 
to be provided. He maintained that the Anglo-French Agree­
ment did juet this. Then, too, the agreement provided for 
the principle of evacuation. Furthermore, that agreement 
provided for the transfer of the responsibility for the 
amintenance of security in Syria and Lebanon to some organ 
of the United Ration*. Before this transfer could become 
effective, Bidault explained that negotiation* eere neceaeary 
14. Rorman Benteich and Andre# Martin, A Commentary on the 
Charter of the United Mations, lev tork# 165Ù,p. l§ll 
ÎÀlso' aee page" 39footnote' 19.) 
15. See page 39, footnote 20. 
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betmeen the parties lovolved. Se no# ahookeA that 
Byrla and Lebanon desired no negotiations. Re stated: 
Either there is a dispute, In *hloh ease me are 
required under Article 33 of the Charter to negotiate 
*lth a Tie* to seeking a solution of the dispute; or 
else, if there are no negotlatloae and there is a re­
fusal to negotiate, the assumption muet be that there 
is no dispute.,.** 
The paradox in the whole affair #as that Bidault de* 
sired negotiations while M-Khourl did not. Ho#ever, Bi 
Bidault*s eonelusion *as a «eak one. The faet that Syria 
and Lebanon did not *lsh to negotiate with franoe did not 
necessarily negate the existence of a ^dispute," Bidault 
failed to state that Syria and Lebanon had tried to nego­
tiate in May 1945. The Levant nations se« refused further 
negotiations only beeause Franee attempted to make the 
evacuation of troops dependent upon other negotiations 
tihleh were to grant her preferential treatment in the Le­
vant. Furthermore, merely because Bidault aooepted the 
prinoiple of evacuation as stipulated in the Anglo-French 
Agreement did not necessarily mean that the negotiations he 
wished #ere not of the same nature as those of May 1945. 
The neea for any type of negotiations became very question­
able. Syria and Lebanon were independent. France had no 
legal right to maintain troops «ithin their territories or 
1$. Security Council, Official Records ; Fir at Tear, First 
iSeries. BO. I, tWnty»secocA' p. 326. 
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to demaaa special prlTlleges ualess Syria and Lebanon so 
Seslîei. 
IT 
Rlmt of Egypt 61ep%t#d Bidault'* Interpretation of 
1? 
paragraph 2, Artlola 43, af the Oharter. It aae thle 
aeotlon upon *bloh Bidault baaed frenoh military regroup-
meat la Lebanon. BldaBlt Interpreted the paragraph to re­
fer to the forces of any atate. Rlaz, on t&a other hand, 
atated: "...thla paragraph deala alth the forcee of the 
38 
country concerned and not with the farces of another State." 
Tha baale for the Egyptian Interpretation aaa paragraph 1, 
19 
of Article 40. Under paragraph 1, all mmbere of the 
Halted Rations were to «ake available to the Security Conn-
oil upon It# call or through necessary agraemnta forces 
for maintaining International peace and security. Rlaz in-
alated that thla paragraph referred "to the territory and 
the armed force* ef the State conearneà, and not to the 
go 
forces of a foreign country." 
17. See page 39, footnote 20. 
18. Seoarity gouncdLl» Official Records ; First Tear, First 
Em lea. Mo. 1. t#enty«"aecond àeetlng, p. 327. 
19. See page 39, footnote 20. 
20. Securl ty Council, Official Reoox^ai Fir at Tear, first 
Seriem, #0. ' twenty-aecond meeting, p. 5^^.' ' 
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There is little Aoubt thet the Riez' laterpretatlon of 
Article 45 eae more oorreot than that of Bidault. Rlaz 
might further have mentlooed that aooordlng to paragraph 3 
of that artiele, the Security Couaoll muat iaitlate auoh 
21 
agreeaente beteeea the member*. Soeever, both Elaz and 
Bidault might be aeeueed of mielaterpretation of Article 43; 
for, under that ^tlele action ie to be taken ehen there are 
threat* to iateraatlooal peace io the form of overt eggrea-
aion. Bueh *8* mot the case in Syria aad lebanoQ» 
Bevin iaterrupted Riaz #ith a remarkable obaervation. 
Be iBformed the Cooaell that hie oouatry *aa really not ia-
Tolved in the coatroverey. After all, Bevia aaaerted, 
the United Kingdom mae ready to evaoumte. Therefore, since 
the ooBsenaua had been in the previoue meeting that the four 
parties ahould enter into negotiatlone, Sevin suggeeted th&t 
a method of mettlemeat had ao* been reached. Re accepted 
the van Kleffena* motion. Furthermore, he stated that ne* 
gotiationa ahould deal mith those procedural problem* the 
Council had diacuaaed. If #o, he believed such action mould 
provide a satisfactory matt]mmeat. 
The mere faet Qiat Britlah troopa eere ready to evacu-
ate the Levant did not meke the United Kingdom guiltless, 
Bevin ignored the fact that British troops as veil ae Trench 
21. Sec page 39, footnote 20, 
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foxeee #ere still in Syria and Lebanon, The United Kingdom 
therefore *as a party to the oontroverey. Bevin*e strategy 
appeared to be one of aloofness at this point. In attempt­
ing to mho# hie country «as not involved* he tried not to 
take sides with Syria, Lebanon, or ?mnce. 
T 
The Levant delegates regained the floor aM frangie 
informed the Council twt the diffioulties between Lebanon 
and France were not a quarrel or an eeonoaie question. 
Lebanon was not trying to censure France, frangie stated 
that all Lebanon desired was the ooaplete evaeuation of 
foreign troops. Fmrthermore, he maintained that Lebanon 
and Syria were eapable of making a direct oontrlWtlon to 
their own seocorlty. Therefore, he refused to accept the 
French argument that troops were being stationed in the Le­
vant because ?ranee was eharged with the protection of that 
area under the mandate, and he stated; "We no longer recog­
nize anybody's right to argue on the basis of that mandate, 
and in particular we resent any attempt to claim privileges 
M 
under the mandate." 
22. Security Sounell, Official Becords; First Year, First 
"Series. Mo. I, twenty-second meeting, p. 330. 
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Frangle accepted the prloelple of eTaouatlon as stated 
In the motion of van Kleffena, hut he did not aocept it® 
terms beoauee, "they might give rise to ne# disputes in the 
23 
future." He objected primarily became the type of nego­
tiations «as not qualified. Hoeever$ Prangie accepted the 
Blaz motion, because under it negotiation# were to be of a 
"teehniesl" mature only. The Padilla iervo motion nae the 
second choice of the Lebanese delegate. 
11-Khouri, too, argued that France had no right to 
maintain security In Syria and Wbmon, Be baaed his argu-
84 
ment on Article 106 of the Charter which provided for 
joint action of the pe ma ne nt members in getting up securi­
ty. He insisted that the Anglo-French Troop Agreement could 
not be considered joint action. It waa bilateral action on 
the part of France and the United Kingdom. 
The Syrian delegate contended that there were no dif-
g3. Ibid., p. 550. 
24. The Charter of the United Ratione. Article 106. 
«pending the eomlng into force of much special 
agreemnte referred to in Article 42 as in the opinion 
of the Security Council enable it to begin the exer­
cise of ita responsibilities under Article 4&# the 
parties to the Four-Ration Declaration, signed at Mos-
00*, October 50, 1945, and France, shall, in accord­
ance *ith the pronlsioaa of paragraph S of that Declara­
tion, consult *ith one mother and aa occaaion requires 
»lth other M##bere of the United Bationa with a view to 
auch joint action on behalf of the Organization as may 
be necessary for the purpose of maintaining interna­
tional peace and aecurity.* 
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flealtles oonneoted «rith eraeuatioa» nor sere any segotia-
tloBS required, Hs stated that Syria mould acoept aegotla-
tloas only at the Inalatenae of the Coaaeil» and such aego-
tiatloae should deal ulth evaouatlon oaly because Syria ms 
mot "ready to eater iato Begotlatlon* om suhjeets other 
#5 
than the évacuation...* 
H-ïhourl again called upon the security Couacll to 
take aome type of action to eettle the "dispute." He did 
mot acoept or reject any of the motions before the Council. 
He did not favor any of the motions as did Frangie. 
TI 
A fourth motion, a eoa®»hat iK>dlfled ver ai on of the 
one proposed by van Eleffeas, was submitted by Stettinius: 
The 3ecwIty Council 
Takes note of the atatemeata made by the four 
parties and by the other members of the Council; 
Impresses Its confidence that the foreign troop# 
in Syria and Lebanon *111 be withdrawn as soon a# 
practicable* and the negotiations to that end #111 be 
undertaken bj the parties «Ithout delay; and 
Request# the parties to inform it of the results 
of the negotiations.®® 
£S. Security Council» Official Record a: First Tear, First 
Series, go. I. téènty-aeccmd meeting, p. 3SS. 
26. Ibid., pp. 332-583. 
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The StettinluG motion, too, propcGed &ettlcaKmt of the 
8yrlan*Lcb&a6Be aispute through negotiations between the 
parties Involvaa. Eoaever# Stettlnlue dl& not atata la hla 
motion the nature dT thaae negotiation». He did not limit 
hie negotiations ae did Blaz and ladllla Nervo to thoae of 
a taehnloal nature. The Stet&lnlu# motion did not mention 
Immediate avaouatlon aa did Elaz*. The Stettlnlue motion 
did not stipulate that evacuation was to be sliaultaneoas as 
did the motlona of Bla% and Padllla Narvo. The Stattlqlua 
motion did, however, aatabllah the principle of evaeuatlon, 
provide for a method of nagqtlatlona, and stipulate tb#t 
the parties ln$olved should Inform the Seeurltj Counell of 
the reeulta of negotiation. All four propoaala had theae 
three thing* In ooraon, 
Vyahlnmky analyzed the four motlona at thla point. B# 
stated that the motions of van Kleffena and stettlniua #*ra 
alike In aubatanea; neither defined the type of negotiations 
to be entered Into by the four parties. Therefore, he ob­
jected to the two motlona. On the other hand, Vyahlnaky ae-
eapted the Blaz motion becauae it apeclfloally stated that 
negotiation# were to be of a teuhnleal nature. If the Rlaz 
motion w«re aooeptad, h# aaaertad, there could be no quea-
tion of the "substaaee» of oegotlatlone. ^ahlnaky thus 
baokad the atand taken by fzangle* 
Before the meeting adjourjaad, stettlniua replied to 
M 
TysMoAky'e Interpretation of his motion. StettlDi%B In­
formed VyahlDaky and the Oonnoil that hie motion referred 
oàly to negotiations oonoerneâ «Itb the eTacuatlon of foreign 
troops from Syria aM lebanofi. Re explained that the Be ne­
gotiations «ere to deal «Itb tl^ method of mltMramel en8 
not #lth the "nubatmwe" of #ltMre#al, and he atated that 
the %ordB "to that md" oould only refer to negotlatlona 
neeesaary to aat up a method for aTaowtlon, 
VII 
In aummary, at the end of the tventy-aaoond meeting, 
the Security Gounoll had fomr mot lone before It for the 
aettlemant of the Syrlan-Lebaneee question. 31nee no ac­
tion had been taken upon any of the motion# In the meting, 
the oumberaome taak of making a deelalon a#alted the Ooun-
ell In A&ture meeting#* The four motions #ere ell in 
agreement In pplnelple—the evaeuatlon of foreign troop*. 
The four motlona iiere In agreement In mthod-^-negotlatlon# 
between the partiee Involved, furthermore, the fonr motlona 
mere all In agreement that the Seewlty Gounoll should be 
Infomed aa to the reaulte of theme negotiation*. 
However, there «ere baalo dlfferemoee In the four mo­
tions. The motions of Padllle Kervo and Rlaz limited nego­
tiations to those of a **teehnieel" nature. The motlona of 
95 
van Kleffens eind Ztettialus aerely mentloned negotiatloaa. 
Tet Stettialua atated before the Couaoll thst by negotia­
tions he referrod to %GotlotloD3 releYant to e-vaouatlon. 
The Conaoll Itaelf oowld not egfee upon a pertlcul&r 
motion aa a method of aettllag the Gyrian-Lebsnese question. 
Ilore lapoTtant, the par ties Involved dlaagreed on #hat mo­
tion nould effectively bring about evacuation and peaceful 
settlement. Bevln aeeepted van Eleffenm* awtlon. Bidault 
aeoepted negotiation*, but felt that auoh negotiations 
should be oarrled on outside the jnrledlotlon of the Coon-
oil. In other eorde, Bidault thought the Council should 
drop the matter, frangie eipreeeed an inherent fear of any 
type of negotiations, but he did aooept the Riez motion. 
His aeoomd choice was the Fadilla ïîervo motion. These mo-
tioae limited ncgotietionG to those of a "technical* nature. 
El-Khoarl flatly inaleted that negotiations *ere not neces­
sary, and he aalntalned he did aot want to negotiate. Ee 
insiated that the Counoll ahould set a tlme-lialt by dilch 
foreign troops should be eveouated. Only If the Counoll re­
fused and stated that negotiation #ere to be carried out 
beteeen the pertiee involved, *ould be aooept. Tyehinaky 
accepted the Hlaz motion but condemned the motions of van 
Eleffen8 and Stettlnius because they failed to stipulate 
the natare of the negotiations. The zeabers who proposed 
motions naturally accepted their own motlone. The other 
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members of the CouoGll *are mon-commlttal at tbie polat. 
The closest allgBment la the tgentj-seeoaë meeting 
*se bmtseea Wrangle, El-Ebourl, Vyshlosky, aad Blaz. 
Bidault Btoo6 slont. Bevla tried tc play the role of a 
aeutral la stenAlag bet*ee& Bidault aad the leYantloe dele­
gate#. loo took no part In dlecueelon, Stettlnlue eub-
mltted hie motion for eveoaatloB and malatalaed that 
troofs should be #lthdra#n from the levant a* soon practic­
able. 
Fadllla Kervo, Praagle, El-Khoarl, Blaz, aad Yyahlnaky 
geaerally agreed that the aoglo-freooh Agreeaant of 13 
December 1945 «aa Illegal and violated the Charter. Bevin 
and Bldaolt malntalaed It did act. The Couacll made ao 
decleloa pro or coG, Felther d&d the Couaeil deolde the 
correct laterpretetloB of Article 45* Although Bidault and 
Blaz disagreed radically on that Article, the Interpreta­
tion of the Charter *@8 left to the aembera. 
No deolaloa %as made for the aettlament of the ayrlan-
Lebaneae question in the t%enty»@econd meeting. In fact, 
the meeting showed a aonalderable disagreement on ho* the 
question shoald be settled. Cf the foqr motions submitted 
to aettle the question* not one *as aeoeptable to the four 
parties Involved, !îo vote taken upon any motions aub-
mitted. Sosever, the Ccunoil did again dlscusa the queatlon 
before it. The Council did dlscuaa the methoda propoaed 
97 
for t&G eettlemsaL of tL&t queatloa. Ti&e poaslbillty of 
future seems*! Dearer. 
CmiTER 71 
THE TW3MTT-TRIBD H3ETIBG 
OF THE S3C9RIT? COUBCIL 
I 
After a three hour recess, the twenty-thiré meeting 
of the Saoqrlty Çouoell» the final meeting at whieh the 
Syrian-Lebanese question va# eoneldered, convened on 16 
February 1946 at Ohoreh Hoase, weetainlster, London, The 
meeting nas called to order hy the president and the first 
order of bnelneae was the continuation of dlseneelon of 
the Syrian-Lebeneee question. 
Stettlnlu* of the Baited States opened the discussion 
by stating that throoghoat the 20th, 21st, and &2nd meetings 
the Seeiirlty Goiineil had shown itself generally In agreement 
that foreign troops should be *lthdra*n from Syria and Leba­
non. He Insisted, therefore, that the principle of evacua­
tion had been established, and he argued that his motion in 
stating that "negotiations were to be held to that end," re­
ferred only to negotiations that were consistent with the 
principle of evacuation. Stettlnlu* concluded that his mo­
tion was perfectly clear, and he urged the Council to accept 
that motion and prove to the rest of the world that It would 
not permit "itself to be divided by a lack of mutual confidence 
and mutual trust. 
1. Ibid., p. 556. 
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Stettiûlms* gxplaoatloa coupled nitfe h la orlglml mo* 
tion left little doubt that the aegotiatioas *hich be pro-
poeed mere to be of a "prooedwal" nature. Although the 
United States delegate did not «me the words "teohnleal," 
"prooedar##*" "mllltary^techmleel*" or "ezolwlvely" la 
hi a resolution, hie ezplaoatloa did make It blear that ae-
gotlatloaa were to deal with the evaooat lea of foreign 
troops and not the queatlon of mhether theme foreign troops 
ahocld be emouated# 
So#ever, not all the member# agreed with Stettlnlua, 
Tyahlaaky still qmatloaed the ambiguity of the reeolutlone 
of van Eleffem and Stettlniua* He qoeatloned the inter­
pretation of the «ords "megotlatlona or otherwise" in the 
Dmtoh motion and the meamimg of the #ord# "to that end" in 
the imeriean* S te t M ni us informed the Imasian delegate 
one# again that "to that end" referred to negotlatlona that 
#ere to be eonneeted #ith troop evaoumtlon. The Bus si an 
delegate ooumtered that the Hmited States motion thua refer­
red to the same polloy embodied In the Egyptian motion. 
The only difference, awordlqg to Vyshinsky, earn that Hiaz 
specifically stated %at negotiations *ere to deal with 
"technical details." Beemise of su eh clarity, the Soviet 
representative heartily aooepted the Riat motion. 
Bidault, on the other band, wouM not accept the 
Egyptian motion. He found it unacceptable because it did 
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not pzovlde for negotiation» D#r a#$ bst Halted the pertlea 
ecmoerned to merely *teehnloal negotlatione." The Prœoh 
delegate Inalated that the 8yrian»Lebaneae tyieatlon boiled 
aoen to one of teo alterQatlve»**?#lther there la a dlapute 
& 
or there la not a dlapote." If a "dlapute" did e%lat# a 
eettlement mmat be arrived at through negotlatlwa a a pro­
vided for In Artlol* 93* Artlele 33 did not limit the na* 
ture of the oegotlatloaa. "If irtlele 53 la not applica­
ble," Bidault atate*# "there la no dlapnte ; in that eaae, 
I eomder ehat #e have been doing here fbr w many houra* 
S 
itaefully apent, no do&bt, but to ehat purpoae?" 
The freneh attituid# eippeaaed by Bid a nit by no# eaa 
aome#hat changed* By hla rejection of "te^nloal nagotla* 
tiona" and hla inalatenee on unlimited negotiations aa pro* 
Tided for under Article 33, Bidault admitted negatively, at 
leaat, that a condition e%i#ted in S?ria and Lebanon, brought 
about by the maintenance cf Frmch and Brltiah troope, ehlch 
required a aolntlon. Bla referme# to irtlde 33 implied 
firthw that a "dlapnta" might exlat. The Article epeelfl-
4 
cally mentioned "the partlee to any diapnte," and then 
provided for negotiatlone or other methoda of eettleamnt. 
2• Ibid#, p• 338 » 
3. IhH*, p. 338. 
4* See page 48, footnote 42, 
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Dlecuaslon amltohed baek to the Agreement of 33 De­
c e m b e r  1 9 4 5 ,  B l a z  c o n t e m d e d l  Q & a t  t h e  Y a g u e n e s e  o f  t A t  
agreem^t #aB a baalo cause fbr the dlaagreement In the 
Security Gouaall. Ea propoeeé that the Security Gouaoll 
Interpret the ajgrewemt and give It meaning as aell as 
reaoh aome kind of deolelon on a method to be followed for 
the complete eW total evaomt lem of Syria amd LebanoD# 
Be 0 OA tended hla motloa ahleh provided for "teohnleal oe-
gotlatlona" beat served thle paxpoee. 
IB rebattal, Bevln attempted to alarlfy eertala atate-
meats made by Cadogaa Im the taentl eth aeetii^. Oram ting 
that a "dlapate" did exist la the Le vast in May 1945# 
Be vim Inal# ted that eoaSitioRS had @1 eared up considerably 
as of the An^o-Premeh Agree meat im Deeember 1945. Tet he 
eoaeeded that mialnterpretatlon of that agraemeat Md 
ee*#ed a "dispute." Still, be earn e of the British at ate-
meat of althdrwal a ad the empltflaation of the Anglo-Preaoh 
Agreement by Bldaalt la the E2ac meet lag to the effect that 
Frmoe, too, envieaged althdraaal; Bevla aoaoluded: ***.-! 
muggeet that tb# dlepate arlalag oat of the paragraph qaoted 
S 
ao longer exists*" 
Be via* 8 position in the Byr iaa-Lebane ae question aaa 
far from clear* Bevla argued that a "diapute" had existed 
6, Security Council Official Records; First Year. First 
Series, No. I, twenty-third meeting, p. 399. 
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la the past—la Kay 1945 *ben Brltl&h troops latarYeaed in 
the levant to preaerY* orèer, and In December 1945 over the 
Interpretation of the ADg%o-^Tenoh Agreement, Ths latter 
"dispute" *@3 brought about beoause of a dlaagreement be-
tseen the British ang frenoh authorltlee thamaelves over 
the place to uhlch the United Zimgdom should #lthdra« her 
6 
fweea. franoe Interpreted the agreement to mean Palestine. 
The Dnlted Kingdom interprets the agreement to mean Leba-
non until French fore#s, too, idthdre# from that Levant 
7 
State, Hoeever, Bevln no* insisted that oonditloDS could 
no longer be temed a "dispute** because a tintement s had been 
made In the previous meetings of the Council by himself and 
Bidault oonflrming evaouation at an early date* If Bevln's 
statement «as true, his statement made In the 19th meeting 
of the Council (If a state says a "dispute" ezists, then in 
fact it does) mas fallacious, for, in ooafbrmance *lth 
thot line of reasoning, a "dispute" *as still in progress 
because Syria and Lebanon maiatained that sueh a "dispute" 
did ealet. 
Rlaz ohalleaged Bevin*s argument by insisting that a 
"dispute" did ezist an* that the Security Council *as 
charged vith the settling of thct "dispute." Re contmded 
6. Nee York Times, December 28, 1946, p. 3 
7. Ibid., December £8, 1946» p. S. 
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th# qu$*tlOD mnether aoi miiea Biitish aad franeh troope 
mere to evaoucte 3;yTla sad Leb&aon bad brought about aueh 
eoailtloaa. Bavin retortad that the daoialoa to aithdra# 
aaa pataat under the Anglo^fraoeh ^raemat. aoaaver, the 
Brltlah delegate aonoadad ^at hla goveramaat aould accept 
tba 3tattlalus raaolutloa aiaee the agreamaot appeared not 
daflalta enough. Sa ballavad audh aetloa mould make th# 
agraamant definite, oad ha oooeludad: "..*1 ahould hava 
8 
thought# alaarad up tha raal dlaputa that axlata," 
Bavlo aBalg coatradloted hlmaaif, fw hare ha atatad 
that a "dlaputa** azlatad. Again he took the poaltloa that 
he held la the 19th maetljqg* 
Baeauaa of the utterly eoafuaed state of affairs la 
the Ceaaoil by this time, Stettlnlua requested that tha 
other three partica luvolvad empraaa ihelr vie ma upon hia 
aotlon. Bidault atatad that frauaa mould have preferred 
to dlapenaa mlth a motion of the type aubalttad by 8tattlal-
ua but mas aom ready to support it aa a method of aattlement. 
Therefor#, both of the Great Pomara to the "dlaputa" ae-
cap tad tha Stettlaius raaolution. Fraugla expiai aad that 
Labanoa still faver ad the motlone of Blaz and PadUla Servo 
because both stated clearly the type of aegotlatioas to be 
8. Saaurlty Couaail Cfflclal Racorda; First Tear, First 
Series, Bo. I, t-geioty-third meeting* p. ë#). 
1C4 
entered lato. Bosever, the Lebeneae delegate propoGed that 
If Immediately before the 9«arde "to that end" In the 
Stettlnlus resolution, the word *0XGlu3l?ely" was Inserted, 
end if at the erd of Die nroroeel the #ords "ae nell as of 
9 
the floRl date of elthdramal" %*re added, then he would 
10 
agree *ith the Stettlnlue reeolutlon and accept it, 
Bevin ohjeoted to the proposals to aawnd the Stettlnlua 
motion on the grounda that wch limited negotiations to the 
Rithdraval of troops only end Implied ^et negotlationm on 
no o%ier metteic eo%ld be oonAacted. He eontended that 
ench aotlon «ae unduly dieeriminatory end argued that ell 
kind* of negotiation* *ere going on in other eouatrlee in 
lehieh foreign troope «ere atôtloned. Kone of theee nere 
regulated by the Security Council. Re did, however, (luall-
fy the negotiatlone desired and stated: 
I ought to meke It elear that the other negotla-
tioas ahould not be mde dependent upon the *ith-
draaal of the troops, bat I am quite olear that eome-
thlng ha# to be done while *# are withdrawing; and, 
if the tcrda in this text tare u@ea# It Bouli mean 
that we coald not dieenea anything at all.ll 
The Brltl#h delegate, in admitting that other negotia­
tion# mere neoessary for withdrawal, did not edmlt ehat 
Itid". p. 340. 
10$ The Lebanese delegate*» euggeetions were not formal 
amendments enô the Connell did not vote. 
11. Security Council Official Records; First Year, first 
Series, No. I, twenty-third me etIng, p. 541, 
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matter# theee other gegotletlon# *ere to imolude. But, 
Bevln made it emphatioally clear to the Sjriah and leba-
nee# Relegates and the other meWber# thet troop elthdramal 
should not be dependent om any other negotlatitme. The 
atatemant #as a definite j^itiah guarantee to Syria and 
Lebanon. The oppoaite had been true regarding negotiationa 
bet#eea framce^ Syria, and Lebanon la May 1945. Bevin'a 
statement guaranteed that eu A procedure eould not recur 
uBder the motion aa propoaed by Stettinlue. 
frangie of Lebamon Interrigpted the dlacuealon to point 
out that the teo Lenmtine atatee did not refhee megotla-
tloae. But he maiatalaed that both Syria and Lebanon did 
refuse "to negotiate on the question of the uithdraeal of 
12 
troops in relation to other queetiome*" For thle reaeon 
he had Imaerted the eord "eaMHaalvely" iu the Stettlniue 
motion "to avoid eny ettempt to confuse teo types cf nego-
tiations in euoh a way that the result of one ^pe of aego* 
13 
tlatioas might influenee the result of another type.* 
Tyshlnaky agreed eith Framgie * a argument and asserted 
that uniese the Council specified the obaracter of the ne* 
gotiatlone epeelfleally in the eritten motion, #be organi* 
zation mould get noehere in the settlement of the Syrian-
12. Ibid,, 342. 
13# itia.. p. 5*2. 
10* 
Lebameae queatioa, Ea oallaâ apoa tha Preooh reprasanta-
tlve aiplieltly to oommit bimeelf upon tlw ebaraetar of lha 
nagotlatloaa ?raa% anvlsagad. Baoaaaa BWault bad not 
aaa##r*d VyBblaaky'a aama qoeatloa prevloualy, th# Soviet 
delegate admitted that be eae led to believe that Frmnoe 
etlll elmhed to negotiate upon ti» eultural, eeonomle, and 
atrategle eonditioae ehe bad %med In %ey 1945. for thla 
reaeoa, he oalled apon the Goqnell to make a clear wt de-
cieion on the negotlatlona emd aonaoded: 
If they are to be teebaleal megotlatlone, let 
ue aay ao; if they are to be megotlatlone of another 
kind, let ae aay eo; but, unleee ee do# I feel that 
mot only shall #e eomtlmme to mark time, but the 
eltua^on iteelf may beoome more difficult 
from Vyehloaky^e atatememt# %e queetion aroee, eae 
the Soviet delagate moe eonelderlng the leaue a "dlapute^ 
or a "eituatioa?" Hie eomeludlmg atatement referr^ to 
the possibility of the "situation" beeomlug more difficult. 
Zvem the Soviet delegete eae not dear ea to Wiieh pre­
vailed. Certainly the other msmbereeere not. Eoeever, 
Vyahinsky eae positive that $he Seeuiity Counell should 
aet doen a définitloa of tsrme. Sueh definition eould have 
to Imolude epeolfie metbode of settlement to Wiich the feu* 
partlee eoaoerned eould be bound, tnder susb procedure. 
14. Ibid., p. 543. 
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France, the United Kingdcm, Syria, and Lebanon louM have to 
confom to the pattern eet by the Security Council, and 
there could be no mleinterpretation of t&e type of aego-
tiatlone to be follomed, Tyakijaeky contended that euob 
*&* not true under the Stettlnius motion. 
In an attempt to lend clarification to hie original 
motion, Stettiniue made #e following amendment to hie ori­
ginal motion: "and that negotiations to that end, inde-
15 
pendently of other ieeuee, *111 be undertaken." With 
the nee epejidment, the orig&wl atettlniue motion had been 
amended three timea—teiee by Prangie and once by atettlniue. 
In addition, the Counell had three other motions, thoee of 
van Kleffene, Padllla Hervo, and Riez, before it. 
fyehineky denounced the stettinine amendment because 
it did not limit negotlatione to thoee of a technical na­
ture. In aeceptin^ the aewndmenk, Bevin etated: 
I am milling to mce#gpt that theee negotieticne 
are «lèlasively for the withdranal of the troope; 
and if they do that, that ie all there ia to it, ae 
far ae I can mee. That ane#ere the complaint that 
the lebmneee and Syrl ane put to ue»** 
Frangie, in epeaklng Ar the levmatlne etatee, explained 
that the Stettinine amendwant did not clear up the politi­
cal ieeuee Involved in the Agreement of 13 December 1945. 
15, Ibid., p. 543. 
16. Ibid*, p. 345. 
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Se Qould accept the amended motion only If France vould no 
longer stand by the Agreement of 1945 and etlpulate that no 
oondltione other than teehnlcal ones necesaary to withdraw­
al would be InelTided In the negotlatlone. Frangle aeaured 
the membera that after aueh eondltiona had been fulfilled, 
both Syria and Lebanon would be happy to dlaouaa any oui* 
tural, eoonomlo and strateglo laeuea, Bidault aooepted 
the amendment but aalntalaed that his oouctry waa in honor 
bound by the Inglo-Frenoh Troop Agreement. Re did clarify 
the French etand eonalderably: 
The purpoae of the negotiation# provided for in 
the text le beyond doWbt the evacuation of the 
oountrlea referred to. For my part, I set no objeo-
tion, quite the oontrary, to theme negotiation# be-
Ing aeparate fro# other negotlatlona leading to a re-* 
sumption of fully eatlsfaetory relation# between our 
various oountrlee and our old friend* of tbe Levant.!" 
Bevin and Bidault, then, aeeepted unoondltlonally the 
method for eettlement of the Syrian-lebaneae queetlon a# 
laid down in the amended version of hie original motion by 
Stettlniwa. The other two pat tie# to the "dispute," as 
?r angle eta ted, aeoepted the emendaent and original pro-
poeal only with quallfieatione. They demanded that Frenee 
no longer etand by the Anglo-Freneh Agreement for troop 
evaouation In the Levant. Furthermore, Frangle deaaoded 
that France stipulate eondl tlom for evacuation be only 
17. Ibid., p. 346. 
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thosG of a technical nature so that Begotiatlona aeceasary 
to evaouatloa coula la no way be made depeadeot upon any 
other oegotlatlong betseen Freaoe and Syria and Lebanon. 
Bidault ecoepted the condition ihat the negotiations vould 
be concerned %ith eraouatlon and mould be aeparate from 
any negotiations leading to a resumption of more eatlafao-
tory relation* with 8yrlc and Lebanon. Bidault, then, dl4 
clarify the yrenoh etaod. He stated %nequlvocally tbat 
other negotiations mould be eepaTate froa troop évacuation 
negotiation». So^eveT, he did not etate epeolfleally that 
evacuation negotiations mould not be dependent upon other 
saooeseful nGgotiatlonB. 2e did not cornait France on the 
time elemnt involved. 
The trend tomard general agreement on the atettlnlue 
motion between the partie* to the **dl8pute" did not prevent 
further atteagpts to change tkat motion, Van ICleffene of 
The NetlKrlande euggeeted the morde, "mhieh may be dlsoue-
18 
eed* be added to the original motion to qualify the "ne-
19 
gotiatione**' Bevln requeeted that the lïcrd "mutually" 
be ineerted before the toard *dleouased." The t%o proposal a 
mere not ooneldered formal emendmente. Both helped to con^ 
fuse the Gounoll further. 
18. Ibid., p. 346. 
19i Ibid., p. 346. 
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1# timual# 7y*hin#ky foand the m## propoaala objection­
able beeauaa nalthar mde memtloa of l&a "ambatano#" of tha 
nagotlatioDa. Ha a till maiatalma that tha Counoll ahoulA 
apaoifloally #tat* la the motlea the "proaadura" to be fol-
lo#ad, laaviag only tha tlma of althdraaal, detail# of 
althdraaal, mod dapartwya aahadula to tha four partie» to 
the "diaputa." Bla aomtentioa #aa that Fraaoa atill aiahad 
to aagotlata oa tha "aubatanaa" of tha qsaatloa. 
Yyahiaaky'a attitude aaa uaaarraatad, Tha aoaaaaama 
aaa that troopa ahoold be altbdra«a from Syria aad Labanoa# 
%Yaa Bidault had openly admlttW that fraaoa favored auah 
policy# aad every awmber praaappoaed that aagotlationa be-
t#aaa the partlaa aould be @oaa#%mad aith avaomtioa pro* 
cadara^, Bid wit aeaep&ed thla pollay ahea he atated: 
I ooaaiier that the «hole problem of later pre-
tatloa aa to tha mtura of the aegotlatloaa to take 
plaaa betaaaa ua haaLalraady beea aolvad by ^e fore-
goiag azplaaatloaa.**^ 
At thla polat, loo praaaatad om of tha mat ratloaal 
avaluetlmxa of tha proposed methoda for aattleaeat of the 
qaeatloa. Be maintained that the orlglaal motion of 
Stettlalaa aaa tha moat aarkable beoaaae it laeorporatad 
all Idaaa ia tha other motloaa. Be fbaad the amaadmaata 
aothlag bat aoafaalag. Ha explalaad that "aa soon ea 
praetlaabla" aad "to that aad" aould refer oaly to the 
*0. Ibid., p. 547. 
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praotloal arfangeaeatg to be Th# phrases could aot 
r*f#r to "#ub»taatlTe" queetloa** Stattlmlg* had aald me 
much la hi# explanations* Furthermore, Koo informed the 
Couooll that It «as to be oonoeimed lith negotiatlone for 
eiMiom tion only. Other negotiatloae «ere going on in the 
*orld every day and «ere mo eoneera of the Coimoil, There­
fore, elooe theee aegotlatloB# #ere to be eonoemed «ith 
the evaeuation of foreign troope from Syria and I^banon, 
einee the prinoiple of eithdramal had been definitely reeog-
aized by membere, aM eiae* negotiatioss «ould naturally 
eenter apoo praetieal arrangeseata for the eithdraeal of 
freneh end British troops, Koo called upon the Oouaoil to 
accept the original Stettlaiae motion and settle the 
que ation. 
Sl-Khourl la attempting to olmrify Fraagie^e ameadment 
(iaeertion of the word *e%Olw@ively*) asserted that it 
did mot prevent other me got la ti one between the four oouatriee 
if eueh mere mutmlly egreed upoa. Be lnform#d the Coaaoil 
that hie goverameat aad the Lebanese governmeat wished the 
«card iaeluded as definite proteetioa again»t amy attempt to 
make évacuatioa negotiations depeademt apoa any other nego­
tiations beteeea fraaee and Syria and Lebanon. (Bidault 
had not apecifloally stated fraaee eould act attempt to do 
thi## Bavin had stated the United Kingdom mould not.) 
Furthermore, the Syrian delegate did not favor the inoluaioa 
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of the StettiDlaa ameMmmt added the %ord8 "lade» 
peadently of other laews." He felt the addition vould 
only eomplicate oegotiatioae by laeln%ating that other 
ieswea had to be aegotiated. Be etated; 
I e%preaa the vieea of my Government ehea I e:gr 
that# for the tlm# beiag. It prefer# that no other 
ewbjeet ehoold be opebed for aegotlation elth France 
aa loag aa treepa are la ow eouatry.^^ 
Boeever, Ël*Khomrt qmlified hi# etatemaat by aaying that 
Syria eonld eeleome aegotlatioa# oa any queatlone elth aay 
governmeat a# eoea aa foreign troepa eere oat of 8]BPla, 
gl*Khoarl, eho had ;qp#vloa#ly expiai aed to the Coua-
ell that hi# eoaatry preferred the motion# of Biaz and 
Padllla Rervo to the Stettialu# motion, informed the Se* 
ourlty Oouaell at thl# point that a# long a# the matter of 
eithdraeal of foreign troope ea# aabetantlated, aooepted, 
and reoommended by the Gouaell# tben: 
..*any method ebieh 1# adopted to attain that 
ea& eoald be eqgually a<^ptable to ae, provided that 
ao matter# for aa^ptiatlon# are ia^oeed on th# par^ 
tie# ia addition to the mala i##aa# ezeapt by mutua 1 
eonaent.** 
By thla etatemaat# %l*ghouri Iji^lied that 3yrla eould ae* 
eept the Stettinia# reeolatloa. lay method of eettlement 
adopted by the Security Coanoll ea# aeeepteble to him a# 
Ibia.* p. 34^* 
2B» «# p« 350» 
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long a* the natter of #lthilra«al #@8 mabetaatlated and ao-
oeptei. Praagie leas conciliatory. He had not stated 
he %ould drop hie amBOdmeat oontalnlng the eord ^'excluslve-
ly."* Furthermore, although both Syria aod Lebanon refueed 
aegotlatlona without muWal eonsent, yrangle maintained 
that Lebanon refused to negotiate any other leeue with 
France tmtll frweh troops vere evacuated. The pwadox 
#ae that Chrletlan Lebanoa, aleaya more friendly toward 
Rpanee than Moaimm Syria, at this point appeared more 
hostile. 
Of the propoaal# for aettlament of the Syrian-Lebanese 
question, most of the dlaeqeelon had centered around the 
original veraloa and the amended verelon proposed by 
Stettlnlue. Aware of thla faot and tryl% to bring eboot 
a method of aettlememt* the president of the Counell again 
celled upon the partita Involved to etate their preference 
between the two# Bevln admitted he fawred the original 
motion, El-Khouri hedged. Be etated tbat Syria wod Leba­
non felt that the text ebould be elaborated in such form to 
protect the "amll powers" If Ihe Ormat Powers attempted 
to iBteipret the résolution as they saw fit. f^angle did 
not aeeept either of the Stettlnlme resolutions. He stated 
that he would drop the amendment *'eielualTely" but main­
tained tbat the negotlatlone should be technical and that 
the Security Council should be informed of th# final date 
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of sithdiawal. Fraagie could aaeapt the Stettlalua aotloa 
only «1th thaae propoagd amaMaamte. Bidault did not apeak 
at this time* Previously In the meetlog he had stated that 
he tould agoept the Stettlalus reaolatloa* 
After aaoertalalng the atatemeota of the parties to 
the "dlapute," iWekla put the follomlag queatloa to the 
Gouaell: 
I ahould like to aak the ammbera of the Couacll 
«hether. In the llg^t the explanatloma that #e have 
had, there 1# any objeotlon to tb# original teit that 
*a* aRbmltted by *r. Stettlnlge.BB 
Before the membera noold respond Tyehlnaky Interrupted 
to propoae that the Conseil eetabllah *n order of voting 
npon the motions befere It. Re proposed that Hole @2 of 
the provlalomal rules be follo#ed end that van Kleffena* 
motion be veted mpon first, Pndllla nervosa second# Hlaz* 
third, and Stettlnlms* fourth. The Council agreed. 
Before the vote taken on van lOLeffen^e motion. 
The ]fetherlanda delegate mlthdree It. He took this action 
under Enle @5 of the provlelon&l rulee of pioeedure bellev-
*3. Ibid., p. 35d. 
24. aeourlty Gounell. Provisional Rules of Proeedure. Res 
fork. Juïi. I«4«,''fiule JS. 
Trlnoiple motlooa end draft reaolutlona ahall 
heve precedence In the order of their submission. 
"Parts of a motion or of e draft resolution 
shall be voted on separately at the re#eat of any 
representative, unleee the original mover objects." 
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log that there «aa Buffiolent agreemmt on the Stettlalus 
25 
r#»oiutloD. The action left three proposals before the 
Gouooll. Beoauae the Jtettlnlua reaolutlon was eo oon-
fusea hy auggemted aa»a&aent9$ It %aa read to tl* meabera 
In original form: 
The Sawirlty Couaoil 
Takea note of the atatemaate aade by the four 
part lea and by the other members of the Gounell; 
Bipraaaea Ita oonflAeno# that the foreign troopa 
In Syria and Lebanon *111 be vlth&reen as eoon as 
praotloable and that negotiation* to that end *111 be 
nndartaken by the parties althout delay; and 
Raqusata the pwtlea to Inform It of the result* 
of the negotiation*.^^ 
After th# rereading» 3t#ttlnlus #%plained that there *as 
only one amenam#mt to the motion, that belqg the addition 
of the «ord* "independently of other laeuea" after the *oraa 
"to that end." 
?rangle of Lebanon and Rlat of ggypt propoaed certain 
formal amemdments befor# the other motion* could be read to 
the Gounall. frangle *ithdre* hi# propoaed amendmwit to 
25. Ibid.. Bule 3G. 
*1 motion or draft resolution can at any time be 
*lthdra*n, so long a* no vete haa been taken *rth 
reapeet to It, 
"If th# motion or draft resolution ha* been 
aeoonded, the representative on the Security Council 
#ho has seocndad it may require that It be put to the 
vote a* hi* motion or draft resolution with the earn# 
rlsht of preoedenoe es If the original mover had not 
*iEhdra*n it." 
26. 8#ourlty Council, Official Record*; first Year, first 
a#rie#/#o. %. t*#nty-thlra^meetW. P. 555. * 
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Insert the aorâ "eicluslvely" before the tords "to that 
tad" In the Stettlnlus motion, Eo*$?6r* Wrangle aaln-
t&lBeù that his other t*o eaendmente, the Inclusion of tie 
sord "teehnicsl" before negotletlcna and the addition of 
the word* "as mell as of the final date of *lthdra%&l" at 
the end of the Calted States resolution, atlll stood. 
Rlaz amended his motion by deleting the $ord "azoluelTely.* 
The motions as read by the president of the Council 
were as folloaa: 
The Seourlty Gounall shall decide: 
1. That the claim of the Syrian and Lebanese 
Governments to the effect that the British and rrench 
troop# sho&ld be «ithdraan almultaneously and at the 
earlleat poealble date 1* justified. 
Ê. "That the date of th# evaeuatioa of such 
troops should be fixed by negotiation# between the 
parties In thl# ease* it Wing understood that suoh 
negotiatione will be oomcerned eicluaively with the 
mllitary-teebnleal arraagemmnte neoessary for the 
adequate evaeuation of such troop#. 
3. To request the parses to Inform the Council 
when this is done. 
The motion of Hlaz, the delegate from Igypt; 
After having heard %ie statements by the repré­
sentative a of Lebanon, Syria, frenee and the United 
Kingdom, and after having exchanged views on the case 
whloh is submitted to it* 
The Security Counoll, 
Considering that the presenoe of British and 
French troops Lebanese aad Syrian territory Is 
incompatible with the principle of tbe sovereign 
equality of all Members laid down in the Charter; 
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Believing that thje principle, the valiùlty of 
#bloh l8 fully Mcogal%#d by all the parties eoa-
cerneà; chould receive Itt; full spplloatlon by the 
immediate »M alaaltaaeou# #itb4ra#al of all Brit lab 
6D& frenoh troops still In the territories referred 
to; 
Reaommeod# to the Brltiah eM freneh Govern-
ment G on the one band, end to the Lebanese end Syrian 
Qovaramenta on the other hand, to enter into negotia­
tions 88 aoon as possible %lth e vlet to establlahlng 
the ted&nieal datai la of the aaid elthdraaal, Inelud-
Ing tb€ fixing of the date of Ita eoapletlon, and 
requaate them to iceep the Counell Informed of the re­
sult of tbeee BEgotlatlona. 
The motion of Stettlnlaa, the delegate from the United 
Gtstee: 
The Security Council 
Takes note of the statemeote make by the four 
parties and by the other ammbars of the Gomell, 
ETpyessea its confldanoa that the foreign troops 
in Syria end Lebanon #111 be nithdraan as soon as 
praetleable, and that negotiations to that end *111 
be undertaken by the parties tlthouk delay; and 
IRequests the parties to Inform it of the results 
of the negotiations. 
Thia *&s tbe originel motion of the representative of the 
TOnlted St&tes. The president of the Council did not sub­
mit the amended version* 
II 
Before the Seourlty Council #as reedy to vote, the 
question of "aubetantive" and "prooadural* voting, ehleh 
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had been lalaed but aot settled In the nlaeteGath meetlsg, 
*69 ajrin brought up by Tyshlnsky. Ths Soviet delegate in-
eleted* as before, that & "substartlve" vote be taken under 
Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter. Because Tyehlnaky 
malBtalned that a "dlepuie* did eilst. It *as loslcal for 
him to Gall this article Into force. Since under the ar­
ticle parties to a "dispute* Tsre to refrain from voting 
under Chapter 71 and Article of the Cherter, Tyshinaky 
#e* actuelly calling upon the Council to legally decide the 
Gyrlan-Lebanese queetlon constituted e "dispute." 
Although the pr$8igent had no authority to determine 
by hlmetlf If the queetlon constituted a "dispute," be-
ceuae the opinion In th# Council hed previouely Implied 
that some foim of a "dispute" did exist, he stated: 
...If there Is no objection, I eh&ll take it to 
%e the declaion of the Comnail that a dlepute doea 
exist between Syria and lebamon on the one byid and 
France and the United Kingdom on the other,*" 
Bidault end Bevln objected to the decialon. 
Bidault, ea throughout the entire diecoaalon on the 
Syrian-Lebanese question, limiatad that a "dispute" did 
not exlet. He adhered to the aeme argument used earlier 
and pointed out that Syria aM Labanon did not alah to 
negotiate under Article 35 of the Charter. Ria conclusioa 
27. Ibid., p. 357. 
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**#, therefore, that a "dlepate" did not exist» Further" 
more# Bidault baeed hla oaee om the letter of 4 Tebrwry 
1946 from the Syrla&^Lebameee government a. He oontended 
that the letter #aa ImooMlateat. Although the fifth para­
graph memtloaed that "thla dlapute" #ae being brought to 
the attention of the Security Oounell, the aeooM paragraph 
a#* a oomtradlotlea and atatad that "the preewae of theae 
troopa, ahloh oomatltutaa a grave Infringement on the aover-* 
algnty of tao @tatea Me#er» of the United Eatlona» may 
give rlae to ear loue dlaputea*" Bidault* a oonolualon aaa 
that even Syria and Lebanon aere not poeltlva Aat a "dla-
pute" did ezlat. 
Bevln, ahoae p(»ltion #ae aonfuaed throughout the en* 
tire dlaeuaalom qf the Syrlam-Lebaneae qoeetlon, did not 
no# admit that a "diaputa* axlatad. He, too, took note of 
the letter from the Syrian and tebaneae governmmnte. If 
he admitted that a "dlapute** did a%lat, he alao had to ad-* 
mit that Brltlah troape aere eonetl^tl%% a "grave infringe­
ment of the aoverelgnty* of Syria and Lebanon. Bavin ln« 
formed the Council #at the latter aould not be the oaae 
beoauaa the praaenae of Brltleh troope had been requeated 
by the Syrian and Lebanaee governmenta In May 1945$ There­
fore# auoh troope could not be gravely Infringing their 
aoverelgnty. Bevln ueed tble exouee to hedge and ooaoluded: 
120 
I am really not pitting the opinion I ezprasaad 
than (If sa aaeuaer state ##y# there is a dlapata, 
there la a d la put a, aagpresead In nineteenth meeting) 
against the oplnlena that mere ezpreaaed all around 
the table by the grmt authorities ae have here no# 
on procedure.^ 
Aa am alternative, Bevln aoggeatad that the queatlon go to 
the Committee of Experts that was aet ap for determining 
baala questions of procedure. In the mBentlme, he a tat ad 
thet the United Kingdom aould, In aeoordanee alt h Bidault*e 
atatamant, refrain voluntarily from voting without preju­
dice to future daolalona* 
In oppositloa to the positions adopted by Bidault and 
Bevla, ll-Ehûuri, In epaakiag for Syria and Lebanon, mala* 
taiaed that a "dispute" did exist. The Syrian representa­
tive referred to the letter from hia government of 4 Febru­
ary 1946 to prove hla point. He pointed out that the fifth 
paragraph stated that a "dispute" did exist• Furthermore, 
he aontended that the "dispute" might take one or more 
forma. It might lead to more sazloua "dlsputea" as stated 
In paragraph t»o. Bo#ever, Sl*Khourl Insisted the possi­
bility of more serious "disputes" did not negate the "dis­
pute" then in existecoe, TyAlnsky and Rlam agreed aith 
this interpretation, 
Tyshlnaky, too, rebutted the argument expressed by 
28. Ibid.. p. 352. 
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Bidault. K# the ffweh delegate that the Saonilty 
Coonoll *a» the organization charged #lth determining, af­
ter hearing all evidence, «hether a "dlapute* actually 
*%l#ted. It *a# not @p to one nation to decide after In-
Yeetlgatlng plecee of evldenoe. Be further reminded the 
Gonnell that irtlele 33 of the Charter provided that partie* 
to a *dl#pute" eere to eeek eolntlon by "negotiation, en­
quiry, medlatlony eonelllatlon, arbitration, judicial aet-
tleMnt# reeort to regional agenclee or errengemente, or 
other peaceful mean# of their o*n eholee." The Soviet 
delegate Ineleted, therefore, that negotiation *ae but one 
method of peaceful eettlement and the turning do#n of that 
one method by partlee to a *dl#pute" did not rule out the 
exletence of that "dlapute," With theee rea#»ne In mind 
Tyehlneky eoneladeA: 
It le a dlapute #hleh threetena International 
relatione, ehleh may lead to further bloodehed and 
eonetltuW a menaee to International peace and ae-
curlty,*. We have to admit that the dlapute la,^t 
aolved yet, and that the Council muet eolve It. 
In ao doing, Tyehlneky contended that Article 27, paragraph 
S, of the Charter should be followed. 
The eaae TyehlnWcy preaemted #ae logloal. Merely be* 
29. See page 48, footnote 42. 
30. Secw ity Council, Official Re corda; First Tear, first 
aeriee.'Bo. I. pi 56*. 
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oaus* Syrl* aad Lebaaon did not wish to accept one meana 
of aettlement under Article 53, that of negotiation, did 
not neoeasarlly mean, as Bidault concluded, that a "die* 
put*" did not exist. The reason the LevantIne states re-
fuaed negotiation ma# their fear that negotlatlona for the 
évacuatIon of troop# «ouId be dependent upon other negot1-
atlone. Such had been the ea#e In *ay 1945. Furthermore, 
Tyshlneky #aa correct in maintaining that it «as the duty 
of the Security Council to determine after hearing all e?l~ 
dene* «hether a "dispute" did ezlat. Although the Security 
Council did not epeclflcally commit itself, opinion in the 
Council, barring that expressed by Bidault and Bevin, «a# 
that a "diepute" did e%i*t. Even Bevin tmice had admitted 
as much, end Bidault had insinuated as much in this meet­
ing. However, Tyahlnaky'e argument implying that the "dis­
pute* could lead to bloodshed and become a menace to inter­
nat ional peace «as more debatable. It is impossible to 
tell «hat might have happened in the 8yrlan*Lebaneae ques­
tion had it not been settled, but it is possible to con­
clude that a "diapute" or "eltuation" left unchecked is a 
possible threat to «orld peace and security. 
Makin proposed that the Council vote upon the motions 
before It. He did not term the question a "dispute" or a 
"situation" but suggested that the vote be taken without 
any formal decision on voting rules since the delegates 
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fro* fraoee aaâ tfee United Kingdom stated they would re­
frain from voting. The procedure made voting possible 
without the Council's aotml deterMmtlon of whether the 
Syrlan-'Lebanaee queatlon waa a "dlapote." 
Ill 
Toting waa aonduoted in tb* ehronologlcal order In 
which the mot lone had been aiabaltted and the motion of 
Padllla îîerTo waa the first to be voted upon. Before the 
vote wae taken# the Mezlcan delegate requested that he be 
allowed to amend hia motion by deleting the word "exolu-
alvely." Thla #ae done, but the motion #ea loat. four 
members voted for the motion; an affirmative vote of aeven 
31 
gae neeeaaary to carry. The Egyptian motion* which car-
32 
rled only four affirmative votes, waa likewise defeated. 
Before a vote could be taken on Stettlnlua* motion, 
Vyahlaaky propoaed three amendmenta. The first amendment 
replaced the words "aipreaaea its confidence that the 
foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawn" by 
31. Ibid.» p. 364, (In the early meetings of the Seourl-
ty bouneil, no breakdown was given in regard to the 
way members voted on a partioular issue. Total votes 
were recorded only. Later meetings divide the vote 
into auch categories as: in favor, agalnat, abstain^ 
Ing, and absent 
32. Ibid.* p. 364. 
1% 
the eipreeslon "recommendg to the GoTtrmmmats of tb& United 
Kingdom eM Frence to #itbdra« their troops from the ter-
33 
ri tories of Syrie si^ Lebanon." The gecond amscdment aub-
34 
stltuted the «ord "immdletely" fcr »ooD ae praotic-
able." The third called for the iBeertion of the word "teeh-
35 
ni cal* before the ecrd "oegotietione." The vote became 
more eosfueed ae Biaz ao* propoeed an amendment to the Soviet 
amendment. Be euggeeted deleting the word "recommande"* in 
the Soviet gmecdment and insertion of the words "takes 
35 
note," Tyehinaky aceepted the Egyptian amendment. 
The voting proceeded. Eiaz' amendment eae lost by an 
3? 
affirmative vote of three. Tyahinmky*e second amendment 
58 
«as lo$t by affirmative vote of teo. Rig third amendment 
39 
#88 defeated by an affirmative vote of five. The original 
motion of Stettiniue we voted upon neit and carried by an 
40 
affirmative vote of a even. Bavin aM Bidault abstained 
33. Ibid.. p. 365 
34. Ibid.. p. 365 
55. Ibid.» p. 366 
56. Ibid*. p. 566 
57. Ibid.. p. 567 
38. Ibid., p. 367 
59. Ibid.. P# 567 
40. Ibid.. p. 367 
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voluntarily because of their previous pledges to the Securi­
ty Council. The Syrian and Lebanese delegates did not have 
the franohlee. Poland abstained. Modelewskl informed the 
Council that he did not vote beoauee the Stettinlue motion 
did not completely eatlefy him that it mould yield good 
result#. 
TyWilneky voted agsinet the Stettiaiu# reeolution. 
He maintained, since voting was condwted under Article 27, 
paragraph 3, of the Charter, that the motion #ae defeated* 
He ezereleed hie po#*r of the veto and eiplained the Soviet 
poa&tion by stmtlmg; 
I am m permanent wmber, and I voted against this 
proposal, because the amendments which would have en­
abled me to vote for it have not been accepted. I 
think the position le quit# clear. I am applying a 
rule, end I am using my right as a permanent member to 
make such stateinents as I think proper.** 
Stettinlue and Eoo made no comment. The other tiio per­
manent members accepted the position taken by the Soviet 
delegate as being completely within the Interpretation of 
the Charter. Bidault stated: 
The Interpretation of Article 27 by the repre­
sentative of the Soviet Dnlon is entirely in conform­
ity with the letter and spirit of the Charter. I 
therefore believe that, from the leg^l standpoint, 
thle vote does not create an obligation.** 
41. Ibid., p. 367. 
48. Ibid.. p. 388. 
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His colleague, Bevln, concurred: 
I jolD «1th Mr. Bidault and I agree that legal-
ly the interpretation given of the Charter is correct. 
We mill, as a party to this conflict, carry out the 
majority decision of the Couzwil ae ezpreeaed in the 
vote.43 
Bidault, in sroeakiag for France, also pointed out that his 
gOTernment «ould carry out the decieion of the Council, 
"After five houra and fifty mlnutea of a debate that failed 
44 
to reach a decision," the president declared the motion 
not carried and the Security Council passed on to the next 
order of business, 
IT 
Legally, the twenty-third meeting of the Security Coun 
oil did not settle the Syrian-Lebanese question. The pro-
posal for settlement by Stettinius «as vetoed by the Soviet 
delegate under the "substantive" provision for voting em­
bodied in irticle 29, paragraph 3, of the Charter, and by 
this action, the opinion of the majority of the Council sas 
nullified by Tyahlnsky. 
Actually, though, since the majqpity of the members 
favored the Stettinius motion, Bidault and Be vin stated 
43. Ibid., p. 368. 
44. The Nes York Times, February 16, 1946, p. 1. 
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that their governmente «ould be mcrally bound to conform 
to lt8 etlpulBtlome. They agreed to negotiate as aoon as 
practicable. They accepted the Council*s opinion that 
negotiations mere to be directed to*ayd evacuation pro* 
cedures. They agreed to notify the Counell as soon as 
negotiations wre carried out. The d0#lre for settlement 
#88, therefore, aeoepted. The technicalities of evacua­
tion «ere to be carried out by frsnoe, the United Kingdom, 
Syria, and Lebanon. 
The alignment delegates In the twenty-third meet-
iim of the Security Council was more discernible than in 
any of the other meeting# In ehlch the Syrian-Lebanese 
question «as considered. gl~Khourl and frangle #ere agreed, 
as throughout the entire discussion, that a ^dispute" 
existed and that the Security Council should take action to 
put an end to that "dispute*'* They preferred the motion# 
of Blaz and Padllla Servo as methods of settlement because 
these motions limited negotiation# to those of a "technical" 
nature. They insisted that any other negotiations between 
their governments and France and the Dnlted Kingdom should 
In no #ay be dependent upon negotiations related to the 
evacuation of troops. From this point, there vac some dls-
agreement between the t#o delegates, frangie stated speci-
fically that his country «as not viilllnp to have negotia-
tlons «1th France on other matters until troops «ere evacu­
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ated* El-Khourl implied as much, but he stated that Syria 
mould aooept any solutloa agreed upon by the Council as 
long as the prinelple of évacuation vas embodied in that 
aolution. Frangie insisted upon "technical" negotiatloDs 
and that the Council aet a date at «hieh time eyaouation 
should be completed. ïlie Lebanese delegate did not yield 
on lAese points, although he did finally vithdrav hie 
ameadment #hich had stated negotiations should be ""eiclu-
sively" directed toward evacuation, 
Vyshinaky and Riaz upheld the atand taken by the Le­
vant delegatesi They insisted that a "dispute" existed 
and that the best method of settlament of that "dispute" 
nas embodied in the Biaz motion because that motion pro­
vided for "technical" negotiations. Because the Stettinius 
motion made no such limitation on negotiations, vyshlnsky 
vetoed it. Bidault and B#vin #ere agreed that the Soviet 
action #as justified because of the "substantive" nature 
of the vote under Article 27, paragraph 3. 
Stettinius and Zoo did not commit themselves on the 
legality of the Soviet veto. However, neither questioned 
the procedure. Koo and Stettinius were non-committal on 
the question of whether a "dispute" actually eilated, but, 
again, neither contested voting procedure being oindnoted 
under Article 27, paragraph 5, which stated that parties 
to a "dispute" must abstain froai v. ting. 
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Bidault and Bevln veie la general agreement at the end 
of the tT»enty-third aeetlng that oondltlons In the Levant 
did Bot conatltute s "dispute." The French delegate had in­
sisted upon this point throughout the discussion, but the 
British delegate had vacillated back and forth, at one time 
maintaining that a "^dispute" did exist, and at another main* 
taining that it did not* Both delegates accepted the prin­
ciple of and th» method for evaouation aa set do%n in the 
Stettlniua motion. 
Delegates of the other nations, mith the eioeption of 
Hodelenskl, after auoh pro and con discussion, also so-
oepted the Btettinius notion. Their decisions nere arrived 
at only after prolonged discussion that at lotervala beoeme 
so involved and so coaiplloated that it appeared unlikely 
that the Council *oald ever some to a decision. Although 
the process mas tedious, and although ultimate results ̂ ere 
doubtful, a deolalon #as finally reached. British and 
French troops mere soon to be evacuated from Syria and 
Lebanon. 
lao 
CmPTER VII 
CGKCLTJSION 
I 
In a letter dated 30 April 1948 addressed to the près* 
ident of the Security Council, Ambaaeador Henri Bonnet of 
France Informed the Council tbat the French and British 
gOTernmanta had jointly made arrangements for the complete 
evacuation of their troops from Syrian territory by 30 
1 
April 1946. These arrangements had been agreed upon at a 
conference of French and British military eiperts held in 
larls from 2-6 March 1946, the purpose of #hioa wa to de­
termine the procedures to be folloi^ed In the evacuation as 
«ell aa to set time limite under «hlch the evacuation ^8s 
2 
to be carried out. The British and French troo;» in ques­
tion #ere evacuated from Syria by 15 April 194Ô, and the 
Syrian Premier Saadallah El Jablrl eonflrmed this fact in a 
telegram of the 19 May 1946 to the Security Council: 
1, Security Council, letter froc jgbassador B. -onnet to 
tïï'è President oi' t & Èecur it y ëbûnoll. Doc «"g/'ëë, Ëew 
York, 3 May 1946. (See aipendli, page 161) 
E. Security Council, Letter from the minister of Lebanon 
in Washing ton^D. d. to the necretary-General> Doe. 
È/60, New York, 20 .j^une I'GiB. (See appendii, page 164) 
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The Syrian OoTernmeat he8 the honour to Inform 
the mmbera of the Security Council that the evacu­
ation of the foreign troopa from the Syrian terri­
tory In compliance with the proposal of the delegate 
of the Dnlted Staten of America has teen aocompllahed 
during the fir at t#o veeka of April 1946.^ 
In conjunction Mth the French and British military 
conference of 2*6 March 1946, the French and Lebaneee 
Mlnlatera of Foreign Affaire met in Parle to fix a date 
by vbleh all French troona #ould be evacuated from leba-
4 
non. This date #as set at 1 April 1947. Brltlah forces 
5 
«ere to be #lthdra«n from Lebanon by 30 June 1946. Fur­
thermore# the flrat thousand Brltleh and the first thou-
6 
sand French troops «ere to be evacuated by 31 March 1946. 
#lthdra##l of these forces «as carried out by the appointed 
dates. 
By a note dated 19 March 1946, the French government 
Informed the Lebanese government tb&t French troops could 
be «Ithdramn from Lebanon at an earlier date thah 1 April 
194? If the Lebanese government mould take certain steps 
to aid In the evacuation. France called upon Lebanon to 
5. Security Council, TelegraiB from the Syrian Premier and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs io th^ Èécretaj^-ùeheralj 
feoe. ^/64, Éem YorK, 23 'May 1946. (ëee appendix, page 
160) 
4. Ibid.. Doc. 8/64. 
5. Security Council, Letter froa Sir Alexander Cadoggn 
to the President of t he 3ecur it y ùouncl 1, DOC, S/51, 
Ne# Tort, 3 May 1^46. fSee#pendix,'Page 158) 
6. Ibid.. Doc. 8/51. 
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grant to the frenoh ooomaad la the Levant the full use of 
the public eervlces anA of the Lebmneee army for the trans­
port, guarding, anâ embarkation of all mater lei, franoe 
also requested the Lebenese government to agree to the 
setting up of a joint ^anoo-Lebaneee military ataff fc* 
the coordination of all activities connected «it%i the evac­
uation. Lebanon accepted these provlelona and verified 
the fact by a letter of 21 Karch 1946 from the Lebanese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to Bidault, 
In a mutual exchange of letter a betmew the Lebanese 
and French Ministers of Jforelgn Affairs of 23 March 1946, 
the date et «blch French troops as a «hole were to be 
8 
withdrawn from Lebanon «es set at 31 Augaat 1946. from 
the 31 August 1946 to the 51 Deceober 1946, France «eis to 
be allowed to maintain thirty officers and three hundred 
technlGlans In Lebanon for the purposes of supervising the 
shipments of materiel to France. Both countries accepted 
these stipulations. 
In a letter dated 12 June 194 6, Dr. Charles Malik, 
Lebanese lllnleter to the United wtates, informed the Se­
curity Council that negotiations had been ccncluded be­
tween his government end France to bring about the com-
7. Security Council, op. cit.. Doc. S/52. 
8. Security Gouncll, op. oit., Doc. S/90. 
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plete évacuation of Frenob troopg fro3 Lebanon. Rls let­
ter Included a letter from Hamld yrangle, the Lebanese 
Mlnlmter of Foreign Affaire, vbloh etated; "The Lebsneae 
goTertment le satisfied »lth the outcome of the said ne-
frotlatlons and haa decided to Inform the Seourlt? Council 
9 
thereof.* 
The "dlepute** over the eTaouftlon of French and 
Brltlah troopa frtm Syria and Lebanon Kas, therefore, a 
closed lamie. 
II 
Certain definite coneluelona oan be dra#D from the 
operation of the Security Council In the Syrian-Lebenese 
question. The Council Iteelf did not aettle the "^dls-
pute." It had no le^l authority to act after the veto 
of the StettlnluB motion without reconsidering the ques­
tion. At the moet, the Security Counoll merely provided 
a world forum «hlch heard the oaeee of t e four parties 
to the "dispute*" In thle reepect, the value of the 
Counoll ahould not be underestimated. General agreement 
reached among %e members within the Counoll influenced 
Prance and the United Klqgdom to the eitent that they 
@4 Ibid., Doc. 8/90. 
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accepted on their oen initiative the content of the Stettlniize 
motion and acted outeide the Council to bring about settle­
ment of the "dispute." Dleoueelon #lthln the Council aided 
in Initiating thl# actlon*-aegotlatlonG between Franoe, the 
United Kingdom, Syria, and Lebanon—mhloh brought about the 
evacuation of foreign troops. 
Otber important queetions wtre not settled by the Coun­
cil during the time mhieh the Syrian-Lebanese "dispute" «as 
before it. No decision ems reached on nAiether the mainten­
ance of Prwch and British troops in Syria and Lebanon con­
stituted. a "dispute" or e "situation." Even so, from the 
evidence presented. It can be concluded that a "dispute" 
did exist. (Bidault ea@ the only member to maintain con­
sistently that a "dispute" did wt exist.) Moreover, the 
Council did not decide whether the vote necessary to deter -
mine the e%lstence of a "dispute" ems to be "substantive" 
or "procedural*" Again from the evidence presented, the 
concluëion to be dra#m is that much a vote if taken should 
have been "substantive." AM, finally, the Council never 
determlwd the legality of the Anglo-freoeh Agreemezt of 
13 December 1945. Still, that agreewnt earn apparently 
regarded am illegal by moet of the members of the Security 
Council. 
In its early meetings In 1946, the Council avoided 
or at learnt «as non-committal on such controveraial ques-
135 
tlons 8S tho9€ mentioned above. Decisions in these ques­
tions %ere left to the discretion of the lodlTldual mem-
bere. Perhaps thle «ae a #lBe policy. Perhaps the members 
realized there wa$ little poeslbillty for agreement. By 
mvoldlng Commitment, the Council did leave Itself a greater 
pOBalbillty for agreement on its aajor i85ue-"^the determin­
ation of a method fw the evacuation of the foreign troop» 
in the Levant. Bomever, thia proeedwe did set a bad ex­
emple* It created the Impreeglon for imdlvidial meia)ere 
and the #orld that the Goimoll oould not even agree on 
minor iseuea. It appeared not even to try, for a vote was 
taken on only one of the three isauea olted. If the mem­
bers were aware that theme questions probably could not be 
settled at that time, then the procedural techniques de­
veloped by the Oouneil were at leaet workable. On the other 
hand, the Security Gounoil in falling to decide all these 
queetiona might well be charged with having failed in Ite 
duty. 
During the meetinge in which the Syrlan-Lebaneee "dis­
pute" was heard, Council action further showed the begin­
ning of the epllt between the Great Fowera, later to be 
called the "Cold Sar*" Vyshlneky coneiatently opposed 
Bevln, Bidault, Eoo, and Stettinlus, hie opposition con­
tinuing even though Bevin and Bidault made certain impor­
tant conceeelone to the Soviet delegate. Still, theee 
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oonce8eioii8 failed to satisfy Vyshlnsky, aM he eventual­
ly vetoed the Stettlnlus motion fcr the aettlment of the 
Syrian-'Lebaneae "dlepute." 
A peradoz oan be seen In Soviet gtretegy. Tyahlnsky, 
«ho had championed the oauae of Syria and Lebemon through­
out all the dlacuaalona, chanced leaving the levant nations 
devoid of United Nations aid by hla veto. The Council 
could thus make no guarantee to Syria and Lebanon that 
French and British troopa #ould be evacuated, for it had 
no legal authority to act under the Stettlnlua motion. 
Furthermore, It «aa highly debatable that any other plan 
mould be aa acceptable to a majority of the members. There 
fore, the veto by Vyahlnaky «as not only a betrayal of the 
Syrian-Lebanese oauae, but it «es an eiample of Soviet un­
cooperative spirit and en indication of pocslble future 
Soviet action in the Security Council, 
Yet, even though the Soviet veto blocked the Council*a 
action to settle the Syrian-Lebanese "dispute," and even 
though the Council failed to settle important questions 
(regarding "substantive" and "procedural" voting, the ei-
istence of a "dispute," end the legality of the Anglo-
French Agreement), the Council did at least provide a wrld 
for usa #hl(ÈL heard the Syrian-Lebanese plea. Discussion in 
this forum made known to France end the United Kingdom the 
majority opinion of the lumbere, and in good feith and in 
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a eplrlt of cooperation vlth this majority opinion* the 
tso Great Po*erG evacuated their troops from Syria and 
Lebanon. Although evacuation vas carried out by Prance 
and the Dnlt^d Kingdom on their ovn Initiative, they i;ere 
atlBMilated to this action by the Security Council dlscus-
ëlons. This «as the "vietory** of the United Nations, 
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eae Important becauee it presented the offlolal Lebaneae 
attitude In regard to the Agreement between yramce and the 
United Kingdom. The Syrian note of 26 Deoember 1645 oould 
not be obtained. 
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1946 and for February 1?, 1946, oontalned an exoellent 
analyala of the goaltiona of the Great Powere to the quee-
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Gegeral Catroux's Proolamatlon of 8 June 1941 
After conferring #ith General Wavell and General 
d# Gaulle, General Gatrouz Isaued a proolamatiùn on the 8tb 
of June, in the name of General de Gaulle, Chief of the 
free French, to t^^ in&abiteats of Syria an6 the Lebanon; 
"People of Syria and the Lebanon! At the moment «hen 
the forces of Free France, united to the forces of the 
British lm#lre, our ally, are entering your territory, 
I declare that I aaaime the powers, responsibilities, 
aad duties of the repreaentative of "La France au 
l#Taac." I do thla in the naae of Free France, *hioh 
Identifies herself aith the traditional and real 
Prance, and in the aaae of her Chief, General de 
Gaulle. In this capaoity I come to pet an end to the 
mandatory regime and to proclaim you free and inde-
peMejjt. 
«Ton will therefore be henceforward sovereign and in­
dependent peoples, and you #111 be able either to 
form yourselTea into aepar&te statee or to unite into 
a aingle State. In either event, your Independent 
and sovereign status will be guaranteed by a Treaty 
In «hich our mutual relations *111 be defined. This 
treaty mill be negotiated aa soon as possible betmeen 
your representattvee and myself, Pending its conclu-
aion, our autu&l poaition %111 be one of close unity 
in pursuit of a common ideal and common aima. 
Allies to Ensure Syrian Independence. 
"People of Syria and the Lebanoâ, you mill see from 
this deolarstion that if the Free French and Britieh 
forces cross your frontier, it la mot to take away 
your liberty, it is to ensure it. It is to drive out 
of Syria the for&e# of Bitler. It la to prevent the 
Levant from becoming an enemy base directed against 
the British and against ourselves-. 
"*e mho are fighting for the liberty of the people 
cannot allow #e enemy to submerge your country step 
by step, obtain control of your per eons and your be­
longing®, and turn you into slaves, fe cannot alio* 
the populations which Fr&nce hae promised to defend 
to be thrown into the hands of the most wanton and 
pitiless master that history has known. We cannot 
allow the age-long interests of France in the Levant 
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to be k&sdcd over to the GB&my. 
The Blockade Will b# Lifted. 
"People of Syria and the Lebanon! If, In answer to 
our appeal, you rally to ua, you should knoa th&t 
the British OoYernment, In agreement *lth free 
franoG, hss promised to grant you all the advantagea 
enjoyed by the free countrlea mhlah are associated 
#lth them. Thus the blooka&e *111 be lifted and you 
«111 enter into Immediate relation* *lth the sterling 
bloc, *hlch *111 open up the tldeet possibilities to 
ycur Imports and exporta. Tou *111 be able to buy 
end soli freely #lth all the free countries, 
"People of Gyrla a&d the Lebanont A great hour In 
yonr hlBtory haa sounded. France declares you Inde-
pendeat by the voice of her aona %ho are fighting 
for her life and for the liberty of the world.* 
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Sir Mlles Lampeoa'* Deelaratloa of 8 June 1941 
fhls call to arms from Gene ml Catroux Bas fol­
lowed by a â«claratioa of support from Sir Miles 
LampSOB, Brltlah Aabassador Im Cairo, ©a behalf of 
the British Ooveramemt: 
"Gênerai Oatroux, oa behalf of General de Gaulle, 
Chief of the free freneh, has isseed a deelaration 
to the iBhabltanta of Syria mâ Lebsooa before ad­
vancing with the object of expelling the Germane. 
In this he declare# the liberty and IMependenoe of 
Syria and lebanon. He uniertafees to negotlet* a 
treaty to ensure these obj#ot#. 
"I am authorize# by his Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom to declare that they support and as­
sociate themmelvea «ith the assuranoe of independence 
given by General Catroux on behalf of General de 
Gaulle to Syria and Lebanon. 
"I am also authorised to give you the assurance that 
should you support join the Allies, his Majesty's 
Government In the United Kingdom offers you all the 
advantage# enjoyed by free countries who are aasoci-
at# with them. The blockade *111 be lifted and you 
may enter lato Immediate relations with the sterling 
bloc, which will give you enormoa#, besides immediate, 
advantage# fram the point of view of your exports and 
Importe. You will be able to sell your products and 
to bay freely in all free countries." 
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Les Aooorde Fraaoo-Brltannlquee sar Le Levant 
Texte Officiel 
L# alaietfre d** affaire* dtreng&re* a communiqué le 
texte des accord* franco-britannique* aur le Levant, signe* 
a Londres, le 15 deGembrc(1945); 
Accord yo. 1 
Le* expert* militaire* fyanpai* et britannique* #e 
rdualroat * Beyrouth le ai décembre 1945 pour arrêter le* 
modalité* d*un programme d*dvacuation e&helonnde, 
avec regroupement corrélatif des force*, 
L*go de* objete^de la diecuaalon *er# de fi^er une 
date tre* prochaine a laquelle commencera cette évacuation. 
Il eet entendu que l*dvecuetlOB de le Syrie *e fera 
"parti pa8*u", de telle aorte qu'elle sera achevée en même 
temps pour les force* frsngaiaee et pour le* force* 
britannique*. 
le programme d'évacuation sera établi de telle eorte 
qu'il assurera le maintien au Levant d'élément* suffisant* 
pour garantir la eécurité, jmequ'au moment où l'organisa­
tion de* Ration* unies aura à etatuer sur le dispositif de 
la sécurité collective deb* cette tone. 
Juequ'à ce que cette miae en place aoit effectuée, le 
gouvernement francaie conservera des elements regroupe* au 
Liban. 
Le* gouvernements, français et britannique%.feront part 
aux gouvernements libpnaie et *yrien des olau*é*ïe&*ee qui 
concerne le# medalltes de l'évacuation et inviteront lesdit* 
gouvernement* à déaigner, les plu* tët possible, de* repré^ 
«entant* quallfidb pour discuter lè* di*po*itlon6 à arrêter 
d'un commun accord en consequence de ces déclarations. 
La discueeioa portera également sur les mesures qui 
seraient à prendre pour faciliter aux gouvernements ayrien 
et libanais l'exercice de* mission* de maintien dë l'ordre 
qui leur Incombent. 
Accord Ho. g 
Le gouvernement provisoire de la république française 
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et le gouveraernent de ga Majeete Aaaa le Boyaume-Uni, 
a^aat ezamln^ la altuatloo dans le Moyaa-Orleat, 
deblareot qa'll# *ont aalme* de la meae lateatlon de faire 
ee qui ddpemd d'esz pour que eoit aeaurdé àu% paya oôn-
8ide%da et pour que aoit reepeetee l*Imae&ea6noe qui leur 
a fte promise. 
Lee deux go*verBe*eate eoaviemaeat qu'il eat de leur 
iatdrét mutel de favorieyr, #a eollaboratloa avec d'autres 
gouveraemeata, la proaperitë^ ëeoaomiqu# de# peuplee de 
oette rdgioa daae la paix et la eeeuritd. Ils proedderoat 
auz eohaagae d'iaformatiea leur permettaat d'dViter les 
divergeaces de politique qui eeraie&t euseeptibles de oom-
promettre leurs iatdrets mutuels, 
Les deux gouTeraemeats affirmeat leur iateation de ae 
rlea eatrepreadre pour ae substituer au% iatdrdts qu^ils 
#e reooaaaisseat mutuellemeat dans le Moyea-Orieat, oompte 
pleiaement teau du atatut politique des paye en eause. 
C'est daas eet esprit^qu'ils eiamiaeroat toute propo-
sitioa qui serait soumîee a l'organisation des Natloas 
unies au sujet de la seeurîté collective. 
Lebaneae Bote to fr&aoe of 9 Jaouary 1946 
Le Liban, qal a eoatrlbw^ a l'effort eommun de guerre 
ea mettant, notamment, agn territoire & la disposition dee 
Troupee Allle&a. a demand^* maintes reprîmes le retrait de 
ses Troupee après la Tletoire ear le# l'A%e, 
Le pfinelpa de l'dvaeuatloa vient d*ëtre ddcld^ par 
lee deux PuÈaaanoea dont le* Tronpee atationnent apqpre en 
8yr^# et an Liban# et aa# date tre* repproohde a ete envia-
.aedé poar aa #lae à aadautlon ainei qu'il eat prdvu dan* 
l*Aaaord aonalu par eee deoz Puiaeanoe* et qu'elle# ont 
notlfia'au Gouveroaant libanai* le 18 D$a#mbre 1945, 
Le Qoùvermament libaaal» n*eut pa# manqué d*ezprlmer 
#a aatiafaetioa d* eette meamre al elle n*avalt dtdconpue 
en des termes et subordonnée d dea eondltiona qui ne con­
cordent pa# avec le principe d^abll, 
C'est alnal que, suivant l'Accord, de* eïdmenta de 
troupes dtren^&zea se retireront due territoire syrien pour 
se regrouper au Liban, juaqu*au moment ou l'Organisation 
des Nations Unies aura atatud' sur le dispositif de la aë^url-
td collective* 
Le Gouvernement libanais a imme&iatement fait connaître 
au Ministre de Grande Bretagne et au représentant de la 
France au Liban, qu'etcnt tierce partie au regard de l'AC-
Gord, il ne pouvait (qw) aa reeonnaitre le* stipulation# de 
nature à porter attahte aux droits et aua Intdrfte du Liban, 
Le Qoavernamant libanais a protesté et proteste en par­
ticulier contre toute violation par l'Accord franco-
britannique, des dlapositiona du Pacte des Nations Unies. 
Il ne peut laisser passer sans les relever, lea termes 
"IntdrëtB" et "responsabilités" mentionne^ dans l'Accord 
et que rienc ne aaurait justifier. 
Le Gouvernement libanais, gouvernement d'un paya inde^ 
pendant et souverain, se declare seul responsable du main­
tien de la sdkuritf sur aon territoire. De mÂae il aasum# 
seul et 11 entend assurer entièrement la protection des In­
térêts lëg&tlmea de tous les étrangers admis à ad^ourner au 
Liban. 
Sous les réserves ausdltea. le Gouvernement libanais 
prend note que la prlnclp* de l'évacuation de aon territoire 
est d/finitiTemeût établi et accepte. Il en demanda l*ap-
plicatlOB iBtdgrale et Imad^late. Il renouvelle l'ezpree-
alon de a@ volonté de cooperation au maintien de la justice 
et de la sécurité' Internationale. 
Beyrouth, le 9 janvier 1946 
15 Ô 
Traaslatloa of the letter to the Secretery-0eneral from 
the""Ëêmës of the Lebanese amd Syrian l5éle^âtlQS8. 
lon&on, England 
February 4, 1948 
To Mr, Trygve lie 
Seeretary-General 
The United Natlone 
(Salutation omitted In document) 
Freneh and British troops are still being maintained 
In Syria and the Lebanon, although hostilities «ere ended 
many montbe ago. 
The presence of theae troops, whloh eonatitutea a 
grave Infringment of the aoverelgnty of t#o State* members 
of the United Katlone, may give rise to eeriou* diaputea. 
The past haa Ghoma that some of these troops have been a 
constant menaee to peace and security in this region. 
The GoveroÈemts of Syria and the Lebanon expected that 
these foreign troops #OBld be mithdramn Immediately upon 
the ceaaatlon of hostilities *lth Germany and Japan, and as 
a result of the representations these Qovernments have made 
unceasingly to that end. But on 13 December 1945, they 
#ere notified of a Franco-British agreement, of which *e 
reproduce the folloming extract: 
"The program of evacuation #111 be dravn up In 
saeh a way that it #111 ensure the maintenance In the 
Levant of sufficient forces to guarantee security, 
until such time as the United Rktlone Organization 
has decided on the organization of collective security 
In this zone. 
"Until these arrangements have been carried out, 
French Govermmnt #111 retain forces regrouped in the 
Lebanon. 
This agreement, accordingly, makes the #ithdra#al of 
foreign troops subject to conditions mhloh are Inconsistent 
with the spirit and letter of the United Mations Charter. 
Therefore, since the t#o Contracting Foners have them­
selves referred, in the aforesaid agreement, to the United 
;7 
Nations» the Syrian and lebaaeae delegations, acting on the 
InatruotlOBs of their Governments, have tie honour, in ao-
oordanoe «1th Article 34 of the Charter* to bring this dis­
pute to the attention of the Security Council end to request 
it to adopt a decision recommending the total and simultane­
ous evacuation of the foreign troops from the territories of 
Syria and the Lebanon. 
They are ready to aselet the Security Council by supply­
ing it #lth all relevant information for the purpose. 
(Signed) 
H. Frangie 
Head of the Lebanese Delegation 
(Signed) 
P. Khourl 
Head of the Syrian Delegation 
Letter from Sir Aiezaaaer Cadogaa to the Iresldent of the 
Security ̂ 'Couacil oj^ ifay 1"» '1046. 
Tour Eioelleacy, 
On iDGtruotlons from cy GoTernment I have the Honour 
to requeet you to bring the follovlng to the attention of 
the Security Gouaoll. 
Cn 16 February at the close of the Security Council'* 
dlsousaloB regarding the «Ithdr&sal of forelg# trooc# from 
the Levant States, a vote *&B taken on the following rea-
olutloB which «88 preeenteâ by the United States represent-
atlve: 
"The Security Council, taking note of statements 
made by the four parties and by other members of the 
Council, ezpresaes Its confidence that foreign troops 
la Syria and Lebanon *111 be withdrawn as soon as 
practicable and that negotiations to that end Bill be 
undertaken by the parties without delay; and requests 
the parties to Inform It of the results of the negot­
iations.* 
Although the Council's vote In favour of this res­
olution had no legal validity the United Kingdom represent­
ative uadertook to give effect to the majority decision of 
the Council as expressed In It. Accordingly, His Majesty's 
Government, who had likewise agreed to act In accordance 
with the majority opinion of the Gounoll, sent a military 
delegation to Paris to agree on the necessary arrangements. 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom now has 
the honour to Inform the member* of the Security Council 
that the following arrangeaents were then made for the with­
drawal of British troops; 
1. All British troop* (were) to be withdrawn from Syria 
by 30 April. The withdrawal was actually carried out in 
advance of this date and was completed by 15 April* 
2. The first thousand British troops (were) to be with­
drawn from the Lebanon with a similar number of Frenoh 
troops by 51 March* Thle mcve&ent wa* carried out by the 
mentioned. 
i: " 
3. The remainder of British troops, except for e small 
liquidation party, (was) to be withdrawn from the Lebanon by 
SO June. 
4, This plan was duly ooamunlceted to the Syrien and 
Labanese Governments, who have suggested no oodlfloatlona. 
I have the honour to be Your Ezoellency's Obedient Servant, 
(Signed) 
A. Cadogan 
Telegram froffi the Syrlan Premier and Mlnlater for Foreign 
Affairs to the Secretary^Qeccral ot the l9 Kây IM6. 
HI* Ezeellenoy the President of the Security Council 
Re* York 
At the EBrd sitting of the Security Council held at London 
on Saturday the 16 Febrmry 1946 for discussing the ques-
tlon of the #ithdrs#al of foreign troops from the Syrian and 
Lebanese territories the United States representative pre­
sented to the Council the following resolution: 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKING NOTE OF STATEMEÏM'S mng BY THE 
FOUR PARTIES AND BY 0TB2R MEMBERS OF TgE COUKCIL EXPRESSES 
ITS CONFIDENCE THAT FOREIW TROOPS IN SYRIA ARD THE LEBANON 
WILL BE WITHDRAWN A3 SOON AS T-RACTICABLE AM) THAT NEGOTIA­
TIONS TO THAT 3ND WILL BE UNDZRT^JKEN BY TARTIES WITHOUT DE­
LAY AND BFOUESTS PARTIES TO INFORM IT OF THE RESULTS CF TE2 
NEGOTIATIONS. 
Although thl* resolution had no legal validity in vie# of 
paragraph 3 of the 2?th Article of the charter it got the 
approval of the majority of the members of the Security 
Council among shorn sere the representatives of the United 
Kingdom and France sho undertook to give effect to it. 
The Syrian Government hss the honour to inform the members 
of the Security Council that the evacuation of the foreign 
troops from the Syrian territory in compliance with the 
proposal of the delegate of the United, States of America 
has been accomplished during the first two weeks of April 
1946. 
Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Saadallah 11 Jeblri 
Letter fro* Ambassador H# Bonset to the President of the 
Security Counoil of May 3# léiè. 
Re% York 
50 April 1946 
To Sis Kzoellency 5&fe% Pasha, 
President of the Security Council, 
Buster College, 
Re* York. 
31r, 
I have the honour to send you here# 1th a eommumioa-
tloa from my Government relating to the results of nego­
tiations regarding the #ithdra#ai of French troops from 
Syria and the Lebanon* 
I should be grateful if you would bring this docu-
ment to the knovledgs of the delegates to the Security 
Council* 
I have the honour to remain, etc. 
(Signed) S. Bonnet 
Baolosare: To lette? on page 161 
At Its meeting In London on 16 February 1946, «hen It 
oonsiaered the presence of foreign troops In Syria and the 
Lebanon, the Security Council eae aeked to vote on the fol-
lowing motion submitted by the United States delegate: 
"The Security Gogneil takes note of the etatemente made 
by the foar parties end by the other members of the Council; 
ezpreaeee Ite confidence that the foreign troops in Syria 
and the Lebanon #111 be *ithdra#a me eoon ae practicable, 
and that Begotietione to that end «ill be undertaken by the 
parties without delay; and requests the parties to inform 
it of the results," 
Although the vote taken on thi# motion did not of it-
self carry any legal force, the French Government immed­
iately declared that it mould abide by the decisions of the 
majority. In fulfillment of this umdertaklng it has the 
honour to bring to the knowledge of the mKabere of the 
Security Council that &e negotiations undertaken with the 
various parties concerned have resulted in an agreement, 
the terms of ehich are stated below: 
(1) AS regar&s Syria the French Oov«nment and the 
British Government have jointly made the necessary arrange­
ments so that the evacuation of Syrian territory may be 
fully carried out by 30 April 1946. 
(S) Ae regards the Lebanon there took place, in 
pursuance of conversations between French and British 
experts, conversations in Paris with the Lebanese Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who accepted the Invitation to Paris 
extended to him by the French Miniater for Foreign Affairs 
at the end of the 61«eussions in the Security Council, 
#lth a view to exploring with him the mêthod most likely 
to result In en agreement between the two Governments in 
accordance with the notion of the Council. 
In accordance #ith these conversations the French 
Government, by a note dated 19 March, Informed the Lebanese 
Government that the time limite reoomownded by the military 
experts could be brought appreciably closer if the Lebanese 
Government for its part undertook to grant the French 
command in the Levant the full support of the public 
services and of the Lebanese Army for the transport, 
guarding, and embarkation of material. At the same time 
the French Government asked the Lebanese Government to 
agree to the setting up of a joint Franco-Lebanese military 
staff. 
In the eveat of the Lebanese Oovernment's agreeing to 
promlae Its full support In this oonneetlon the French 
Qoveriment stated that, for Its part* It «as ready to re-
due® the time limits previously contaaplated In the fol-
lo#lng manner. The withdrawal of French troops as a %hole 
from the Lebanon could be completed by 31 August 1946. 
Prom 31 Au;?ust to 31 December 1946 the French Government 
would retain In the Lebanon only a group of thirty officers 
and approzlmately three hundred technicians In order to en­
sure control over and transport of material; the departure 
of thes# last mentioned elements would ^ve to take place 
not later than 31 December. Lastly, In order to meet a 
Bleh eipressed by the Lebanese Governments, the French 
Government etressed- Its desire to ensure the withdrawal of 
the bulk of fighting forces before 50 June 1946. 
The Lebanese minister for Foreign Affaire Informed the 
French Government on 21 March that these proposals were 
acceptable to hie Government. Be undertook, further, to 
make available to the French command the full co-operation 
of public servleea and of the Lebanese army for the technl-
oal operations In connection with embarkation. 
In pursuance of tbla agreement the French and Lebanese 
Minister# for Foreign Affairs ezchanged letters on 23 March 
1946, the text of which has been published In the press, 
noting the happy outcome of the negotiations recommended to 
the parties in the resolution proposed to the Security 
Council on 19 February. 
Letter from the Mlalster of Ltbanoa In Waablngtoa, D. C 
Io 'the ''SmoreGry^enera 1 of June 20$ " 
Legation of Lebanon 
Waablngton, D, C, 
12 June 1946 
Mr, Secretary-General: 
I have the honoar to tran&mlt to you hereelth a 
letter from Ble Zzeellenoy the Minister of Foreign 
Affaire of Lebanon, together elth the tezt of t*o let­
ter* ezohanged heteeen the Mlnleter of foreign Affaire 
of Lebanon and the Mlnleter of foreign Affairs of France. 
I have the horour to be, eto, 
(Signed) Dr. Charles Malik 
Mlnleter of Lebanon 
Kr. Trygve Lie, 
Seeretary-General of the Dnlte4 Ration* 
Eaolosure: To letter on page 16& 
Republic of Lebanon 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Tolltloal Department 
Beyrouth, 9 Kay 1946 
Mr. Seoretary-Qenéral: 
Further to the communioatlon addreased on 27 
February 194G to the General Secretariat of the United 
Rations by the Ghairwan of the Lebanese and Syrian del-
egAtlone, and in accordance *lth tbe reaolutlon proposed 
by tbe Delegate for tbe United Statea of America, to 
which the Brltlah and French Governments have adhered 
notwithstanding the veto of the Delegate for the Union 
of Socialist soviet Republics, I have the honour to in­
form you that negotiations have been undertaken between 
Mr. Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister, and myself 
*ith a vie# to determining tbe forms of evacuation of 
French troops from Lebanon. 
Those negotiations have resulted in an agreement 
established by an exchange of letters dated S3 March 
1946, 
The Lebanese GovermMnt is satisfied *ith the out­
come of the said negotiations end has decided to inform 
the Security Council thereof. 
In these clroumstances I have the honour to submit 
to you the text of the two letters m%ehang#d and to re­
quest you to communicate them to the Security Council. 
I have the honour to be, etc. 
(Signed) 
Hamid Frangle 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Mr. Trygve Lie, 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
Bnolosure: To letter on page 164 
Republic of Franoe 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Pairs, 23 March 1946 
K. le WlGlstre, 
I had the honour to inform you on 19 March that as 
a reeult of the oonferenoe of Freoob and British military 
experts ehloh took place im Parle from 2*6 March# the 
French Military Headquarters fiied 1 April 1947 as the 
date by *blch, In vie* of the liaited facilities locally 
available tD the Freneh High Command in the Levant, the 
%ithdra«al of all the French troope stationed in Lebanon 
could be completed, 
I informed you at the aame time that it might be 
poselble to shorten and modify this time-limit, if addi­
tional resources and facilities could be made available 
to the French High Command by the Lebanese Government. 
It is for this reason that I asked you for the aid 
and co-operation(f your Government under the conditions 
which #e agreed upon, and I indicated to you at the same 
time the modifications which might in consequence be 
made in the evacuation plan. 
On 21 Kerch you were good enough to inform me that 
your Government had agreed to the proposals which I had 
made to you. It follows there from that: 
A. The Lebanese Government undertakes to grant to the 
French Elgh Command in the Levant the following assistance: 
1. By the public services, the co-operation of the 
gendarmerie, of the police and of the administrative 
organs and the provision to the French High Command 
of such contingents of workers as the French Military 
authorities might need for the maintenance, trans-
shlpment and embarkation of material; 
1 
2. By the Lebaaeae ar&y, the aupply of aeceasary ma­
terial, of a certain amount of labor, of specialized 
teams, and the provision, at the request of the 
Frenoh authorities, of all guard service that It might 
be asked for. 
3. The attaohmeat of Lebanese officers to a joint 
franco-Lebanese Military staff for the purpose of aid­
ing the t^o High Commands and keeping them Informed on 
the progress of evacuation opération*. 
B. On the basis of the adherence of the Lebanese Govern­
ment to the programme set forth In the three fore-going 
paragraphs, the French Government, for Its o*n part, under­
takes to adopt the folloelqg evacuatlOD programme. 
(a) subject to the provisions contained In r&rsareph 
(b) beloo^ the *lthdra*al from Lebanon of the French 
troops as a *hole shall be concluded on 31 August 
1946, by which date all auxiliary units *111 have been 
dissolved; 
(b) Prom 31 August 1946 to 31 December 1946, the 
French Government shall be empoigered to maintain in 
Lebanon a group of 30 offlcere and about 300 techni­
cians for the parpos# of supervising control and 
transport of material. The departure of these lat­
ter units *111 be effected by 31 December at the 
latest. 
C. In response to the vlshes ezpressed by the Lebanese 
Government, the French Government ezpresses Its desire 
to effect the *ithdra#al of the bulk of the Combatant 
troops by 31 June 1946. It *111 devolve upon the joint 
Pranco-Lebeaese staff to propose the Preaeh High Command, 
having regard to material conditions and to the progress 
of operations, appropriate measures for the implementation 
of such a programme.* 
I should be obliged to you if you mould kindly confirm 
that the Lebanese Governmeat agrees to the reciprocal obli­
gations of our two Goveramants as set forth la the present 
letter. 
I have the honour to be, etc. 
(Signed) Georgp Bidault 
Minister of foreign Affairs 
Eaoloaure: To letter on page 164 
Bepabllo of Lebanon 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
folltioal Departoent 
Parie, 23 March 1946 
M. le Mi&ietre, 
In your letter of today's date you «ere kind enough 
to state the follomiqg: 
I had the honour to inform yom on 19 March that aa 
a result of the oonferenoe of French and British military 
experts ahich took place in Taris from 2-6 March, the 
French Military Headquarters fized 1 April 1947 as the 
date by «hlch, in vie* of the limited facilities locally 
available to the French High Command in the Levant, the 
*ithdra*el of all the French troops stationed in Lebanon 
could be completed, 
I informed you at the same time that it sight be 
possible to shorten aad modify this time-limit, if addi­
tional resources and facilities could be made available 
to the French High Command by the Lebanese Government. 
It is for this reason that I asked you for the aid 
and co-operation of your Government under the conditions 
which «e agreed upon, and I indicated to you at the same 
time the modifications «hich might in consequence be 
mode in the evacuation plan* 
On 21 March you «ere good enough to inform me that 
your Government had agreed to the proposals *hl&h 1 had 
made to you. It follo«s there from that: 
A. The Lebanese Government undertakes to grant to the 
French High Command in the Levant the following assistance: 
1. by the public services, the co-operation of the 
gendarmerie, of the police and of the administrative 
organs and the provision to the French Hi^ Command 
of such contingents of «orkers as the french Mili­
tary authorities might need for the maintenance, 
trans-shipment and embarkation of material; 
2. by the Lebaoeee army, t&e supply of ^cesaary 
material, of a certain amount of labor, of special­
ized teams, and t&e provision, at the request of the 
Preneh authorities, of ell guard eerYlcee that It 
ml&ht be asked for. 
3. the attachment of Lebanese officers to a joint 
Franoo-lebanese Military staff for the purpose of 
aiding the tvo High Commenda and keeping them In­
formed An the progress of evacuation operations. 
B. Cn the beals of the adherence of t^e Lebanese Govern­
ment to the programme set forth In the three fore-going 
par&grsphs, the French Government, for Its own part, un­
dertakes to adopt the following evacuation programme. 
(a) aubjeot to the provisions contained In paragraph 
(bj belo*, the withdrawal fr.pm Lebanon of the French 
troopa as a whole shall be ccncluded on 31 August 
1946, by which date al] auilllery unite will have 
been dlseolved; 
(b) from 31 Aur^at 1946 to 31 December 1946, the 
French Government shall be empowered to malrteln In 
Lebanon a group of 30 officers and about 300 tech­
nicians for the purpose of supervising control and 
transport of material. The departure of these lat­
ter units will be effected by 51 December at the 
lateat. 
C. In r aponse to the glahes ezpreaaed by the Lebanese 
Government, the French Government eipressea Ita desire 
to effect the withdrawal of the bulk of the Coabatant 
troops by SI June 1946. It will devolve upon the joint 
Franco-Lebanese *taff to propose the French High Command, 
having regard to material conditions and to the progress 
of operations, appropriate measurea for the Implementation 
of such G programe." 
I have t e honour to confirm to you the approval by 
the Lebanese Government of the reciprocal engagements un­
dertaken by our two governments as set forth la the above 
letter, 
I have the honour to be, etc. 
(Signed) HamldFrangle 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
